scholarly journals A generalized cortical activity pattern at internally-generated mental context boundaries during unguided narrative recall

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hongmi Lee ◽  
Janice Chen

AbstractCurrent theory and empirical studies suggest that humans segment continuous experiences into events based on the mismatch between predicted and actual sensory inputs; detection of these “event boundaries” evokes transient neural responses. However, boundaries can also occur at transitions between internal mental states, without relevant external input changes. To what extent do such “internal boundaries” share neural response properties with externally-driven boundaries? We conducted an fMRI experiment where subjects watched a series of short movies and then verbally recalled the movies, unprompted, in the order of their choosing. During recall, transitions between movies thus constituted major boundaries between internal mental contexts, generated purely by subjects’ unguided thoughts. Following the offset of each recalled movie, we observed stereotyped spatial activation patterns in the default mode network, especially the posterior medial cortex, consistent across different movie contents and even across the different tasks of movie watching and recall. Surprisingly, the between-movie boundary patterns were negatively correlated with patterns at boundaries between events within a movie. Thus, major transitions between mental contexts elicit neural phenomena shared across internal and external modes and distinct from within-context event boundary detection, potentially reflecting a cognitive state related to the flushing and reconfiguration of situation models.

2017 ◽  
Vol 41 (S1) ◽  
pp. S631-S631
Author(s):  
N. De Uribe-viloria ◽  
E. Mayor Toranzo ◽  
S. Cepedello Perez ◽  
I. Sevillano Benito ◽  
M. De Lorenzo Calzon ◽  
...  

IntroductionCharles-Bonnet Syndrome (CBS) is a clinical entity characterized for visual hallucinations in patients with severe vision impairment and preserved cognitive state. Its pathogeny is still unknown, limiting management options. For diagnosis neurological and psychiatric disorders must be discarded. Treatment is based in three pillars: explaining to the patient the origin and nature of the symptoms, treating the visual deficit when possible, and pharmacotherapy with anti-psychotics.Objectives and aimsTo outline the main characteristics and etiopathogenic theories of the CBS, so as to improve diagnosis and treatment.MethodsBasing on a case followed in mental health consults, we made a systematic review of the articles published in Medline (PubMed) in the last 5 years, with the following keywords, Charles-Bonnet Syndrome, hallucinations, deafferentation, visual impairment.ResultsWe found that all our case and the reported ones had in common the nature and characteristics of the hallucinations, the presence of a trigger, usually a new medicament, and the functional MRI patrons of activity; those patrons located the loss of input prior to the association cortex, which appeared hyper-excitable in functional MRI.ConclusionsAlthough the aetiology and pathogeny of CBS is still unclear, present data suggests that the key mechanism may be a dysregulation in the homeostatic adaptation of the neural pathway when it is left without external input, traducing a hyper-function of a physiological process, probably mediated by acetylcholine, as opposed with other neuropsychiatric pathologies, in which the cortex is the primary affected area.Disclosure of interestThe authors have not supplied their declaration of competing interest.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Robin Aldridge-Sutton

<p>In the debate over whether free will is compatible with determinism most philosophers on both sides think that folk intuitions are a constraint on philosophical theorising. Most also think that the same criteria are required for free will in all cases. But recent attempts to empirically study folk intuitions about free will appear to show that these two positions cannot be jointly maintained. That is because folk intuitions about free will appear to represent compatibilist and incompatibilist criteria for free will in different cases. In response to this some philosophers have run new studies to demonstrate problems with older ones and undermine their results. One such study has been claimed to show that some participants mistakenly inferred that an agent‘s mental states have no effect on their actions given determinism. In this thesis I argue that the questions about causation that were used in this study were too ambiguous to show this. My central point is that when considering the causal history of an action we tend to privilege the earlier causes over later ones. When participants responded that an agent‘s mental states have no effect on their actions they may have meant that there were earlier conditions that caused the agent‘s mental states which then caused their actions. This would show that the participants had made the correct inference that given determinism the causal histories of an agent‘s actions extend back in time to events outside of the agent‘s mind. Thus the problem of the apparent mismatch between folk intuitions and philosophical theories of free will remains. I also suggest that the results of these studies also appear to demonstrate a greater level of disagreement among folk intuitions about the same cases than philosophers seem to expect. This raises questions about whether the same theory of free will has to apply to everyone, and if so, whether folk intuitions support any such theory. In chapter one I begin by briefly describing the free will debate and the role that folk intuitions usually play within it. I describe some debate over the usefulness of folk intuitions in philosophy, and make some small contributions on behalf of their usefulness. I describe and defend the recent movement towards attempting to empirically study folk intuitions on philosophical issues. In chapter two I describe the empirical studies that seem to show that folk intuitions about free will represent compatibilist criteria in some cases and incompatibilist criteria in others. I suggest that they also seem to show that when considering the same case some folk have compatibilist intuitions and some have incompatibilist intuitions. I raise some questions about the implications of rejecting the assumption, which most philosophers seem to make, that people generally have the same intuitions about the same cases. In chapter three I present the study that is claimed to show that participants in the earlier studies were confused, and thus that they did not really have incompatibilist intuitions. I present my arguments against it and conclude that for now the original interpretation of those studies stands, along with the problems it raises.</p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Andrea Dickens

