scholarly journals Modeling College Admission as a Signaling Game

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (6) ◽  
pp. 21
Author(s):  
Joseph Rekus ◽  
Yixiao Jiang
Keyword(s):  
Standardized Tests ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Standardized Test ◽  
Selection Process ◽  
College Admission ◽  
Signaling Game ◽  
Admission Process ◽  
Academic Abilities ◽  
Incentive Compatible ◽  
Separating Equilibrium

This paper models the college admission process as a signaling game between the admissions office and a pool of heterogeneous applicants characterized by academic abilities and demonstrated interest. In the screening and selection process, applicants attempt to signal their private information through their performance on a standardized test (for academic abilities) and interview (for demonstrated interest).  We show, under general conditions, that a separating equilibrium exists in which it is incentive-compatible for applicants to reveal their characteristics truthfully, and thus the admissions office does not fall victim to the problem of information asymmetry. Furthermore, we delineate how this equilibrium can be induced by setting appropriate “scoring” thresholds associated with standardized tests and interviews.

scholarly journals Markets with Multidimensional Private Information

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 250-274 ◽  
Author(s):  
Veronica Guerrieri ◽  
Robert Shimer
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Price Formation ◽  
Signaling Game ◽  
Equilibrium Path ◽  
One Dimensional ◽  
Pareto Efficient ◽  
Efficient Allocations ◽  
Asset Quality ◽  
Separating Equilibrium

This paper explores price formation when sellers are privately informed about their preferences and the quality of their asset. There are many equilibria, including a semi-separating one in which each seller's price depends on a one-dimensional index of her preferences and asset quality. This multiplicity does not rely on off-the-equilibrium path beliefs and so is not amenable to standard signaling game refinements. The semi-separating equilibrium may not be Pareto efficient, even if it is not Pareto dominated by any other equilibrium. Instead, efficient allocations may require transfers across uninformed buyers, inconsistent with any equilibrium. (JEL D11, D52, D82)

Continuous Signaling within Partitions: Capital Structure and the FIFO/LIFO Choice

1994 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patricia J. Hughes ◽  
Eduardo S. Schwartz ◽  
Anjan V. Thakor
Keyword(s):  
Capital Structure ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Empirical Regularities ◽  
The Many ◽  
Separating Equilibrium

This paper considers a setting in which managers have private information about the values of their firms and can communicate it to uninformed investors through the use of two signals: capital structure and inventory accounting method. We show conditions under which a separating equilibrium with debt alone does not exist. The two-signal equilibrium involves a partitioned separation in which the highest quality firms choose FIFO and the lower quality firms choose LIFO, and all firms then distinguish themselves within these two partitions through capital structure choices. The analysis helps to explain the many observed empirical regularities about firms' capital structure choices and LIFO/FIFO choices and, in addition, produces numerous testable predictions about the relation between capital structure and inventory accounting method.

A framework for helping teachers interrupt oppression in their classrooms

2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 94-105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Meir Muller ◽  
Gloria S. Boutte
Keyword(s):  
Standardized Testing ◽  
Standardized Tests ◽  
Standardized Test ◽  
Professional Lives ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Four Dimensions ◽  
Translational Study ◽  
Children's Book ◽  
Testing Mandates ◽  
Institutional Oppression

