The Juridical People

Author(s):  
Joel Colón-Ríos

This chapter argues that to the extent that a constituent assembly is not a sovereignty entity but a means for the exercise of constituent power, it can be subject to substantive limits arising from a constituent mandate. Part I of the chapter examines the place of the imperative mandate in contemporary constitutional change. Part II analyses the extent to which ‘the people’, understood as a juridical entity, could be said to engage in constituent action through an electoral exercise. It examines whether, during an episode of constitutional change, the electorate necessarily acts as a state organ (a view exemplified in the work of a number of constitutional theories as well as in some judicial decisions). In answering that question in the negative, the chapter develops a distinction between constitutional and constituent referendums. Part III explores the process that led to the convocation of the Venezuelan Constituent Assembly of 1999. In that process, the court recognized the electorate’s right to convene an extraordinary constitution-making body through a referendum that took place outside of the established amendment rule. However, the constituent mandate contained in the referendum’s question was transgressed by the assembly, which assumed sovereign authority. The courts, relying on the theory of constituent power, later sanctioned that transgression.

Author(s):  
Joel Colón-Ríos

This chapter develops a distinction between sovereignty and constituent power. It argues that when distinguished from constituent power, sovereignty appears not as a constitution-making force, but as the ability to create any legal content without being subject to the separation of powers. A sovereign, in this sense, is best understood as an individual or entity who enjoys an uncontrollable jurisdiction to transform its will into law. The exercise of constituent power, in contrast, only involves a constitution-making authority; it can only produce constitutional norms. Part I examines Jellinek’s conception of constituent power, which he developed in the context of his discussion of the theory of the organ. In his work, constituent power usually appears as an extra-legal force, inseparable from the notion of an omnipotent law-maker. Part II contrasts that conception with that of Carré de Malberg, who tried to avoid the risks of a constitution-maker attributed with the totality of political power by conceiving the nation as a sovereign entity that could only act and will through state organs who never enjoyed sovereign authority. Part III argues that it is in Schmitt’s work where the distinction between sovereignty and constituent power (between sovereignty and sovereign dictatorship) appears more clearly. Part IV considers examples of entities that, in the 20th and 21st centuries, have understood themselves as the means for the exercise of constituent power and have assumed sovereign authority. The emphasis will be on the Colombian Constituent Assembly of 1991 and in the Venezuelan Constituent Assembly of 2017.


Author(s):  
Joel Colón-Ríos

This chapter introduces the topic of the book. It provides some initial examples of the roles constituent power has played in justifying or limiting political action. It also examines the two main ways in which constituent power has been understood by constitutional theorists: as an extra-legal constitution-making force that always escapes constitutionalization (i.e. original constituent power), and as a substantively unlimited constitution-making authority (i.e. derived constituent power) that can be expressed through a constitution’s amendment rule. It then summarizes the content of each of the subsequent chapters.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Sarah Mead

<p>This paper assesses the democratic legitimacy of the constitution-making processes that brought into being the Constitutions of the Cook Islands and Niue. New Zealand’s role in the decolonisation of its former colonies has generally been seen as quite benign. New Zealand’s status as an external actor however raises questions regarding the effect its influence had on the democratic legitimacy of the respective constitution-making processes. Constituent power theory demands that a constitution is the product of the popular political will; an act of self-determination undertaken by the people, for the people. This paper argues that the existence of external influence in the constitution-making process is not necessarily at odds with this. The democratic legitimacy of the constitution-making process is dependent on the constitution being a manifestation of the people’s constituent power. Insofar as external actors do not displace the people’s constituent power but rather enhances it, there is no reason to exclude such influence; there may even be reason to encourage it. By drawing on New Zealand’s experience in decolonisation, this paper ultimately advances a two-stage model for constitution-making in the context of small, dependent non-self-governing island-states. As on-going political ties with an external state are often sought, the aim of the model is to provide an avenue for that external state to participate in or contribute to the constitution-making process while maintaining the process’ democratic legitimacy.</p>


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-28
Author(s):  
Jacob O. Arowosegbe

Abstract This article revisits the legitimacy question as it touches the Nigerian 1999 Constitution, bringing to the discourse a review and application of pertinent theoretical perspectives on constitution making and constitutional legitimacy. This theoretical and pragmatic approach introduces a refreshing angle to the debate, revealing the paucity of any attempt to ascribe any legitimacy claim to a constitution with a doubtful normative claim and fraudulent attribution of its source and legitimacy to the people. The author finds the consent basis of constitutional legitimacy as most attractive to a divided state like Nigeria, and concludes by advocating the adoption of a blend of the principles of the constituent assembly and post sovereign constitution-making models for the production of a new people-driven and inclusive constitution to meet the needs of the Nigerian people.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Ivan Sage

<p>Democratic government serves two purposes, both requiring that the substantive element of the rule of law be adhered to. A living constitution is required by a government to able to maintain civil society, which is the main occupation of the rule of law and, secondly, the rule of law also vouchsafes rights and freedoms. Hence, the rule of law enforced by the courts is the factor that controls the constitution, and increasingly this includes controlling the government, both the legislature and executive. This paper considers the capacities of democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, in the context of both New Zealand’s unwritten and America’s written constitutions, with the view of locating the constitution making power (constituent power). The power that makes and changes the constitution was originally found with the people, parliament, and the executive. However, a modern formulation of the rule of law that seeks to replace parliamentary supremacy as the ultimate principle of legality appears to be arising. An egalitarian society is becoming the preferred option by all parties. In this context, the constitution making power will be with the vessel that is working towards creating such a society. To that end, the paper recommends a Constitutional Commission for New Zealand that would review legislation for constitutionality, including adherence to the rule of law. The objective of the Constitutional Commission would be to recommend the review of law for constitutionality, including adherence to the rule of law.</p>


