scholarly journals Third-party punishers do not compete to be chosen as partners in an experimental game

2022 ◽  
Vol 289 (1966) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tommaso Batistoni ◽  
Pat Barclay ◽  
Nichola J. Raihani

Third-party punishment is thought to act as an honest signal of cooperative intent and such signals might escalate when competing to be chosen as a partner. Here, we investigate whether partner choice competition prompts escalating investment in third-party punishment. We also consider the case of signalling via helpful acts to provide a direct test of the relative strength of the two types of signals. Individuals invested more in third-party helping than third-party punishment and invested more in both signals when observed compared to when investments would be unseen. We found no clear effect of partner choice (over and above mere observation) on investments in either punishment or helping. Third-parties who invested more than a partner were preferentially chosen for a subsequent Trust Game although the preference to interact with the higher investor was more pronounced in the help than in the punishment condition. Third-parties who invested more were entrusted with more money and investments in third-party punishment or helping reliably signalled trustworthiness. Individuals who did not invest in third-party helping were more likely to be untrustworthy than those who did not invest in third-party punishment. This supports the conception of punishment as a more ambiguous signal of cooperative intent compared to help.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tommaso Batistoni ◽  
Pat Barclay ◽  
Nichola Raihani

Third-party punishment has been hypothesised to act as an honest signal of cooperative intent. Previous theoretical and empirical work has shown that individuals might escalate signals of cooperative intent when there is competition to be chosen as a partner. Here, we investigate the hypothesis that competition to be chosen as a social partner leads to escalating investment in third-party punishment. In the same scenario, we also consider the case of signalling via helpful acts to provide a direct test of the relative strength of the two types of signals. Investments in third-party helping were higher than investments in third-party punishment – and also exhibited a more robust positive association with audience effects. We did not find a clear effect of partner choice (over and above simply being observed) on either punishment or helping investments. Third-parties who invested more in helping were preferred as partners and were sent more money in a subsequent trust game. Third-party punishers were slightly preferred as interaction partners but less so than third-party helpers. In addition, we found that the amount invested in third-party punishment or helping was a reliable indicator of the individual’s trustworthiness: those who invested more returned a higher proportion of any entrusted amount. Individuals who did not invest in third-party helping were more likely to be untrustworthy, but the same was not true for individuals who did not invest in third-party punishment. This supports the conception of help as a less ambiguous signal of cooperative intent.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Indrajeet Patil ◽  
Nathan Dhaliwal ◽  
Fiery Andrews Cushman

Sometimes people intervene in others’ conflicts—so called “third-party responding”. In some cases, third parties punish perpetrators; in others, they aid victims. Across 22 studies (N > 20,000), we provide a comprehensive examination of the consequences of this choice between punishment and compensation. What do people infer from, and how do they respond to, the choice of punishment versus compensation? We find that compensating victims leads to greater reputational and cooperative benefits than punishing perpetrators. In fact, even people who themselves prefer to punish still prefer social partners who compensate. We also find that the signal that is sent via third-party compensating may be an honest signal of trustworthiness. Furthermore, we find that people accurately anticipate that observers would prefer them to compensate victims than to punish perpetrators and that participants personal decisions about whether to compensate or punish is based in part on the belief that the social norm is to compensate. These findings provide an extensive analysis of the causes and consequences of third-party responding to moral violations.


2018 ◽  
pp. 101
Author(s):  
Rafael Lara González

ResumenPese a su ubicuidad en la práctica contractual, las cláusulas de franquicia han recibido tratamiento incidental en la doctrina. La discusión sobre ellas se ha enfocado en los contratos de seguros de responsabilidad civil, y en la interpretación del artículo 76 de la Ley española de Contrato de Seguro. En este contexto se ha tratado de establecer si el asegurador puede o no oponer la cláusula de franquicia al tercero perjudicado. El presente trabajo analiza la cláusula de franquicia en la obligación principal del asegurador, su naturaleza jurídica, y examina su relación con los terceros perjudicados. La consideración principal a este respecto estará en si nos encontramos ante un seguro obligatorio o ante un seguro voluntario de responsabilidad civil. Palabras clave: Contrato de seguro; Cláusula de franquicia; Terceroperjudicado; Responsabilidad civil.AbstractDespite their ubiquity in contractual praxis, deductible clauses have received only incidental treatment in legal doctrine. Discussion on them has focused on civil liability insurance contracts, and the interpretation of article 76 of the Spanish Law of Insurance Contracts. In this context it has been attempted to establish whether the insurer can invoke the clause to oppose the injured third party's claim. This article examines the deductible clause included in the insurer's main obligation, its legal nature, and its relation to injured third parties. The main consideration in this regard will be whether the insurance contract is of a mandatory or voluntary nature.Keywords: Insurance contract; Deductible clause; Injured third party; Civil liability.


