Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yunan Li
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Interdependent Values

Robust Mechanism Design of Exchange

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pasha Andreyanov ◽  
Tomasz Sadzik
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Information Structure ◽  
Utility Functions ◽  
Double Auction ◽  
Exchange Economies ◽  
Incentive Compatible ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Interdependent Values ◽  
Robust Mechanism Design

Abstract In this article, we provide mechanisms for exchange economies with private information and interdependent values, which are ex post individually rational, incentive compatible, generate budget surplus, and are ex post nearly efficient, with many agents. Our framework is entirely prior-free, and we make no symmetry restrictions. The mechanisms can be implemented using a novel discriminatory conditional double auction, without knowledge of information structure or utility functions. We also show that no other mechanism satisfying the constraints can generate inefficiency of smaller order.

Combined Blocking Contours Concept for a Single-Row Planetary Mechanism Design

2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (5) ◽  
pp. 393
Author(s):  
Olga V. Egorova ◽  
Gennady A. Timofeev ◽  
Marina V. Samoilova
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Single Row ◽  
Planetary Mechanism
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