Legal protection systems, corporate governance and firm performance: a cross-country comparison

2022 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yosra Ghabri
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Institutional Environment ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Investor Protection ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Legal Protection ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Valuation Effect

Purpose This paper builds on the “Law and Finance” theory and aims to examine the effect of the legal and institutional environment on the governance–performance relationship in the context of non-US firms. More precisely, it examines whether and how the country’s legal system and the level of investor protection interact with the firm-level corporate governance and affect firm performance. Design/methodology/approach The authors used the “G-Index” governance score developed by the Governance Metrics International rating for a sample of 12,728 firm-year observations from 23 countries over the 2009–2016 period. Findings The results show that the interaction between the country-level institutions and corporate governance system significantly affect the firm performance. In particular, the findings indicate that firms operating in common law countries tend to exhibit a positive valuation effect and higher performance than firms with a comparable corporate governance level operating in civil law countries. More precisely, the authors find that in common law countries, higher investor protection with enhanced corporate governance is associated with better firm performance. However, firms operating in civil law countries with weaker investor protection and a comparable corporate governance level tend to experience a negative valuation effect. Originality/value The findings suggest that the institutional and legal environment is crucial and important in determining the value-maximizing level of good governance practices. Managers and regulators should carefully analyze the cost of these initiatives and should coordinate it with the needs of the country’s legal system. The challenge for the company will be how to adjust its corporate governance strategy according to the needs and demands of the country’s legal system in which the company operates to improve its performance. The regulators should ensure a fit between the specifics of the national legal and institutional environment and corporate governance standards and practices.

Investor protection and market liquidity revisited

2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 517-529 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaofeng Shi ◽  
Michael Dempsey ◽  
Huu Nhan Duong ◽  
Petko S. Kalev
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Hong Kong ◽  
Stock Market ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Investor Protection ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Market Liquidity ◽  
Stock Liquidity ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Practical Implications

Purpose – This paper aims to establish the relation between corporate governance – as represented by investor protection at both the legal and firm levels – and stock market liquidity. Design/methodology/approach – This paper avails of the unique features of Hong Kong- and China-based stocks that are traded on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange so as to test whether differences between “common law” and “civil law” legal environments contribute to differences in stock liquidity. In addition, by constructing an internal corporate governance index score for each firm based on board size, board independence and information on the audit and remuneration committee, we document whether firms with better corporate governance scores have narrower spreads, greater depth and higher trading volumes. Findings – Overall, results provide support for a linkage between corporate governance issues – as investor rights protection at both the environment and firm protection levels – and stock market liquidity. Research limitations/implications – This paper recognizes that investor protection constitutes a single component of the desirability of investing in a firm’s stock. Nevertheless, it does appear to constitute an important component of a stock’s attractiveness. Practical implications – The practical implications are clear, namely, that good corporate governance of firms leads to their attractiveness as investment vehicles (for both the shorter and the longer terms). Social implications – The paper has clear social implications. In particular, the paper serves to highlight that prospects for enduring wealth creation are contingent on the safeguards accorded to the equity ownership of a firm’s stock. Originality/value – The originality lies in taking advantage of the unique features of the Chinese and Hong Kong firms on the Hong Kong Exchange, so as to examine the contrasting influences of common law and civil law on stock liquidity. Thus, the authors allow for the effects of corporate governance across the two legal environments (China and Hong Kong) to be compared and contrasted while maintaining other influences unchanged across Chinese and Hong Kong shares.

Investor protection, corporate governance and private information-based trading

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Chun-Teck Lye ◽  
Chee-Wooi Hooy
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Emerging Markets ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Market Competition ◽  
Investor Protection ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Securities Market ◽  
Market Manipulation ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Securities Laws

Purpose This study aims to examine the effects of investor protection (PROT), internal and external corporate governance (CG) on private information-based trading (PIBT). Design/methodology/approach This study uses a sample of 3,438 firms from 42 countries for the period 2002–2015 to examine the effects of the broad and specific measures of PROT, internal CG and external CG (product market competition and block ownership [BOWN]) on a more accurate measure of PIBT using regression analysis. Findings The results show that PROT and BOWN are effective in reducing PIBT. However, the specific measure of PROT (strength of PROT) is not significant in emerging markets and civil law countries. The internal CG is also significant but has a positive effect on PIBT. Research limitations/implications The results suggest that PROT law matters in the efforts to prevent PIBT. Policymakers and securities market regulators, particularly in emerging markets and civil law countries, should focus more on refining existing securities laws and enacting detailed securities rules that explicitly prevent specific market manipulation and PIBT. Originality/value This study provides evidence for the importance of specific and detailed securities rules in different market and legal environments. Furthermore, this study uses the segregated private information-based speculative trading component to accurately measure the PIBT.

