The relationship between company performance and executive compensation of construction industry state-owned listed companies

Author(s):  
Yingying Wang ◽  
Bing Zhu
2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yong Ye ◽  
Lei Huang ◽  
Ming Li

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship among negative media coverage, law environment and tunneling of controlling shareholders. Design/methodology/approach – Under the Chinese especial institutional background, this paper empirically test the relationship among negative media coverage, law environment and tunneling of controlling shareholders with the sample of 2009-2011 Chinese listed companies. Findings – The empirical results demonstrate that negative media coverage can reduce tunneling of controlling shareholder, and compared with state-owned listed companies, negative media coverage have a greater effect on tunneling in non-state-owned listed companies; and negative media coverage have a greater effect on tunneling in areas with better law environment. Further study shows that the reduction of controlling shareholder’s behavior of tunneling can improve company performance, and the improvement is more significant in non-state-owned listed companies and areas with better law environment. The research results indicate that media coverage play a very active role on restraining stakeholder’s behavior and perfecting corporate governing. Originality/value – First, this paper will study of tunneling from the perspective of media coverage for the first time. Second, this paper further analyzes how the decrease of tunneling improves corporate performance following the research of how media coverage influence tunneling. Third, this study enrich literatures about the effects of media coverage on corporate governance in Chinese capital market.


Author(s):  
Jonty Tshipa ◽  
Leon M. Brummer ◽  
Hendrik Wolmarans ◽  
Elda Du Toit

Background: Premised on agency, resource dependence and stewardship theories, the study investigates empirically the existence of industry nuances in the relationship between corporate governance and financial performance of companies listed in the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Aims: The main objective of the study is to understand the relationship between internal corporate governance and company performance from the perspective of three distinct economic periods, as well as industry nuances, cognisant of endogeneity issues. Setting: South Africa, as an emerging African market, offers an interesting research context in which the corporate governance and financial performance nexus can be examined empirically. Method: A sample of 90 companies from the five largest South African industries, covering a 13-year period from 2002 to 2014 (1170 firm-year observations) was examined with three estimation approaches. Results: Two key trends emerged from this study. First, the relationship between corporate governance and company performance differed from industry to industry. Second, the association between corporate governance and company performance also changes during steady and non-steady periods, which is an indication that the nexus is driven by the state of the global economy and the type of the industry. Conclusion: Evidence from the study suggests that companies should be allowed to optimise rather than maximise their corporate governance options. This finding questioned the approach of the recently published King IV Code of Good Corporate Governance, which requires Johannesburg Stock Exchange-listed companies to ‘apply and explain’ as opposed to ‘apply or explain’ as pronounced by King III Code of Good Corporate Governance.


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 483
Author(s):  
Mahfud Asyari ◽  
Firna Hayyu Nindya Maritsa

After the disclosure of data from companies, research on executive compensation began to develop. Several studies on executive compensation in banking found that the determination of compensation is positively related to company performance. This research aims to determine the relationship between company performance and executive compensation of Islamic Commercial Bank’s  in Indonesia. Company performance is proxied by Return on Assets (ROA). This study uses a sample of Islamic Commercial Banks because they have very good performance growth and currently only have a market share of 6.18% compared to the national financial market so they still have the potential to experience growth.  Furthermore, sample used 14 Islamic commercial banks registered with the OJK during 2014-2019. The research method used panel data regression analysis. The results showed that the performance of Islamic Commercial Bank’s has an effect on executive compensation. Islamic Commercial Bank Executives have an obligation to improve company performance (ROA) because it affects the compensation received by the executive.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 64
Author(s):  
Jiao Xue ◽  
Heng Fan ◽  
Zhanxun Dong

This study empirically examines the relationship between executive compensation and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) behaviors by identifying the influence of short- and long-term incentive on the propensity and scale of M&A. When the short-term incentive is insufficient, M&A behaviors serve as a beneficial compensation mechanism. Thus, lack of executives’ incentive promotes the propensity to engage in M&A and significantly affects the scale of M&A. With regard to long-term incentives, M&A behaviors serve as a beneficial creation mechanism. Shareholding of executives promotes M&A propensity, and does not significantly affect the scale of M&A. This study significantly contributes to research in M&A behaviors by revealing the beneficial distribution mechanisms of M&A behaviors.


