scholarly journals Incentive mechanism design for citizen reporting application using Stackelberg game

Author(s):  
I Made Ariya Sanjaya ◽  
Suhono Harso Supangkat ◽  
Jaka Sembiring ◽  
Widya Liana Aji

<p>The growing utilization of smartphones equipped with various sensors to collect and analyze information around us highlights a paradigm called mobile crowdsensing. To motivate citizens’ participation in crowdsensing and compensate them for their resources, it is necessary to incentivize the participants for their sensing service. There are several studies that used the Stackelberg game to model the incentive mechanism, however, those studies did not include a budget constraint for limited budget case. Another challenge is to optimize crowdsourcer (government) profit in conducting crowdsensing under the limited budget then allocates the budget to several regional working units that are responsible for the specific city problems. We propose an incentive mechanism for mobile crowdsensing based on several identified incentive parameters using the Stackelberg game model and applied the MOOP (multi-objective optimization problem) to the incentive model in which the participant reputation is taken into account. The evaluation of the proposed incentive model is performed through simulations. The simulation indicated that the result appropriately corresponds to the theoretical properties of the model.</p>

2021 ◽  
pp. 102626
Author(s):  
Hamta Sedghani ◽  
Danilo Ardagna ◽  
Mauro Passacantando ◽  
Mina Zolfy Lighvan ◽  
Hadi S. Aghdasi

Sensors ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (16) ◽  
pp. 4478
Author(s):  
Jing Zhang ◽  
Xiaoxiao Yang ◽  
Xin Feng ◽  
Hongwei Yang ◽  
An Ren

Selection of the optimal users to maximize the quality of the collected sensing data within a certain budget range is a crucial issue that affects the effectiveness of mobile crowdsensing (MCS). The coverage of mobile users (MUs) in a target area is relevant to the accuracy of sensing data. Furthermore, the historical reputation of MUs can reflect their previous behavior. Therefore, this study proposes a coverage and reputation joint constraint incentive mechanism algorithm (CRJC-IMA) based on Stackelberg game theory for MCS. First, the location information and the historical reputation of mobile users are used to select the optimal users, and the information quality requirement will be satisfied consequently. Second, a two-stage Stackelberg game is applied to analyze the sensing level of the mobile users and obtain the optimal incentive mechanism of the server center (SC). The existence of the Nash equilibrium is analyzed and verified on the basis of the optimal response strategy of mobile users. In addition, mobile users will adjust the priority of the tasks in time series to enable the total utility of all their tasks to reach a maximum. Finally, the EM algorithm is used to evaluate the data quality of the task, and the historical reputation of each user will be updated accordingly. Simulation experiments show that the coverage of the CRJC-IMA is higher than that of the CTSIA. The utility of mobile users and SC is higher than that in STD algorithms. Furthermore, the utility of mobile users with the adjusted task priority is greater than that without a priority order.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Song Wang ◽  
Yang Zhao ◽  
Lanfeng Liu ◽  
Fuhua Huang

This paper studies the incentive mechanism of multitask cooperation in logistics service supply chain (LSSC) by building a dynamic incentive model. Research shows the following: (1) the implicit reputation in dynamic cooperation can effectively improve system incentive effectiveness; (2) the difference in the contribution of different logistics cooperation to the performance of the LSSC has a significant impact on the incentive effect; (3) when two kinds of cooperation tasks have complementary relationships, both the LSP’s choice of logistics tasks and the incentives will simultaneously act on the two types of cooperation tasks; and (4) the antirisk degree of LSI and the environment uncertainty will also have a certain impact on the incentive effect of the LSSC. Therefore, the LSI should comprehensively consider the requirements of logistics cooperation and the risk tolerance of LSI to be chosen.


2011 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 231-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiankun Zhang ◽  
Jingfeng Yuan ◽  
Mirosław J. Skibniewski

Currently, the subject of housing in China is of great interest to many researchers, since improvements in living conditions for the largest population in the world have not kept pace with the territory's economic growth. This paper describes basic social housing situations in China, and assesses the inequality in housing reform since 1990s as a result of overall economic improvement. In order to reduce the degree of inequality in China's social housing, this paper is focusing on the policy management of access to economically affordable housing because housing affordability in China is a pressing social and economic issue, particularly for low-income families due to an unreasonable mechanism. The related policies are analyzed in is paper by using incentive mechanism design, which reveals that supervision and announcement system, the restriction in current mechanism, and the area of economically affordable house are critical for the effectiveness of present polices. Furthermore, a housing area calculation model based on the incentive mechanism design is presented and an illustrated case of Beijing City is also conducted, which can maximize the utility of government considering incentive compatibility. Finally, some policy suggestions are explored including enhancing external environment and establishing internal mechanism. Santrauka Būsto tema Kinijoje šiuo metu itin domina daug mokslininkų, nes šalyje, kuri turi daugiausia gyventojų pasaulyje, gyvenimo sąlygų gerėjimas atsiliko nuo šalies ekonominio augimo. Šiame darbe nusakoma bazinio socialinio būsto padėtis Kinijoje ir vertinamas XX a. 10-ajame dešimtmetyje dėl bendros ūkio padėties gerėjimo prasidėjusios būsto reformos netolygumas. Siekiant mažinti Kinijos socialinio būsto skirtumų lygį, šiame darbe daugiausia dėmesio skiriama politinėms priemonėms, kurias pasitelkus valdoma prieiga prie įperkamo būsto, nes dėl neracionalaus mechanizmo būsto įperkamumas Kinijoje yra neatidėliotina socialinė ir ekonominė problema, o ypač mažas pajamas gaunančioms šeimoms. Atitinkamos politikos kryptys šiame darbe nagrinėjamos pasitelkus skatinamojo mechanizmo projektavimą, kuris rodo, kad priežiūros ir praneši-mų sistema, dabartinio mechanizmo suvaržymas ir įperkamo būsto plotas turi lemiamą reikšmę dabartinių politikos krypčių veiksmingumui. Be to, pateikiamas skatinamojo mechanizmo projektavimu pagristas būsto ploto skaičiavimo modelis ir atliekamas Pekino atvejo tyrimas, kuris, atsižvelgiant į skatinamųjų priemonių suderinamumą, gali maksimaliai padidinti vyriausybės naudingumą. Pabaigoje nagrinėjami keli politiniai siūlymai, įskaitant išorinės aplinkos gerinimą ir vidinio mechanizmo sukūrimą.


Author(s):  
Jia Xu ◽  
Yuanhang Zhou ◽  
Yuqing Ding ◽  
Dejun Yang ◽  
Lijie Xu

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document