REFINEMENTS OF NASH EQUILIBRIA IN VIEW OF JEALOUS OR FRIENDLY BEHAVIOR OF PLAYERS

2002 ◽  
Vol 04 (03) ◽  
pp. 281-299 ◽  
Author(s):  
AGNIESZKA RUSINOWSKA
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Infinitely Divisible ◽  
Common Assumption ◽  
Bargaining Models ◽  
The Common ◽  
Simultaneous Moves ◽  
The One ◽  
Alternating Offers

In this paper, several bargaining models, differing in some assumptions from each other, are analyzed. We consider a discrete case and a continuous case. In the former model, players bargain over a division of n objects. In the latter, parties divide one unit of infinitely divisible good. We start with an analysis of the one-round model, and then we consider a model in which players can continue to bargain. For each model, simultaneous moves as well as alternating offers of players are considered. The assumption that each player receives no more than his/her opponent proposes giving to him/her is the common assumption for all cases analyzed. Moreover, we adopt some assumptions concerning players' attitudes towards their opponents' payments, assuming that players can be either jealous or friendly. In view of the jealousy or friendliness of players, Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium are described.

Quantifying Commitment in Nash Equilibria

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (02) ◽  
pp. 1940011
Author(s):  
Thomas A. Weber
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Normal Form ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Canonical Extension ◽  
Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Form Game ◽  
Normal Form Game ◽  
The Given

To quantify a player’s commitment in a given Nash equilibrium of a finite dynamic game, we map the corresponding normal-form game to a “canonical extension,” which allows each player to adjust his or her move with a certain probability. The commitment measure relates to the average overall adjustment probabilities for which the given Nash equilibrium can be implemented as a subgame-perfect equilibrium in the canonical extension.

AN n-PERSON RUBINSTEIN BARGAINING GAME

2009 ◽  
Vol 11 (01) ◽  
pp. 111-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
PÄR TORSTENSSON
Keyword(s):  
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Bargaining Game ◽  
Discount Factor ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Large Discount ◽  
Alternating Offers ◽  
Rule Out

When Herrero (1985) extends Rubinstein's (1982) alternating-offers bargaining model to the case of three or more players any agreement can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) outcome, given a sufficiently large discount factor. We show that this is not the case when players demand shares for themselves instead of proposing agreements to each other. Although it is possible to rule out agreements, the majority remains to be SPE outcomes.

Do we owe a Duty to Future Generations to Preserve the Global Environment?

1990 ◽  
Vol 84 (1) ◽  
pp. 190-198 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony D’Amato
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Global Environment ◽  
Future Generations ◽  
Common Assumption ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
Present Generation ◽  
The Common ◽  
Environmental Legacy ◽  
The One

A common assumption underlying nearly every book or essay on the global environment is that the present generation owes a duty to generations yet unborn to preserve the diversity and quality of our planet’s life-sustaining environmental resources. This duty is sometimes said to be an emerging norm of customary international law, including the more recently treaty-generated custom of the “common heritage of mankind.” Professor Edith Brown Weiss lists three different approaches one might take in response to an asserted environmental obligation to future generations: the “opulent” model, which denies any such obligation and permits present extravagance and waste; the “preservationist” model at the other extreme, which requires the present generation to make substantial sacrifices of denial so as to enhance the environmental legacy; and the “equality” model—favored by Professor Weiss—which says we owe to future generations a global environment in no worse condition than the one we enjoy.

scholarly journals BACKWARD INDUCTION: MERITS AND FLAWS

2017 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-24
Author(s):  
Marek M. Kamiński
Keyword(s):  
Infinite Number ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Complex Structure ◽  
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Perfect Information ◽  
Backward Induction ◽  
Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Sequential Games ◽  
Theoretical Predictions

Abstract Backward induction (BI) was one of the earliest methods developed for solving finite sequential games with perfect information. It proved to be especially useful in the context of Tom Schelling’s ideas of credible versus incredible threats. BI can be also extended to solve complex games that include an infinite number of actions or an infinite number of periods. However, some more complex empirical or experimental predictions remain dramatically at odds with theoretical predictions obtained by BI. The primary example of such a troublesome game is Centipede. The problems appear in other long games with sufficiently complex structure. BI also shares the problems of subgame perfect equilibrium and fails to eliminate certain unreasonable Nash equilibria.

scholarly journals On gamesmen and fair men: explaining fairness in non-cooperative bargaining games

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 171709 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ramzi Suleiman
Keyword(s):  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Golden Ratio ◽  
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Backward Induction ◽  
Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Bargaining Games ◽  
Discount Factors ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
Resource Dilemma ◽  
Alternating Offers