2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-211 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaobao Song

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship between ownership concentration and company performance in China private listed companies. Design/methodology/approach – By taking into account of the difference of managerial positions of large shareholders in listed companies (whether they assume the posts as presidents or general managers), and based on the two agency theories, the paper analyzes the state dependency of the relationship between ownership concentration and the company performance of listed companies with the samples of China private listed companies from 2003 to 2011. Findings – The paper finds that if the large shareholders assume no posts in the listed companies, there is an inverted U shape relation between shareholding ratio of the largest shareholders and the company performance. This result indicates the inadequate or excessive monitoring to the companies by the large shareholders according to different shareholding ratios. If large shareholders assume posts in the listed companies, there is a U shape relation between shareholding ratio of the largest shareholders and the company performance. This result indicates the tunneling and propping to the small shareholders by the large shareholders according to different shareholding ratios. Research limitations/implications – This paper has not taken the influence of earnings management of the listed companies. Practical implications – For strengthening the protection of investors, proper distinction shall be made among shareholders of different conditions, and difference of roles large shareholders play in the company under different conditions shall be understood correctly, so as to formulate and perfect market rules for corporate governance, rather than just restraining the power (rights) of large shareholders. The study in this paper is for helping understand the different roles large shareholders play under different corporate governance conditions. Originality/value – First, different from the research paradigm of relationship between ownership concentration and company performance in existing literature, the paper discriminates the study background with the post-assuming conditions of large shareholders in listed companies and believes that relationship between ownership concentration and company performance shall be presented differently under different post-assuming conditions. Second, by using monitoring theory and tunneling and propping theory to explain the behaviors of large shareholders under different post-assuming conditions respectively, a new theory explanation view is provided for explaining the relation between ownership concentration and company performance.


2011 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 294-304
Author(s):  
Marco Artiaco

The recent financial crisis highlighted the issue of Board of Directors compensation, which had been analyzed by many authors. In fact, there is a vast academic literature on the impact of the compensation of Board of Directors on corporations characterized by the separation of ownership from control. The compensation of Board of Directors has been a subject of debate, also by global regulators like OECD, FSB, Central Bank of Italy and European Commission and many are pushing for an international uniform regulation. This paper aims to investigate the relationship between the board of Directors compensation, the company performance and the risks decided by the Board. The article analyses a sample of Italian listed companies in order to test wether or not the Board of Directors compensation structure could turn into a performance incentive, given the risk taken.


Author(s):  
Ravichandran K. Subramaniam ◽  
Chee Ghee Teh ◽  
Murugasu Thangarajah

This study seeks to present the relationship between executive compensation, dividend payout policy and ownership structure of listed firms in Malaysia. We examine a panel data on a sample of 300 of the largest Malaysian public listed companies (PLCs) on Bursa Malaysia for the years 2008 to 2014. Based on 2,009 firm-year observations, our results show consistent empirical positive evidence on the association between dividend payout and executive compensation across all models. However, the results are inconsistent with Bhattacharyya model of dividend payout. Further, there is evidence that government and family ownerships are positively associated with dividend payout. Our results show that the positive relationship between executive compensation and dividend payout is more evident in politically connected firms (PCON firms) which is consistent with the clientele (catering) theory.


10.28945/4166 ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 13 ◽  
pp. 417-435
Author(s):  
Mochamad Agung Wibowo ◽  
Rudi Waluyo ◽  
Zhabrinna Zhabrinna