<p>Differences in dynamic capabilities (DCs) help explain firms’ abilities to change. DCs research has explored what DCs might be and generic categorisations of them after they have emerged, but little light has been thrown on the specific practices that enable or inhibit their emergence. This study explores how DCs emerge and why firms might develop DCs differently under the same market conditions.   This thesis sought to understand these questions and respond to calls for longitudinal empirical studies to extend DC theory by studying the paths of four professional services firms in New Zealand over three decades. Using a multi-case study design and thematic analysis, this research applied Teece’s (2007) framework of sensing, seizing and transforming capabilities to identify the presence of DCs within each case, before attempting to identify the enablers and inhibitors influencing the development of such capabilities. While elements of each generic class of DC were evident in each case, the findings suggest that in order to utilise DCs to adapt effectively to environmental changes, a firm must deploy all three classes of capabilities at the same time.   This research contributes to the DC literature by proposing a prioritised typology of antecedents that may help stimulate Teece’s sensing, seizing and transforming DCs, while identifying the rigidities that could inhibit their development. The empirical results reported on in this thesis suggest that similar firms’ development of DCs may be different because of idiosyncratic leadership and culture that can limit a firm’s ability to perceive the importance of DCs. Other characteristics that inhibit the development of DCs include centralised, non-participative cultures and high internal (or inward looking) orientation. These results extend current theory about triggers for developing DCs by identifying that the strongest triggers may be either serious macro-economic events or internally driven by firm-defined goals or strategies.</p>


2008 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 323-335 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Nettle ◽  
Bethany Liddle

We hypothesise on a number of grounds that the personality dimension of Agreeableness may be associated with inter‐individual differences in theory of mind (ToM) functioning. However, it is important to distinguish social‐perceptual from social‐cognitive ToM. Previous findings on ToM in psychopathic individuals, sex differences in ToM and the associations between ToM and social relationships, all suggest that social‐cognitive ToM is more likely than social‐perceptual ToM to relate to Agreeableness. In separate empirical studies, we find that Agreeableness is substantially correlated with social‐cognitive ToM performance, but uncorrelated with social‐perceptual ToM performance. We suggest that the propensity or motivation to attend to the mental states of others may be central to the personality dimension of Agreeableness. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.


2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 437-443
Author(s):  
R. V. Kadyrov ◽  
A. S. Elzesser ◽  
N. S. Bartkovskaia

This article is a review of empirical studies on the topic of psychological characteristics that contribute to the incidence of myocardial infarction. Such studies are fragmented and deal mostly with the following categories: mental states, patient’s mental processes, symptoms of mental disorders, behavioral strategies, social factors, etc. The research objective was to analyze the results of empirical studies on the myocardial patients' psychological characteristics. The authors identified difficulties and contradictions in the studies. Diagnostic capabilities of type A proved no longer relevant. An analysis of the contradictions in type D studies suggested that longitudinal studies based on a initially healthy people would prove most effective for further research, as well as detailed meta-analyzes of empirical publications. The role of hostility in the genesis of myocardial infarction proved understudied by domestic scientists. As for anxiety in patients with myocardial infarction, it received enough scientific attention; however, researches do not agree about role in the development of myocardial infarction. To reduce psychological risks during cardiovascular diseases, it is necessary to determine what conditions and factors accelerate or inhibit the onset of myocardial infarction when combined with personal anxiety. The authors propose to use the following samples: 1) patients with a risk of a heart attack; 2) patients after a heart attack; 3) patients past rehabilitation period. The findings indicate promising areas for future research for the prevention of myocardial infarction.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Casey Dorrell

This is one of the first Canadian empirical studies to explore immigrant effects on perceptions of police at a national level. Using the 2009 General Social Survey on Victimization, this paper explores the effects of immigrant status on evaluations of the police. Findings support and contradict current theory, showing that recent immigrants arriving from non-democratic states are associated with stronger positive views of the police. Findings also suggest that visible minority status and community disorder are associated with a higher tendency toward negative perceptions of the police. Recommendations included increased diversity of representation in the police ranks and a continued commitment to decreasing visible signs of crime at the community level.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Casey Dorrell

This is one of the first Canadian empirical studies to explore immigrant effects on perceptions of police at a national level. Using the 2009 General Social Survey on Victimization, this paper explores the effects of immigrant status on evaluations of the police. Findings support and contradict current theory, showing that recent immigrants arriving from non-democratic states are associated with stronger positive views of the police. Findings also suggest that visible minority status and community disorder are associated with a higher tendency toward negative perceptions of the police. Recommendations included increased diversity of representation in the police ranks and a continued commitment to decreasing visible signs of crime at the community level.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Robin Aldridge-Sutton

