The Causes of War

2021 ◽  
pp. 143-154
Author(s):  
Martin Wight

This essay focuses on the various motives of decision-makers responsible for state policy. While smaller and weaker powers often choose to capitulate to threats, states prepared to use force have been inspired by distinct combinations of motives. These have included winning independence, imposing domination, promoting allegiance to an ideology, gaining economic advantages, and resisting the rise to supremacy of a political-military competitor. Fear of the loss of security and autonomy may lead to preventive war or intervention to maintain a favourable balance of power. While leaders as prominent as Napoleon and Bismarck have referred to deterministic models of causation in some circumstances, ‘the motive of mutual fear’ may predominate. Compared to their important role in medieval litigation, irredentist wars intended to settle legal and territorial claims have become vestigial, but they may be regarded as modern versions of wars for rights.

2021 ◽  
pp. 155-172
Author(s):  
Martin Wight

This paper analyses the three causes of war identified by Thucydides and his most eminent translator, Thomas Hobbes. Looking beyond the circumstantial occasions through which wars begin, the chief motives of belligerents have been to pursue material gains, to respond to fears, and to obtain glory and prestige for a doctrine. Wight calls ‘simple Thucydidean fear … the prime motive in international politics’ because it involves ‘a rational apprehension of contingent evil’, not simply ‘some unreasoning emotion’. Wight discusses how fear may be a cause of preventive war, and he labels the great difficulty of building trust between former adversaries ‘the Hobbesian predicament’. Wight defines this predicament as follows: ‘communities of honest and decent men, when they have suffered a long series of mutual injuries, and have a rational apprehension each that its own existence is at stake, and when moreover they live in inescapable juxtaposition, cannot transpose themselves into an attitude of mutual trust’. He also explores the tension between freedom and necessity: the circumstances at hand may seem to be tractable, with choices available between possible decisions and their likely consequences; yet the factors leading to war may prove inescapable.


Author(s):  
Julieta Suarez-Cao

Intergovernmental relations in Latin America present a varied sample of both institutional determinants and actual dynamics. Constitutional structures regulate whether countries have a federal or a unitary system of territorial distribution of power and stipulate the territorial levels of government. Thus, constitutions structure the number of vertical and horizontal intergovernmental relations. Actual dynamics, however, depend on policy prerogatives that establish subnational authority vis-à-vis the national administration. These prerogatives, usually understood in terms of power, responsibilities, and resources, shape the territorial balance of power within a country. Power, responsibilities, and resources can be combined to apprehend the degree of authority in the hands of regional governments. Such authority is analytically organized into two dimensions: the regional power of self-rule and the power to share rule with national decision makers. This distinction helps to explain that the trend toward increasing regional authority is mostly a product of decentralization and devolution politics that have enhanced self-rule, rather than reforms that advance the shared rule dimension. Nevertheless, neither constitutional structures nor new regional policy prerogatives are the only determinants of the dynamics of intergovernmental relations. Informal institutions, such as subnational coalitions and local political clientelism, are particularly relevant to understanding the actual balance of power between national and subnational governments and among subnational arenas.


1986 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy J. McKeown

If a “structural” theory is one that purports to explain behavior in terms of environmental conditions and that largely eschews analysis of the internal processes of decision makers, then it is difficult to identify a theory of commercial policy which is not “structural.” Most microeconomic theory is structural; so are most balance-of-power theories. In the realm of theories of commercial policy, hegemonic stability theories as well as some recently developed theories of international tariff levels fit this description. In the latter category Judith Goldstein's work, which attempts to account for American commercial policy in terms of the ideology of American central decision makers, and Charles Kindleberger's ambitious sketch of a general theory of 19th-century tariff changes in terms of the diffusion of liberal ideology constitute lonely examples of nonstructural research strategies.


1966 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 474-502 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dina A. Zinnes

The origin of wars is to be found … in the minds … of men,” said Frederick S. Dunn in the course of his argument that the United Nations should improve educational opportunities and raise living standards throughout the world. Such reforms, he believed, would alleviate ignorance and mass dissatisfaction, two of the principal causes of war. But Dunn's statement, in the light of recent research, also lends itself to a totally different interpretation.


