Abstract
Moral identity, or moral self, is the degree to which being moral is important to a person’s self-concept. It is hypothesized to be the `missing link’ between moral judgment and moral action. However, its cognitive and psychophysiological mechanisms are still subject to debate. In this study, we used event-related potentials to examine whether the moral self-concept is related to how people process prosocial and antisocial actions. To this end, participants’ implicit and explicit moral self-concept were assessed. We examined whether individual differences in moral identity relate to differences in early, automatic processes [i.e. Early Posterior Negativity (EPN), N2] or late, cognitively controlled processes (i.e. late positive potential) while observing prosocial and antisocial situations. Results show that a higher implicit moral self was related to a lower EPN amplitude for prosocial scenarios. In addition, an enhanced explicit moral self was related to a lower N2 amplitude for prosocial scenarios. The findings demonstrate that the moral self affects the neural processing of morally relevant stimuli during third-party evaluations. They support theoretical considerations that the moral self already affects (early) processing of moral information.
Neural processing of moral content reflects moral identity in 10‐year‐old children