Purpose Providing insights into the need to go beyond superficial equity efforts in classrooms, the authors present a standardized test analogy to make the concept of oppression accessible and relevant for educators. Three levels of oppression (individual, institutional and cultural/societal) are described along with a brief overview of Paulo Freire’s four dimensions of oppression. Drawing parallels from a children’s book, Testing Miss Malarkey (Finchler, 2014), strategies for recognizing and interrupting oppression are offered. The authors recommend resources that teachers can use to help children and themselves take reflective actions (praxis) to interrupt systemic types of oppressions in their classrooms and personal spaces. Design/methodology/approach This paper is grounded in the belief that to teach in socially just and equitable ways, educators benefit from a fundamental understanding of how systems of oppression work in classrooms and in society. The paper provides both a theoretical and practical approach to help guide educators’ efforts in such a way as to address systemic issues of racism, classism, sexism, heterosexism and other “isms” (systems of oppression). Findings This paper does not present findings such as those found in an empirical study. However, it does provide an overview of Freire’s levels of oppression along with instructional guidelines to assist teachers in helping provide children with tools to understand oppression and to take reflective actions (praxis) to make a dent in systemic types of oppressions in their classrooms and worldwide. Research limitations/implications There are many other decolonizing frameworks that are available. This translational study focuses on one of them (Freire’) and what it means for teachers. Practical implications Believing that the school years are foundational for providing children with the tools that they need to be able to identify and address the ongoing acts of oppression, this paper seeks to make the topic accessible to educators with the hope that they can make a lasting and positive difference in children’s lives (and in society in general). Recommended resources are provided. Social implications To interrupt and counter oppression, educators must be informed. The benefits of doing so readily extend to society in general; so, it is important for both educators and students to understand oppression and have tools for disrupting it. Originality/value This paper takes the original approach of using standardized tests as analogy to make the concept of oppression accessible and relevant for educators. The authors use this example because they recognize that many teachers can identify with feeling disempowered by the standardized testing mandates and frenzy. They believe that educators will be able to extrapolate the process by which the loss of their power occurs with standardized testing to understand how institutional oppression works. Neither author has seen an article that uses an analogy from the professional lives of teachers to illustrate oppression.

scholarly journals Budget Feasible Mechanisms on Matroids

Algorithmica ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefano Leonardi ◽  
Gianpiero Monaco ◽  
Piotr Sankowski ◽  
Qiang Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Polynomial Time ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Independent Set ◽  
Deterministic Algorithm ◽  
Matroid Intersection ◽  
Practical Applications ◽  
Incentive Compatible ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Special Case ◽  
Budget Feasible

AbstractMotivated by many practical applications, in this paper we study budget feasible mechanisms with the goal of procuring an independent set of a matroid. More specifically, we are given a matroid $${\mathcal {M}}=(E,{\mathcal {I}})$$ M = ( E , I ) . Each element of the ground set E is controlled by a selfish agent and the cost of the element is private information of the agent itself. A budget limited buyer has additive valuations over the elements of E. The goal is to design an incentive compatible budget feasible mechanism which procures an independent set of the matroid of largest possible value. We also consider the more general case of the pair $${\mathcal {M}}=(E,{\mathcal {I}})$$ M = ( E , I ) satisfying only the hereditary property. This includes matroids as well as matroid intersection. We show that, given a polynomial time deterministic algorithm that returns an $$\alpha $$ α -approximation to the problem of finding a maximum-value independent set in $${\mathcal {M}}$$ M , there exists an individually rational, truthful and budget feasible mechanism which is $$(3\alpha +1)$$ ( 3 α + 1 ) -approximated and runs in polynomial time, thus yielding also a 4-approximation for the special case of matroids.

Austerity*

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harris Dellas ◽  
Dirk Niepelt
Keyword(s):  
Interest Rate ◽  
Current Account ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Investment Decisions ◽  
Borrowing Constraints ◽  
Current Consumption ◽  
Separating Equilibrium ◽  
The Current Account

Abstract We study the optimal debt and investment decisions of a sovereign with private information. The separating equilibrium is characterized by a cap on the current account. A sovereign repays debt amount due that exceeds default costs in order to signal creditworthiness and smooth consumption. Accepting funding conditional on investment/reforms relaxes borrowing constraints, even when investment does not create collateral, but it depresses current consumption. The model contains the signalling elements emphasized by creditors in the Greek austerity programs and is consistent with the reduction in the loans issued by Greece and their interest rate following the 2015 election.