<p>In the debate over whether free will is compatible with determinism most philosophers on both sides think that folk intuitions are a constraint on philosophical theorising. Most also think that the same criteria are required for free will in all cases. But recent attempts to empirically study folk intuitions about free will appear to show that these two positions cannot be jointly maintained. That is because folk intuitions about free will appear to represent compatibilist and incompatibilist criteria for free will in different cases. In response to this some philosophers have run new studies to demonstrate problems with older ones and undermine their results. One such study has been claimed to show that some participants mistakenly inferred that an agent‘s mental states have no effect on their actions given determinism. In this thesis I argue that the questions about causation that were used in this study were too ambiguous to show this. My central point is that when considering the causal history of an action we tend to privilege the earlier causes over later ones. When participants responded that an agent‘s mental states have no effect on their actions they may have meant that there were earlier conditions that caused the agent‘s mental states which then caused their actions. This would show that the participants had made the correct inference that given determinism the causal histories of an agent‘s actions extend back in time to events outside of the agent‘s mind. Thus the problem of the apparent mismatch between folk intuitions and philosophical theories of free will remains. I also suggest that the results of these studies also appear to demonstrate a greater level of disagreement among folk intuitions about the same cases than philosophers seem to expect. This raises questions about whether the same theory of free will has to apply to everyone, and if so, whether folk intuitions support any such theory. In chapter one I begin by briefly describing the free will debate and the role that folk intuitions usually play within it. I describe some debate over the usefulness of folk intuitions in philosophy, and make some small contributions on behalf of their usefulness. I describe and defend the recent movement towards attempting to empirically study folk intuitions on philosophical issues. In chapter two I describe the empirical studies that seem to show that folk intuitions about free will represent compatibilist criteria in some cases and incompatibilist criteria in others. I suggest that they also seem to show that when considering the same case some folk have compatibilist intuitions and some have incompatibilist intuitions. I raise some questions about the implications of rejecting the assumption, which most philosophers seem to make, that people generally have the same intuitions about the same cases. In chapter three I present the study that is claimed to show that participants in the earlier studies were confused, and thus that they did not really have incompatibilist intuitions. I present my arguments against it and conclude that for now the original interpretation of those studies stands, along with the problems it raises.</p>


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (10) ◽  
pp. 130
Author(s):  
Clara Trompeta ◽  
Beatriz Fernández Rodríguez ◽  
Carmen Gasca-Salas

Theory of mind (ToM) is a social cognitive skill that involves the ability to attribute mental states to self and others (what they think (cognitive ToM) and feel (affective ToM)). We aim to provide an overview of previous knowledge of ToM in Parkinson’s disease (PD). In the last few years more attention has been paid to the study of this construct as a non-motor manifestation of PD. In advanced stages, both components of ToM (cognitive and affective) are commonly impaired, although in early PD results remain controversial. Executive dysfunction correlates with ToM deficits and other cognitive domains such as language and visuospatial function have also been related to ToM. Recent studies have demonstrated that PD patients with mild cognitive impairment show ToM deficits more frequently in comparison with cognitively normal PD patients. In addition to the heterogeneity of ToM tests administered in different studies, depression and dopaminergic medication may also be acting as confounding factors, but there are still insufficient data to support this. Neuroimaging studies conducted to understand the underlying networks of cognitive and affective ToM deficits in PD are lacking. The study of ToM deficit in PD continues to be important, as this may worsen quality of life and favor social stigma. Future studies should be considered, including assessment of the patients’ cognitive state, associated mood disorders, and the role of dopaminergic deficit.


Discourse ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (6) ◽  
pp. 17-27
Author(s):  
A. I. Ponomarev ◽  
K. G. Frolov

Introduction. Empirical studies of recent years convincingly show that the character of sensory perception can be influenced by non-cognitive mental states of the agent, such as her desires. The aim of the paper is to analyze how this causal connection between agent's wishes and her sensations can affect the epistemological status of dependent sensations.Methodology and sources. The author examines S. Siegel's argument on this issue. S. Siegel argues that the empirically proven dependence of sensations on desires (wishful seeing) should lead to a decrease of the epistemological status of sensations to the same extent as the dependence of beliefs on desires (wishful thinking) leads to a decrease of the epistemological status of these beliefs. Thus Siegel's argument concludes that the phenomenon of wishful seeing deprives us of any reason to accept sensations as credible evidence of the states of the world. So, this is an argument in favor of skepticism.Results and discussion. The article discusses two main strategies for rejecting Siegel's argument. According to the first strategy proposed by R. Long, sensations are not so similar to beliefs that one can conclude that their epistemological status should be decreased on the basis of their dependence on desires. According to another strategy for refuting Siegel's argument, proposed by A. Raftopoulos, the influence of desires on perception does not extend to early vision. Early vision is free from the influence of higher order conscious mental states. The dependence of the results of sensory perception on other mental states is reduced to the influence of these states on the agent's attention. At the same time, attention can be volitionally controlled and can be trained. Therefore dependent perception under certain conditions can be rationally accepted.Conclusion. Thus, the article shows that, even though perception is dependent on other non-cognitive mental states, such as desires, this dependence does not necessarily lead to a decrease in the epistemological status of sensations, so sensations can be rationally accepted under certain conditions. This means that Siegel's argument for skepticism is not compelling.


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