Aim/Purpose: This study aims to investigate the relationship between the knowledge management (KM) process and the performance of construction companies. The ultimate goal is to promote better efficiency and competitive advantage in the construction industry by making the best use of knowledge. Background: While attention to KM is currently on the rise, as shown by the number of studies conducted, research on KM in the construction industry of Indonesia is still very rare. However, organizational learning as the implementation of KM provides an opportunity to improve the construction industry, and thus there is an urgency to conduct research on this topic. Methodology: This study lasted for three months and used the survey method, with 100 questionnaires distributed to contractors of grade 6 and 7 on the islands of Java and Borneo in Indonesia. A total of 54 returned questionnaires were deemed complete and eligible for further analysis. Data analysis was performed using the structural equation modeling method with partial least squares (SEM PLS). Contribution: This study helps to measure the relationship value of the KM process and company performance. Findings: The results of this study indicate that the process of KM has a significant and positive influence on company performance, and there is a positive interaction in the process of KM and company performance as well. Recommendations for Practitioners: Construction companies need to perceive that activities undertaken in a construction project should always be assumed to be a KM process in order to make strategic and effective decisions that can result in improvements to customers, finance, internal business, learning, and growth. Recommendation for Researchers: Research on the KM process and information technology needs to be developed more, so that construction companies can apply this knowledge to explore problems and create solutions, resulting in methods to facilitate efficiency and effectiveness. Impact on Society: This paper helps to understand that KM activities provide initial benefits and guidance for companies that want to apply KM. Future Research: Innovative and new ideas to cultivate the KM process in the construction industry need to be explored and developed to improve the implementation.


2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 85
Author(s):  
Wahyu Puspita Maharani ◽  
Evy Rahman Utami

This study aims to analyze the effect of institutional ownership towards executive compensation mediated by company performance. This study used manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange during the period 2015-2017 as the sample. The sample selection method used purposive sampling so that sampling is in accordance with the criteria that have been set by the researcher. The number of samples used in this study were 209 companies. The analytical tool used was multiple regression analysis and path analysis to measure the mediating variables. The results of this study indicated that institutional ownership has a positive and significant effect on company performance, institutional ownership did not directly influence executive compensation and the company's performance variable was able to mediate the relationship of institutional ownership to executive compensation.


2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaohong Zhang ◽  
Gaowen Tang ◽  
Zhaohong Lin

Purpose Based on the theory of “optimal contracting approach” and “the managerial power approach”, this paper aims to investigate whether senior executives of listed companies in China make use of their power to gain their own private benefits. The paper also compares compensation contracts between state- and private-owned enterprises to test whether there is a significant difference between senior executives from different ownership types of enterprises in terms of compensation contracts. Design/methodology/approach The paper raises four hypotheses based on the theories of “company agency”, “optimal contracting approach” and “managerial power approach”. After that, 5,680 A-share-listed companies of stock market in Shanghai and in Shenzhen Stock Market from 2008 to 2012 were taken as research samples to conduct a series of research analysis, including t-test, reliability analysis and regression analysis, with the help of SPSS 18.0. Findings The senior executives of listed companies in China could make use of their power to increase their own salary to gain power pay and, at the same time, company performance, company size and other factors that are important to influence the executive compensation. This paper further argues that senior executives of private-owned listed companies are more likely to use their power to obtain power pay and increase their own compensation. Additionally, the agency costs of Chinese listed companies are negatively related to the performance pay of senior executives, whereas there is no obvious negative correlation with the power pay of senior executives. Practical implications This paper takes multiple, in-depth approaches to study the relationship among managerial power, agency cost and executive compensation and to find out the differences in compensation contracts of senior executives between private-owned listed companies and state-owned companies. It also provides necessary suggestions to ensure the interests of stockholders, such as: optimizing the management structure of listed companies; improving the transparence of information disclosure of listed companies; establishing effective mechanism of incentive and constraint; and improving and standardizing the market of professional managers. Social implications The compensation contract of senior executives in China is critical to enhance enterprises’ performance, and it will become an important factor that will facilitate the interests of stockholders and management. However, this paper argues that some phenomena of over-payment of senior executives in listed companies cannot be explained by the theory of “optimal contracting approach”, but it is necessary and important to compare the differences of compensation contract of senior executives between private-owned listed companies and state-owned companies. A series of findings are proposed in this paper. Originality/value This paper made use of a principal analysis to extract the main factors that could represent the managerial power from different angles. In addition, this paper also compared the differences between compensation contracts of senior executives between private-owned listed companies and state-owned companies. Additionally, in this paper, the compensation of senior executives was divided into “power compensation” and “performance compensation”, which were used to test the relationship with the management cost of companies.


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