Investor protection: effects of takeover convergence

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jyoti Dixit ◽  
Poonam Singh ◽  
Arunima Haldar
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Investor Protection ◽  
Critical Role ◽  
Emerging Economy ◽  
International Standards ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Global Standards ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism

Purpose Takeovers play a critical role as an external corporate governance mechanism to ensure investor protection. There is a long-standing debate on whether the convergence of corporate governance to global standards can enable emerging economies to ensure investor protection. This paper aims to analyse the evolution of the takeover code, namely, Securities Exchange Board of India’s Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers (2011) in India from the lens of investor protection. It then compares the takeover provisions in India, the USA, the UK, Singapore and Australia to examine the extent of convergence and its implications for investor protection. Design/methodology/approach Using a cross-national comparative analysis of takeover mechanisms in common law countries, the study analyses the extent and relevance of convergence in form. The focus of the comparison is on regulations governing offer size, offer price, creeping acquisition and initial trigger limit for the mandatory open offer. Findings The findings suggest that certain provisions such as the initial trigger threshold for the mandatory offer and the offer prices of the Indian takeover code are converging with the standards in common law countries. However, the offer price determination based on market prices may not reflect true market value in an inefficient market like India. Other provisions such as creeping acquisition and offer size are not only diverging from the international standards but are also inconsistent with the key objective of investor protections of the Indian regulator. Research limitations/implications Indian takeover regulation needs to converge to higher global standards to ensure adherence to improved investor protection. This needs to be done for the initial trigger limit for mandatory bid and offer prices, after accounting for the differences in institutional structure. The Indian regulators need to revisit provisions on the initial trigger, creeping acquisition to converge to the broader principle of investor protection. Originality/value This technical paper provides a comprehensive depiction of takeover mechanisms in an emerging economy context as a means of investor protection. Further using a comparative lens, it analyses the relevance of convergence of takeover laws. Thus, advances the theoretical knowledge of limited extant work on external corporate governance mechanism in an emerging economy context.

Corporate governance and firm performance in Malaysia

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (5) ◽  
pp. 896-912 ◽  
Author(s):  
Padmanabha Ramachandra Bhatt ◽  
R. Rathish Bhatt
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Institutional Environment ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Resource Dependency ◽  
Government Agencies ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Corporate Governance Code ◽  
The Relationship

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to study the effect of Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG, 2007 and 2012) on the performance of the listed companies in Malaysia. The agency theory and resource dependency theories indicate that the firms with strong corporate governance outperform firms with weaker governance. This paper explores this relationship in a developing country like Malaysia having different institutional environment compared to western countries. Design/methodology/approach The study used a sample of 113 listed companies in Malaysia. The study incorporates the endogenous relationship between corporate governance, firm performance and leverage. Findings The study analyzes how the corporate governance framework affected firm performance in Malaysia with the help of self-developed corporate governance index (MCGI). The authors’ findings show that the performance of the firm is positively and significantly related with corporate governance measured by MCGI. Secondly, corporate governance of sample firms shows marked improvements after implementation of MCCG 2012 as compared to MCCG 2007. Originality/value The findings of this paper support the agency and the resource dependency theories. The study contributes to the understanding of the relationship between the corporate governance and firm performance in emerging economy and builds a case for enforcement of strong corporate governance code by government agencies.

scholarly journals Effect of the legal system country of European commercial banks on the financial distress

2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 168
Author(s):  
Nizar Baklouti ◽  
Frédéric Gautier ◽  
François Aubert
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Financial Distress ◽  
Commercial Banks ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Financial Health ◽  
The Relationship

This study examines the effect of the legal system on the governance of banks and hence on financial distress. We compare corporate governance to the legal system in 18 countries of the European Union to explain the relationship between financial distress and bank governance. Using a sample of 147 commercial banks, we find that the effect of the legal system really counts. The results also suggest that banks operating in common law and civil law countries tend the concentration of ownership and board size to the effect of increasing the likelihood of financial distress. This study contributes to research in the governance of enterprise to provide empirical evidence that the legal system has the power to influence the financial health of banks.

scholarly journals Perspectives and obstacles of the shareholder activism implementation: A comparative analysis of civil and common law systems

2015 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 520-533 ◽  
Author(s):  
Khurram Parvez Raja ◽  
Alex Kostyuk
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Stock Market ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Shareholder Activism ◽  
Legal Systems ◽  
The Usa ◽  
The Uk

The paper outlines shareholder activism development in common law and civil law countries and identifies features of these legal systems that create preconditions and obstacles for shareholder activism. Our findings show that tendencies of shareholder activism depend on the type of the legal system, but also vary within the countries that share the same legal system. Thus, we conclude that the type of legal system is not the chief determinant of shareholder activism. A comparative analysis of shareholder activism in Germany and Ukraine (civil law countries) and the USA and the UK (common law countries) shows that the system of domestic corporate regulation, development of the stock market, companies’ capitalization and corporate governance influence the development of shareholder activism in equal measure.

A cross-country comparison of the relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance: does judicial system efficiency matter?