Author(s):  
Ly Tayseng

This chapter gives an overview of the law on contract formation and third party beneficiaries in Cambodia. Much of the discussion is tentative since the new Cambodian Civil Code only entered into force from 21 December 2011 and there is little case law and academic writing fleshing out its provisions. The Code owes much to the Japanese Civil Code of 1898 and, like the latter, does not have a requirement of consideration and seldom imposes formal requirements but there are a few statutory exceptions from the principle of freedom from form. For a binding contract, the agreement of the parties is required and the offer must be made with the intention to create a legally binding obligation and becomes effective once it reaches the offeree. The new Code explicitly provides that the parties to the contract may agree to confer a right arising under the contract upon a third party. This right accrues directly from their agreement; it is not required that the third party declare its intention to accept the right.


Author(s):  
Sheng-Lin JAN

This chapter discusses the position of third party beneficiaries in Taiwan law where the principle of privity of contract is well established. Article 269 of the Taiwan Civil Code confers a right on the third party to sue for performance as long as the parties have at least impliedly agreed. This should be distinguished from a ‘spurious contract’ for the benefit of third parties where there is no agreement to permit the third party to claim. Both the aggrieved party and the third party beneficiary can sue on the contract, but only for its own loss. The debtor can only set off on a counterclaim arising from its legal relationship with the third party. Where the third party coerces the debtor into the contract, the contract can be avoided, but where the third party induces the debtor to contract with the creditor by misrepresentation, the debtor can only avoid the contract if the creditor knows or ought to have known of the misrepresentation.


Author(s):  
Masami Okino

This chapter discusses the law on third party beneficiaries in Japan; mostly characterized by adherence to the German model that still bears an imprint on Japanese contract law. Thus, there is neither a doctrine of consideration nor any other justification for a general doctrine of privity, and contracts for the benefit of third parties are generally enforceable as a matter of course. Whether an enforceable right on the part of a third party is created is simply a matter of interpretation of the contract which is always made on a case-by-case analysis but there are a number of typical scenarios where the courts normally find the existence (or non-existence) of a contract for the benefit of a third party. In the recent debate on reform of Japanese contract law, wide-ranging suggestions were made for revision of the provisions on contracts for the benefit of third parties in the Japanese Civil Code. However, it turned out that reform in this area was confined to a very limited codification of established case law.


2021 ◽  
pp. 002200272199322
Author(s):  
R. Joseph Huddleston

This paper investigates how violence in self-determination conflicts influences bilateral foreign policy. I argue that a general preference for international stability causes third parties to support self-determination groups when violence reaches high levels, when they gain territorial control, and when major powers officially recognize. In these conditions, third parties perceive a stable new status quo to be nigh: unrecognized statehood. Ongoing instability encourages foreign policy that encourages the development of the de facto state, even when third parties have no intention of recognizing them as states. Importantly, I also show that targeting civilians erodes third-party support of the perpetrating side. I demonstrate these relationships using a latent variable model of international sovereignty of aspiring states, built on bilateral military, diplomatic, and economic exchange data. My model and tests provide new insight into how aspiring state actors become increasingly eligible for recognition through the tacit support of third-party states.


Tunas Agraria ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 53-75
Author(s):  
Dedy Setyo Irawan ◽  
Harvini Wulansari

