Eu Fiscal Governance on The Member States: The Stability and Growth Pact and Beyond

Author(s):  
Jean-Paul Keppenne

As explained in the previous chapter, the Maastricht Treaty put in place a mild system of coordination in the area of economic policy, in particular fiscal policy. The Member States keep conducting their fiscal policy, particularly the adoption of budgets and the exercise of taxation power which are at the core of the sovereignty of the states. The Member States thus remain largely sovereign with regard to the conduct of their budgetary policies given that their annual budget, as well as their longer-term fiscal planning are still decided by the national authorities. The Union has no competence to interfere directly in this area acting in place of the national authorities. Notably, no veto right is provided, and the Union could not somehow prevent the adoption of national budgets.

2001 ◽  
Vol 31 (125) ◽  
pp. 637-648
Author(s):  
Hansjörg Herr

The terrorattack hit the western world in a situation of a sharp cyclical downturn in the USA, Europe and Japan. Mainly because of increased uncertainty the downturn will be intensified by the attack. Immediately after the attack US monetary and fiscal policy became even more expansive. In Europe monetary policy reacted very reluctantly. Active fiscal policy in the Euro-area is nearly not existing as the Stability and Growth Pact as well as neo-liberal ideology prevents fiscal measures. The inactive economic policy in the Euro-area is not only dangerous for Europe but also a depressing factor for the world economy.


2006 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Bartholomew Paudyn

Fiscal profligacy poses a high risk to the credibility of Europe common monetary policy and its ultimate objective of price stability. Unfortunately, the aim of preventing fiscally responsible states from being penalized by those with lax budgetary policies via inflationary pressures and interest rates is jeopardized as members breach the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). Moreover, there are major institutional inconsistencies in how states are treated under the current framework as is exemplified by the November 2003 ECONFIN crisis. What is witnessed is an antagonistic relationship between the programmatic and operational dimensions of monetary governance. Does the fact that half the members who have adopted the euro have also breached its rules signal that surveillance as regulation is being displaced as a mode of governance? It calls for a re-imaged spatial-temporal explanation of governance to adequately capture the political economy of EMU. At the core of EMU management are risk and uncertainty based modes of governing. Employing a governmentality approach, I argue that the audit is one prominent style of processing and institutionalizing risk as an aggregate future of monetary activity. By altering the administration and objects of risk governance the audit is perceived as reducing the susceptibility to failure. Hence, it has a performative function that extends beyond simply measuring deficit or debt to GDP performance and acts as a social and institutional process structuring a homogenous set of fiscal practices.


Author(s):  
Ekkehart Reimer

In course of the financial crisis, States have proven to be strong actors. However, they have paid a high price for the demonstration of their power-skyrocketing budgetary deficits as well as an alarming increase of overall public debts. With regard to EU Member States, it is true that EU law has mitigated tendencies towards deficit-spending to a considerable degree and that these merits are due to State Aid rules (Arts. 87 et seq. EC Treaty, now Arts. 107 et seq. TFEU) rather than to the Stability and Growth Pact. Many Member States, however, regard an autonomous reduction of deficits as indispensable and take constitutional measures to restrict their annual deficits and/or overall debts. The article analyses the amendments to the German Grundgesetz as well as accompagnying legislation which have been enacted by the Bundestag and Bundesrat in July 2009 as a „Föderalismusreform II“, a major reconfiguration of the legal rules on public deficits on both the federal level and the level of the 16 Länder (states), and provides an outlook on further steps to be taken in the future.En la crisis financiera los Estados se han mostrado como agentes poderosos. Ahora bien, han pagado un precio muy elevado por esta demostración de su capacidad de acción: un aumento vertiginoso de su nuevo endeudamiento neto y un incremento preocupante de la deuda acumulada. Dentro de la Unión Europea, si bien el Derecho de la Unión ha suavizado en considerable medida la tendencia de los Estados a financiarse mediante déficit, esto se ha debido más a una inteligente aplicación de las normas en materia de ayudas estatales [arts. 87 y 88 del Tratado de la Comunidad Europea (antigua versión), actualmente arts. 107 y 108 del Tratado de Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea] y menos al Pacto de Estabilidad y Crecimiento. No obstante, muchos Estados miembros consideran a la vez indispensable una reducción autónoma del déficit, y están adoptando medidas constitucionales para limitar su nuevo endeudamiento anual y/o su deuda acumulada. El presente trabajo analiza la reforma de la Ley Fundamental alemana y la legislación de acompañamiento que aprobaron el Bundestag y el Bundesrat en julio de 2009 en el marco de la segunda reforma del federalismo (Föderalismusreform II), una reordenación fundamental de la normativa en materia de déficit público, tanto en el ámbito federal como de los dieciséis Estados Federados (Länder), y aporta una visión prospectiva de qué reformas adicionales son necesarias.


Author(s):  
Charlotte Rommerskirchen

This chapter sets the scene for this study by providing historical context and introducing the key aspects, processes, and players of fiscal policy coordination. In so doing it charts key developments of pre-crisis fiscal policy coordination, before turning to the creation of the European crisis agreement, the European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP), and finally the reform packages post-crisis. Despite impressions to the contrary, the procedures for fiscal policy coordination are extensive, albeit enforced and reinforced with little political and legal power. Although there is persistent continuity for some ideas and procedures—the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and its fear of stability free riding chief among them—new innovations and reforms have made inroads.


2002 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-193
Author(s):  
Marco Ciaffi

Abstract Brunila, A. - Buti, M. - Franco, D. (eds), 2001, The Stability and Growth Pact: The Architecture of Fiscal Policy in EMU, New York, Palgrave, pp. 438, hardcover, ISBN<italic/> 0-333-96145-5, US$69.95.


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