Thomas of Sutton’s Intellectualist Doctrine of the Will’s Self-Motion
Thomas Aquinas famously draws a distinction between a potency in the will to the specification of its act and a potency in the will to the exercise of its act. He also thinks that the will is moved to the specification of its act by the good apprehended by reason and to the exercise of its act by itself. Although Aquinas’s distinction has many attractive features, his explanation of how the will moves itself to the exercise of its act (namely, by moving reason) is not adequate; it does not really explain how the will’s potency to the exercise of its act is actualized. I argue that, by distinguishing between three modes of self-motion, effective, accidental, and consecutive, and two types of potency, essential and accidental, the early Oxford Thomist Thomas of Sutton (ca. 1250–1315) presents a plausible development of Aquinas’s distinction that addresses this problem; the will, by willing some end, actualizes its accidental potency to willing some means to that end, thereby moving itself consecutively. Although I think that Sutton does give us the means to clear up some of the confusion surrounding Aquinas’s view on the will, I also motivate some doubts about whether he really succeeds in preserving what makes Aquinas’s distinction so attractive in the first place.