Author(s):  
Joel Colón-Ríos

This chapter examines the ways in which the debates about the nature and implications of the theory of constituent power that arose during the French Revolution reappeared in later constituent episodes. It pays particular attention to the electoral rules regulating citizen activity and to the types of constitutional forms that resulted from them. In Part I, the chapter explores the distinction between the constituent power of the people and the constituent power of the nation. From each of these notions, emanate different types of legal and institutional demands on the juridical order. After distinguishing between these two approaches, the chapter examines, in Part II, the ways in which they were (or not) put into practice in the constitution-making process that resulted in the creation of the Spanish Constitution of 1812. Part III focuses on the creation of the Venezuelan Constitution of 1811 and Part IV examines the process that led to the adoption of the Colombian Constitution of 1886. During these three processes, constituent power became an extraordinary constitution-making jurisdiction directed at the identification of the common good, and as a power that could be exercised through mechanisms that excluded important parts of the population.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Ivan Sage

<p>Democratic government serves two purposes, both requiring that the substantive element of the rule of law be adhered to. A living constitution is required by a government to able to maintain civil society, which is the main occupation of the rule of law and, secondly, the rule of law also vouchsafes rights and freedoms. Hence, the rule of law enforced by the courts is the factor that controls the constitution, and increasingly this includes controlling the government, both the legislature and executive. This paper considers the capacities of democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, in the context of both New Zealand’s unwritten and America’s written constitutions, with the view of locating the constitution making power (constituent power). The power that makes and changes the constitution was originally found with the people, parliament, and the executive. However, a modern formulation of the rule of law that seeks to replace parliamentary supremacy as the ultimate principle of legality appears to be arising. An egalitarian society is becoming the preferred option by all parties. In this context, the constitution making power will be with the vessel that is working towards creating such a society. To that end, the paper recommends a Constitutional Commission for New Zealand that would review legislation for constitutionality, including adherence to the rule of law. The objective of the Constitutional Commission would be to recommend the review of law for constitutionality, including adherence to the rule of law.</p>


Author(s):  
Joel Colón-Ríos

This chapter examines two related traditions of thought that reject the existence of an extra-legal constituent power or deprive it of one of its main features. The first of these traditions, the doctrine of the historical or internal constitution, presented a direct challenge to the theory of constituent power. In Spain, the main exponent of this doctrine during the 19th century was Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos, who held that rather than the result of an act of will, constitutions emerged through long historical processes and could not be simply created and recreated. The second (and related) line of attack against the concept of constituent power during the 19th century came from the French and Spanish doctrinaires. The doctrinaires rejected the idea that the people (or any other individual or group) had a right to create new constitutional orders. For them, sovereign authority belonged to reason itself, not to the monarch or the community. The chapter examines the practical implications of these ideas by exploring the debates that took place during the adoption of the Spanish Constitution of 1845.


Author(s):  
Ngoc Son Bui

This chapter investigates the making of Vietnam’s 2013 Constitution. Compared with previous experience in Vietnam and with the experience in the other four socialist countries, the 2013 experience features the local adherence to universal norms in the process and substance of socialist constitutional change. This model of socialist constitutional change is, therefore, characterized as the universal model. The adherence to these universal norms informs and legitimatizes the process of the constitution-making. But, the global norms are contextualized by their intricate interaction with socialist, local elements: the party’s reformist program, legislature’s constituent power, party’s control of participation, and the party’s control of international involvement. Procedurally, the interplay of global and socialist factors results in a more open national constitutional dialogue and a less authoritarian paradigm of constitutional imposition. The three aspects of dissonance (internal to the socialist constitution of Vietnam, between the socialist constitutional ideals and external Vietnamese reality, and between the socialist and global constitutional norms) result in the pragmatic incorporation of universal ideas, principles, and institutions into the socialist Constitution of Vietnam, e.g. people’s constituent power, limited power, and human rights.


Author(s):  
Joel Colón-Ríos

This book examines the place of the concept of constituent power in constitutional history, focusing on the legal and institutional implications that theorists, politicians, and judges have derived from it. It shows that constituent power, even though having historically been associated with extra-legality and violations of the constitutional order, has played important functions in the making of determinations of legal validity. Constitutional courts have employed it to justify their jurisdiction to invalidate constitutional amendments that alter the fundamental structure of the constitution and thus amount to a constitution-making exercise. Some governments have recurred to it to defend the legality of the transformation of the constitutional order through procedures not contemplated in the constitution’s amendment rule but considered participatory enough to be seen as equivalent to ‘the people in action’, and these attempts have sometimes been sanctioned by courts. Commentators and citizens have relied on the theory of constituent power to defend the idea that electors have the right to instruct representatives, and that the creation of new constitutions must take place through extra-legislative entities, such as primary assemblies open to all citizens. Several Latin American constitutions explicitly incorporate the theory of constituent power and allow citizens, acting through popular initiative, to trigger constitution-making episodes that may result in the replacement of the entire constitutional order. Building on these findings, the book ultimately develops a distinction between sovereignty and constituent power and argues that even a constitution-making body can be made legally subject to the conditions arising from a constituent referendum.


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