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 321-340 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luigi Lepore ◽  
Francesco Paolone ◽  
Sabrina Pisano ◽  
Federico Alvino
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Investor Protection ◽  
Legal Protection ◽  
Judicial System ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
System Efficiency ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Judicial Efficiency ◽  
The Relationship

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance, including judicial system efficiency as a moderator to investigate the joint effects of both explanatory variables. Although prior studies have considered judicial system efficiency by examining de jure investor protection, this study identifies another useful proxy and explores de facto legal protection. Design/methodology/approach Ordinary least square multiple regression models were used to examine the influence of judicial efficiency, which was measured using the disposition time (DT) and legal origin, as a moderator of the relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance for a sample of 565 non-financial companies listed in Italy, France, Germany and Spain in 2013. Findings This paper shows that de facto investor protection ensured by an efficient judicial system is relevant to the relationship between firm performance and ownership structure. As a moderator variable, DT strengthens the intensity of this relationship in countries with low judicial efficiency, showing that ownership concentration leads to a better enhancement of firm performance and is, therefore, a more efficient governance mechanism in countries in which investor protection is weak. Originality/value The evidence presented expands the understanding of the link between firm performance and ownership structure. The institutional deficiencies suggest that internal governance mechanisms may substitute for external mechanisms in facilitating efficient governance. This study corroborates policymakers’ concerns regarding the efficiency of judicial systems and their role in protecting the rights of minority shareholders. The results suggest a need for more efficient external mechanisms of investor protection to facilitate investment in equity capital. Moreover, this study shows that DT is a more accurate measure of investor protection than the traditional measure of de jure legal protection.

The effects of government relation and institutional environments on channel performance

2018 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 587-604
Author(s):  
Fang Jia ◽  
Zhilin Yang ◽  
Ling (Alice) Jiang
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Institutional Environment ◽  
Legal Protection ◽  
Institutional Factors ◽  
Institutional Environments ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Environment Factors ◽  
Government Relations ◽  
Government Interference ◽  
Channel Performance

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to examine the importance of channel partners’ government relations within channel performance and explore how institutional factors interact to influence channel performance. A theoretical framework, inclusive of hypotheses, is proposed to demonstrate the interaction of government relations and institutional environments on firm performance. Drawing on an institutional perspective, this paper suggests that the effect of partner’s government relations on firm performance is moderated by institutional environment factors, such as government interference, legal protection, and the importance of guanxi.Design/methodology/approachThis study conducted a questionnaire survey and collected data from 393 Chinese manufacturer managers in China.FindingsPartner’s government relations increase focal firm’s performance and this effect is moderated by different levels of legal protection. Partner’s government relations increase firm performance only in the context of high-legal protection; whereas, when legal protection is low, partner’s government relations decrease focal firm performance. As for the interaction of institutional factors, legal protection and importance of guanxi, all three moderate the negative effect of government interference on firm performance.Originality/valueThis paper provides insights on how channel partner’s government relations, representing a key institutional capital, interact with institutional environment factors to influence channel performance.

scholarly journals Effect of the legal system country of European commercial banks on the financial distress

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 40
Author(s):  
Nizar Baklouti ◽  
Frédéric Gautier ◽  
François Aubert
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Financial Distress ◽  
Commercial Banks ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Financial Health ◽  
The Relationship

This study examines the effect of the legal system on the governance of banks and hence on financial distress. We compare corporate governance to the legal system in 18 countries of the European Union to explain the relationship between financial distress and bank governance. Using a sample of 147 commercial banks, we find that the effect of the legal system really counts. The results also suggest that banks operating in common law and civil law countries tend the concentration of ownership and board size to the effect of increasing the likelihood of financial distress. This study contributes to research in the governance of enterprise to provide empirical evidence that the legal system has the power to influence the financial health of banks.

A win-win situation for both managers and shareholders

2020 ◽  
Vol 46 (8) ◽  
pp. 977-1000
Author(s):  
Jayalakshmy Ramachandran ◽  
Nafis Alam ◽  
Chea Ei Goh
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financial Distress ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Legal Protection ◽  
The Philippines ◽  
Annual Data ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Asean Countries ◽  
The Impact

PurposeTo examine the impact of corporate governance on Cost of Capital (COC) and financial distress in the ASEAN countries.Design/methodology/approachWe compiled a list of the 50 largest publicly listed firms by market capitalization in each of the following five East Asian countries, namely Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Furthermore, we then divided the five countries into two distinctive categories – (i) Malaysia and Singapore (Common Law/strong legal protection countries) and (ii) Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia (Civil Law/weak legal protection countries). The annual data is collected for the time period ranging from 2006 to 2015, allowing a total observation of 1,317 firm years.FindingsOverall, the paper supports the findings of many researchers that Board independence, promulgating good corporate governance, leads to better access to capital at lower cost, thus providing growth opportunities for ASEAN region. Taking lead from Simpson and Gleason (1999) and similar, we emphasize that during financial distress CEO duality will strengthen control systems and reduce internal discord in ASEAN firms.Originality/valueThe paper is one of the niche studies that has incorporated the difference between civil and common law rule in the study of corporate governance and its impact on financial measures of firms' in the ASEAN countries.

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