1996 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 347-357 ◽  
Author(s):  
Helga Drummond

The term ‘risk management’ implies that risk is something which can be quantified, predicted and controlled. This paper seeks to demonstrate the limits of this assumption where complex projects are involved. The argument is based upon a case study of a failed £80 million IT venture known as Taurus. Analysis focuses upon the relationship between politics and the assumption of risk. Acceptance of risk, it is argued, is ultimately determined by the balance of power between decision makers. Moreover, risk analysis and other techniques of management may actually compound the difficulties by fostering an illusion of control and escalation. The implications for project management are discussed.


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-152
Author(s):  
Dogachan Dagi

AbstractThe Ottoman alliance politics before the Great War has not been explored for theorizing alliance politics though it presents a unique example of alliance formation under external threat. Thus, in this article, a neo-realist balance of threat theory is utilized to examine the Ottoman decision to align with Germany in the Great War. Unlike a historical account as to why the Ottomans sided with the German-Austrian alliance, this article develops a theoretical approach that takes insights from ‘alliance theories’ to explain the Ottomans’ fateful alignment. Such an alliance theory approach underlines the dilemmas of the Ottoman decision makers and demonstrates ‘rational’ elements of their strategy of balancing the main source of the threat. By bringing alliance theories and Ottoman historiography together it is argued that the Ottomans, in their search for an alliance before the Great War, sought a “balance of threat” politics rather than a “balance of power” politics.


Author(s):  
John J. Mearsheimer

This chapter examines why states pursue power from the perspective of structural realism. It considers a body of realist theories that argue that states have deep concern for the balance of power and compete among themselves either to gain power at the expense of others, or at least to make sure they do not lose power. This competition for power makes for a dangerous world where states sometimes fight each other. There are, however, important differences among structural realists. The chapter first explains why states want power and how much power they want before discussing the causes of war. These theoretical issues are illuminated with a case study that assesses whether China can rise peacefully according to offensive realism vs. defensive realism. Along the way, concepts such as the security dilemma, offence–defence balance, central war, buck-passing, unipolarity, bipolarity, and multipolarity, and deterrence are analysed.


Author(s):  
John J. Mearsheimer

This chapter examines why states pursue power from the perspective of structural realism. It considers a body of realist theories that argue that states have deep concern for the balance of power and compete among themselves either to gain power at the expense of others, or at least to make sure they do not lose power. This competition for power makes for a dangerous world where states sometimes fight each other. There are, however, important differences among structural realists. The chapter first explains why states want power and how much power they want before discussing the causes of war. These theoretical issues are illuminated with a case study that assesses whether China can rise peacefully according to offensive realism vs. defensive realism. Along the way, concepts such as the security dilemma, offence–defence balance, central war, buck-passing, unipolarity, bipolarity, and multipolarity, and deterrence are analysed.


1987 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 387-419 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emerson M. S. Niou ◽  
Peter C. Ordeshook

2014 ◽  
Vol 219 ◽  
pp. 670-692 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chin-Hao Huang ◽  
Patrick James

AbstractDebates about whether China's rise poses a threat or an opportunity for Taiwan have settled into a realist assumption that Beijing will continue to upset the balance of power and a liberal approach that believes the benefits of economic interdependence are leading to greater gains. Missing from this debate is a nuanced consideration of how Taiwan's policy elites view themselves and their position in cross-Strait relations. Taiwan's decision makers' views are deeply affected by, and interact with, factors and institutions on and beyond the island. This article offers a model of political processes – the staying power of the status quo and order of movement – as a possible route towards an explanation for Taiwan's position on cross-Strait negotiations. The conclusion is that the status quo position – de facto but not de jure independence – is becoming more entrenched with time. Taiwan's colours of partisanship, Blue and Green, are blending into Aquamarine.


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