Collusion-free for Cloud Verification toward the View of Game Theory

2022 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Hongyang Yan ◽  
Nan Jiang ◽  
Kang Li ◽  
Yilei Wang ◽  
Guoyu Yang

At present, clients can outsource lots of complex and abundant computation, e.g., Internet of things (IoT), tasks to clouds by the “pay as you go” model. Outsourcing computation can save costs for clients and fully utilize the existing cloud infrastructures. However, it is hard for clients to trust the clouds even if blockchain is used as the trusted platform. In this article, we utilize the verification method as [email protected] by only two rational clouds, who hope to maximize their utilities. Utilities are defined as the incomes of clouds when they provide computation results to clients. More specifically, one client outsources two jobs to two clouds and each job contains n tasks, which include k identical sentinels. Two clouds can either honestly compute each task or collude on the identical sentinel tasks by agreeing on random values. If the results of identical sentinels are identical, then client regards the jobs as correctly computed without verification. Obviously, rational clouds have incentives to deviate by collusion and provide identical random results for a higher income. We discuss how to prevent collusion by using deposits, e.g., bit-coins. Furthermore, utilities for each cloud can be automatically assigned by a smart contract. We prove that, given proper parameters, two rational clouds will honestly send correct results to the client without collusion.

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Tao Li ◽  
Yuling Chen ◽  
Yanli Wang ◽  
Yilei Wang ◽  
Minghao Zhao ◽  
...  

Blockchain has been an emerging technology, which comprises lots of fields such as distributed systems and Internet of Things (IoT). As is well known, blockchain is the underlying technology of bitcoin, whose initial motivation is derived from economic incentives. Therefore, lots of components of blockchain (e.g., consensus mechanism) can be constructed toward the view of game theory. In this paper, we highlight the combination of game theory and blockchain, including rational smart contracts, game theoretic attacks, and rational mining strategies. When put differently, the rational parties, who manage to maximize their utilities, involved in blockchain chose their strategies according to the economic incentives. Consequently, we focus on the influence of rational parties with respect to building blocks. More specifically, we investigate the research progress from the aspects of smart contract, rational attacks, and consensus mechanism, respectively. Finally, we present some future directions based on the brief survey with respect to game theory and blockchain.


2020 ◽  
Vol 57 (6) ◽  
pp. 102308 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Esposito ◽  
Oscar Tamburis ◽  
Xin Su ◽  
Chang Choi

Author(s):  
Juan Ma ◽  
Yuling Chen ◽  
Ziping Wang ◽  
Guoxu Liu ◽  
Hongliang Zhu

AbstractThe delegating computation has become an irreversible trend, together comes the pressing need for fairness and efficiency issues. To solve this problem, we leverage game theory to propose a smart contract-based solution. First, according to the behavioral preferences of the participants, we design an incentive contract to describe the motivation of the participants. Next, to satisfy the fairness of the rational delegating computation, we propose a rational delegating computation protocol based on reputation and smart contract. More specifically, rational participants are to gain the maximum utility and reach the Nash equilibrium in the protocol. Besides, we design a reputation mechanism with a reputation certificate, which measures the reputation from multiple dimensions. The reputation is used to assure the client’s trust in the computing party to improve the efficiency of the protocol. Then, we conduct a comprehensive experiment to evaluate the proposed protocol. The simulation and analysis results show that the proposed protocol solves the complex traditional verification problem. We also conduct a feasibility study that involves implementing the contracts in Solidity and running them on the official Ethereum network. Meanwhile, we prove the fairness and correctness of the protocol.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Chuanxiu Chi ◽  
Yingjie Wang ◽  
Yingshu Li ◽  
Xiangrong Tong

With the advent of the Internet of Things (IoT) era, various application requirements have put forward higher requirements for data transmission bandwidth and real-time data processing. Mobile edge computing (MEC) can greatly alleviate the pressure on network bandwidth and improve the response speed by effectively using the device resources of mobile edge. Research on mobile crowdsourcing in edge computing has become a hot spot. Hence, we studied resource utilization issues between edge mobile devices, namely, crowdsourcing scenarios in mobile edge computing. We aimed to design an incentive mechanism to ensure the long-term participation of users and high quality of tasks. This paper designs a long-term incentive mechanism based on game theory. The long-term incentive mechanism is to encourage participants to provide long-term and continuous quality data for mobile crowdsourcing systems. The multistrategy repeated game-based incentive mechanism (MSRG incentive mechanism) is proposed to guide participants to provide long-term participation and high-quality data. The proposed mechanism regards the interaction between the worker and the requester as a repeated game and obtains a long-term incentive based on the historical information and discount factor. In addition, the evolutionary game theory and the Wright-Fisher model in biology are used to analyze the evolution of participants’ strategies. The optimal discount factor is found within the range of discount factors based on repeated games. Finally, simulation experiments verify the existing crowdsourcing dilemma and the effectiveness of the incentive mechanism. The results show that the proposed MSRG incentive mechanism has a long-term incentive effect for participants in mobile crowdsourcing systems.


Sensors ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 1793 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuta Nakamura ◽  
Yuanyu Zhang ◽  
Masahiro Sasabe ◽  
Shoji Kasahara

Due to the rapid penetration of the Internet of Things (IoT) into human life, illegal access to IoT resources (e.g., data and actuators) has greatly threatened our safety. Access control, which specifies who (i.e., subjects) can access what resources (i.e., objects) under what conditions, has been recognized as an effective solution to address this issue. To cope with the distributed and trust-less nature of IoT systems, we propose a decentralized and trustworthy Capability-Based Access Control (CapBAC) scheme by using the Ethereum smart contract technology. In this scheme, a smart contract is created for each object to store and manage the capability tokens (i.e., data structures recording granted access rights) assigned to the related subjects, and also to verify the ownership and validity of the tokens for access control. Different from previous schemes which manage the tokens in units of subjects, i.e., one token per subject, our scheme manages the tokens in units of access rights or actions, i.e., one token per action. Such novel management achieves more fine-grained and flexible capability delegation and also ensures the consistency between the delegation information and the information stored in the tokens. We implemented the proposed CapBAC scheme in a locally constructed Ethereum blockchain network to demonstrate its feasibility. In addition, we measured the monetary cost of our scheme in terms of gas consumption to compare our scheme with the existing Blockchain-Enabled Decentralized Capability-Based Access Control (BlendCAC) scheme proposed by other researchers. The experimental results show that the proposed scheme outperforms the BlendCAC scheme in terms of the flexibility, granularity, and consistency of capability delegation at almost the same monetary cost.


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