Experiments on bargaining games have repeatedly shown that subjects fail to use backward induction, and that they only rarely make demands in accordance with the subgame perfect equilibrium. In a recent paper, we proposed an alternative model, termed ‘economic harmony’ in which we modified the individual's utility by defining it as a function of the ratio between the actual and aspired pay-offs. We also abandoned the notion of equilibrium, in favour of a new notion of ‘harmony’, defined as the intersection of strategies, at which all players are equally satisfied. We showed that the proposed model yields excellent predictions of offers in the ultimatum game, and requests in the sequential common pool resource dilemma game. Strikingly, the predicted demand in the ultimatum game is equal to the famous Golden Ratio (approx. 0.62 of the entire pie). The same prediction was recently derived independently by Schuster (Schuster 2017. Sci. Rep. 7 , 5642). In this paper, we extend the solution to bargaining games with alternating offers. We show that the derived solution predicts the opening demands reported in several experiments, on games with equal and unequal discount factors and game horizons. Our solution also predicts several unexplained findings, including the puzzling ‘disadvantageous counter-offers’, and the insensitivity of opening demands to variations in the players' discount factors, and game horizon. Strikingly, we find that the predicted opening demand in the alternating offers game is also equal to the Golden Ratio.

scholarly journals Computing Nash Equilibria of Unbounded Games

10.29007/1wpl ◽  
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Escardo ◽  
Paulo Oliva
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Proof Theory ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Backward Induction ◽  
Closed Formula ◽  
Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Finite Games ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Theoretic Technique

Using techniques from higher-type computability theory and proof theory we extend the well-known game-theoretic technique of backward induction to finite games of unbounded length. The main application is a closed formula for calculating strategy profiles in Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium even in the case of games where the length of play is not a-priori fixed.

THE EU SUGAR MARKET PROFILE AND ITS MAIN DRIVERS

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lubos SMUTKA ◽  
Irena BENEŠOVÁ ◽  
Patrik ROVNÝ ◽  
Renata MATYSIK-PEJAS
Keyword(s):  
Market Failure ◽  
Current System ◽  
Quota System ◽  
Considerable Debate ◽  
Sugar Market ◽  
The Common ◽  
The One ◽  
Production Capacities ◽  
The Given ◽  
The Eu

Sugar is one of the most important elements in human nutrition. The Common Market Organisation for sugar has been a subject of considerable debate since its establishment in 1968. The European agricultural market has been criticized for its heavy regulations and subsidization. The sugar market is one of the most regulated ones; however, this will change radically in 2017 when the current system of production quotas will end. The current EU sugar market changed is structure during the last several decades. The significant number of companies left the market and EU internal sugar market became more concentrated. The aim of this paper is presentation characteristics of sugar market with respect to the supposed market failure – reduction in competition. The analysis also identifies the main drivers and determinants of the EU especially quota sugar market. In relation to paper’s aim the following results are important. The present conditions of the European sugar market have led to market failure when nearly 75 % (10 million tonnes) of the quota is controlled by five multinational companies only. These multinational alliances (especially German and French one) are also taking control over the production capacities of their subsidiaries. In most countries, this causes serious problems as the given quota is controlled by one or two producers only. This is a significant indicator of market imperfection. The quota system cannot overcome the problem of production quotas on the one hand and the demand on the other; furthermore, it also leads to economic inefficiency. The current EU sugar market is under the control of only Sudzucker, Nordzucker, Pfeifer and Langen, Tereos and ABF.

The concept of motivation for effective credit risk management

2020 ◽  
Vol 26 (11) ◽  
pp. 2567-2593
Author(s):  
M.V. Pomazanov
Keyword(s):  
Risk Management ◽  
Economic Modeling ◽  
Type I ◽  
Credit Risk Management ◽  
Curve Modeling ◽  
Business Functions ◽  
The Common ◽  
Lending Decisions ◽  
The One

Subject. The study addresses the improvement of risk management efficiency and the quality of lending decisions made by banks. Objectives. The aim is to present the bank management with a fair algorithm for risk management motivation on the one hand, and the credit management (business) on the other hand. Within the framework of the common goal to maximize risk-adjusted income from loans, this algorithm will provide guidelines for ‘risk management’ and ‘business’ functions on how to improve individual and overall efficiency. Methods. The study employs the discriminant analysis, type I and II errors, Lorentz curve modeling, statistical analysis, economic modeling. Results. The paper offers a mechanism for assessing the quality of risk management decisions as opposed to (or in support of) decisions of the lending business when approving transactions. The mechanism rests on the approach of stating type I and II errors and the corresponding classical metric of the Gini coefficient. On the ‘business’ side, the mechanism monitors the improvement or deterioration of the indicator of changes in losses in comparison with the market average. Conclusions. The study substantiates the stimulating ‘rules of the game’ between the ‘business’ and ‘risk management’ to improve the efficiency of the entire business, to optimize interactions within the framework of internal competition. It presents mathematical tools to calculate corresponding indicators of the efficiency of internally competing entities.

Road names in Vologda dialect: semantics, derivational relations

2018 ◽  
Vol 79 (7) ◽  
pp. 77-82
Author(s):  
E. P. Andreeva
Keyword(s):  
Lexical Item ◽  
The Road ◽  
Russian Word ◽  
The Common ◽  
The One

The road image in the worldview of Northern-Russian countryman is described in the article. The semantic and derivational potential of the common Russian word in the dialect context is analyzed, the motivated reasons of the dialect words named ‘place, area that is moving on’are defined. The language means explicating characteristics of the one of the key images in the dialect linguistic worldview are marked. The article purpose is show the functioning of the common Russian word road in the dialect from the one side and to watch what other dialect units make the list of the lexical item group, what links and relations are among them.

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