Costly Voluntary Disclosure in a Signaling Game

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Pecorino ◽  
Mark Van Boening
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Experimental Analysis ◽  
Voluntary Disclosure ◽  
Signaling Game ◽  
Strong Case

Abstract We conduct an experimental analysis of pretrial bargaining, while allowing for the costly disclosure of private information in a signaling game. Under the theory, 100 % of plaintiffs with a weak case are predicted to remain silent, while 100 % of the plaintiffs with a strong case are predicted to voluntarily disclose their type. We find that 75 % of weak plaintiffs remain silent and 67 % of strong plaintiffs reveal their type. In line with theory, weak plaintiffs who reveal their type receive a lower payoff, while strong plaintiffs who reveal their type receive a higher payoff. Plaintiffs with a strong case who reveal their type have a dispute rate which is 50 % points lower than strong plaintiffs who remain silent. Because plaintiffs who reveal their type cannot extract the entire surplus from settlement from the defendant, the incentive to engage in voluntary disclosure is weaker empirically than it is in theory.

scholarly journals Comparative Reliability of Structured Versus Unstructured Interviews in the Admission Process of a Residency Program

2011 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 517-523 ◽  
Author(s):  
Danielle Blouin ◽  
Andrew G. Day ◽  
Andrey Pavlov
Keyword(s):  
Residency Program ◽  
Variance Components ◽  
Critical Incident ◽  
Selection Process ◽  
Job Analysis ◽  
Structured Interview ◽  
Structured Interviews ◽  
Admission Process ◽  
Resident Selection ◽  
Overall Reliability

Abstract Background Although never directly compared, structured interviews are reported as being more reliable than unstructured interviews. This study compared the reliability of both types of interview when applied to a common pool of applicants for positions in an emergency medicine residency program. Methods In 2008, one structured interview was added to the two unstructured interviews traditionally used in our resident selection process. A formal job analysis using the critical incident technique guided the development of the structured interview tool. This tool consisted of 7 scenarios assessing 4 of the domains deemed essential for success as a resident in this program. The traditional interview tool assessed 5 general criteria. In addition to these criteria, the unstructured panel members were asked to rate each candidate on the same 4 essential domains rated by the structured panel members. All 3 panels interviewed all candidates. Main outcomes were the overall, interitem, and interrater reliabilities, the correlations between interview panels, and the dimensionality of each interview tool. Results Thirty candidates were interviewed. The overall reliability reached 0.43 for the structured interview, and 0.81 and 0.71 for the unstructured interviews. Analyses of the variance components showed a high interrater, low interitem reliability for the structured interview, and a high interrater, high interitem reliability for the unstructured interviews. The summary measures from the 2 unstructured interviews were significantly correlated, but neither was correlated with the structured interview. Only the structured interview was multidimensional. Conclusions A structured interview did not yield a higher overall reliability than both unstructured interviews. The lower reliability is explained by a lower interitem reliability, which in turn is due to the multidimensionality of the interview tool. Both unstructured panels consistently rated a single dimension, even when prompted to assess the 4 specific domains established as essential to succeed in this residency program.

Educational Tests—To Standardize or Not To Standardize

1928 ◽  
Vol 21 (7) ◽  
pp. 369-389
Author(s):  
W. D. Reeve
Keyword(s):  
Standardized Tests ◽  
Standardized Test ◽  
Type Test ◽  
New Type ◽  
Educational Tests

A steamboat should not be condemned because it is not a RollsRoyce It was not so intended. In like manner, standardized tests are not to be condemned if they serve adequately the purposes for which they are constructed. A standardized test is an example of one kind of the so-called new-type test, in contrast to the old essay-type of examination, in which some standard performance of so many questions correctly answered in a certain number of minutes has been worked out. No one who has followed the testing movement will question the fact that standardized tests have made certain contributions to education, some of which we shall now enumerate.

A Comparative Study of Higher-Order Thinking and Teaching in the United States and United Kingdom

2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 45-63
Author(s):  
Vibhakumari Solanki ◽  
Brian R. Evans
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
United Kingdom ◽  
Standardized Tests ◽  
Standardized Test ◽  
High Stakes Testing ◽  
Higher Order Thinking ◽  
The United States ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
High Stakes ◽  
The United Kingdom

The United States and the United Kingdom have used standardized high-stakes testing as a measurement of students’ cognitive level to determine success in the 21st century. Standardized tests have given teachers guidance to help them determine what to teach students and how to teach to the test. With such increased emphasis on high-stakes standardized tests, students are being taught based on tested content. This study evaluates the frequency of higher-and lower-order items in the respective country’s standardized test, and analyzes the teaching of higher-order thinking within classroom instruction.

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