Abstract: Complete Systematic Land Registration is a program which taken by the government in providing legal certainty in the field of land in Indonesia. PTSL activities at Sidoarjo Regency and Pasuruan Regency Land Office are carried out with third parties. Before starting the measurement, it is necessary to carry out the contradictoire delimitatie principle to ensure legal certainty of ownership of land rights. The research used a qualitative method with a descriptive approach. The data analysis carried out by compiling logically proportional statements to answer research questions. Problem analysis is carried out by making a description based on premier data and secondary data obtained through interviews and observations of implementation. The results of the research showed that the implementation of the contradictoire delimitatie principle is broadly following PP. No. 24 of 1997 and PMNA KaBPN No. 3 of 1997. The results of the study also showed that there were obstacles in the implementation of the contradictoire delimitatie principle, such as the third parties were not following technical guidelines No. 01 / JUKNIS-300/1/2018 annex 10 in the making of measurement drawings. Quality control is needed to improve the quality of work and results of third party products and minimize land problems in the future.Keywords: principle of contradictoire delimitation, third party. Intisari : Pendaftaran Tanah Sistematis Lengkap (PTSL) merupakan langkah pemerintah dalam memberikan jaminan kepastian hukum dalam bidang pertanahan di Indonesia. Kegiatan PTSL di Kantor Pertanahan Kabupaten Sidoarjo dan Kabupaten Pasuruan dilaksanakan bekerjasama dengan Pihak Ketiga yang sebelumnya melalui tahapan asas contradictoire delimitatie untuk menjamin kepastian hukum kepemilikan hak atas tanah. Metode penelitian yang digunakan adalah metode kualitatif dengan pendekatan deskriptif. Teknik analisa yang dilakukan yaitu dengan menyusun pernyataan-pernyataan proposional secara logis untuk menjawab pertanyaan penelitian. Analisa permasalahan dilakukan dengan membuat uraian berdasarkan data premier dan data sekunder yang diperoleh melalui wawancara serta observasi langsung terhadap pelaksanaan kegiatan. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa pelaksanaan asas contradictoire delimitatie secara garis besar telah sesuai dengan PP. No. 24 Tahun 1997 dan PMNA KaBPN No. 3 Tahun 1997. Dalam pelaksanaanya terdapat hambatan yakni  pembuatan Gambar Ukur oleh Pihak Ketiga tidak sesuai dengan pedoman JUKNIS No. 01/JUKNIS-300/1/2018 lampiran 10. Sehingga diperlukan pengawasan kendali mutu terkait pekerjaan dan hasil produk dari Pihak Ketiga agar kedepannya hasil pekerjaan yang dihasilkan lebih baik dan tidak menjadi permasalahan pertanahan dikemudian hari.Kata Kunci : asas contradictoire delimitatie, pihak ketiga.


2011 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jordan Lowe

<span>The expectation gap, and its related effects on auditor legal liability, has been presumed to be caused by diverging perceptions by the auditing profession and third party litigants regarding the professions role, responsibilities, and related performance. Prior research regarding the expectation gap has focused on diverging perceptions of different groups (i.e. financial analysts, bank loan officers, small business owners, and auditors). While this research has identified an expectation gap between auditors and certain third-parties, it has neglected examining the perceptions of judicial litigants. This absence is somewhat ironic given the current auditor legal liability situation. This study fills this void by comparing judges and auditors attitudes toward the auditing profession. Results revealed a large divergence in perceptions of auditors and judges regarding their expectations of the auditing profession.</span>


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaimie Krems ◽  
Keelah Williams ◽  
Douglas Kenrick ◽  
Athena Aktipis

Friendships can foster happiness, health, and reproductive fitness. But friendships end—even when we might not want them to. A primary reason for this is interference from third parties. Yet little work has explored how people meet the challenge of maintaining friendships in the face of real or perceived threats from third parties, as when our friends inevitably make new friends or form new romantic relationships. In contrast to earlier conceptualizations from developmental research, which viewed friendship jealousy as solely maladaptive, we propose that friendship jealousy is one overlooked tool of friendship maintenance. We derive and test—via a series of 11 studies (N = 2918) using hypothetical scenarios, recalled real-world events, and manipulation of on-line emotional experiences—whether friendship jealousy possesses the features of a tool well-designed to help us retain friends in the face of third-party threats. Consistent with our proposition, findings suggest that friendship jealousy is (1) uniquely evoked by third-party threats to friendships (but not the prospective loss of the friendship alone), (2) sensitive to the value of the threatened friendship, (3) strongly calibrated to cues that one is being replaced, even over more intuitive cues (e.g., the amount of time a friend and interloper spend together), and (4) ultimately motivates behavior aimed at countering third-party threats to friendship (“friend guarding”). Even as friendship jealousy may be negative to experience, it may include features designed for beneficial—and arguably prosocial—ends: to help maintain friendships.


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