Western Cold War Broadcasting

1999 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 168-175 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Critchlow

In the 1940s and 1950s, Western governments turned to radio as the most effective means of countering the Soviet information monopoly. U.S. and West European radio stations attempted to provide listeners with the kind of programs they might expect from their own radio stations if the latter were free of censorship. For most of these listeners in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the broadcasts were their only contact with the outside world. The importance of the foreign radio programs was confirmed not only by audience estimates, but also by the considerable efforts the Communist regimes made to jam the transmissions. Given the importance of foreign broadcasting for the political life of the Soviet bloc, it is remarkable that these broadcasts have received scant scholarly attention in the Western countries that sponsored them. The three books reviewed here help to fill that gap.

2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 73-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michelle Denise Getchell

This article reevaluates the U.S.-backed coup in 1954 that overthrew Guatemala's democratically elected president, Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán. The coup is generally portrayed as the opening shot of the Cold War in the Western Hemisphere and a watershed moment for U.S.–Latin American relations, when the United States supplanted its Good Neighbor Policy with a hardline anti-Communist approach. Despite the extensive literature on the coup, the Soviet Union's perspectives on the matter have received scant discussion. Using Soviet-bloc and United Nations (UN) archival sources, this article shows that Latin American Communists and Soviet sympathizers were hugely influential in shaping Moscow's perceptions of hemispheric relations. Although regional Communists petitioned the Soviet Union to provide support to Árbenz, officials in Moscow were unwilling to prop up what they considered a “bourgeois-democratic” revolution tottering under the weight of U.S. military pressure. Soviet leaders were, however, keen to use their position on the UN Security Council to challenge the authority of the Organization of American States and undermine U.S. conceptions of “hemispheric solidarity.” The coup, moreover, revealed the force of anti-U.S. nationalism in Latin America during a period in which Soviet foreign policy was in flux and the Cold War was becoming globalized.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-29
Author(s):  
Jay Scherer

In 1976, amidst a period of détente in the Cold War, the Government of Canada officially hosted an inaugural open-play invitational ice hockey tournament. A detailed narration of these events, pieced together from archival sources, allows scholars to understand the negotiations to prepare the political terrain for the event, including efforts to secure the official endorsement of the International Ice Hockey Federation for a tournament sponsored by the Government of Canada in exchange for Canada’s return to international competition in 1977; the participation of various countries and their respective hockey governing bodies, especially the Soviet Union, in an international tournament featuring professional players; and an agreement with the North American professional hockey cartels, especially the National Hockey League, to allow star players to participate in the event. The success of the 1976 Canada Cup accelerated the commodification and commercialization of hockey both in North America and globally—a process that was increasingly driven by the interests and aspirations of the National Hockey League. At the center of this history is one increasingly powerful—and avaricious—character: Alan Eagleson.


2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Herf

Israel's Moment is a major new account of how a Jewish state came to be forged in the shadow of World War Two and the Holocaust and the onset of the Cold War. Drawing on new research in government, public and private archives, Jeffrey Herf exposes the political realities that underpinned support for and opposition to Zionist aspirations in Palestine. In an unprecedented international account, he explores the role of the United States, the Arab States, the Palestine Arabs, the Zionists, and key European governments from Britain and France to the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Poland. His findings reveal a spectrum of support and opposition that stood in sharp contrast to the political coordinates that emerged during the Cold War, shedding new light on how and why the state of Israel was established in 1948 and challenging conventional associations of left and right, imperialism and anti-imperialism, and racism and anti-racism.


Author(s):  
Hafner Gerhard

This contribution discusses the intervention of five member states of the Warsaw Pact Organization under the leading role of the Soviet Union in the CSSR in August 1968, which terminated the “Prague Spring” in a forceful manner. After presenting the facts of this intervention and its reasons, it describes the legal positions of the protagonists of this intervention as well as that of the states condemning it, as presented in particular in the Security Council. It then examines the legality of this intervention against general international law and the particular views of the Soviet doctrine existing at that time, defending some sort of socialist (regional) international law. This case stresses the requirement of valid consent for the presence of foreign troops in a country and denies the legality of any justification solely based on the necessity to maintain the political system within a state.


2006 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 635-644
Author(s):  
MARTIN H. FOLLY

The Second World War continues to be an attractive subject for scholars and even more so for those writing for a general readership. One of the more traditional areas of focus has been the ‘Big Three’ – the alliance of the United States with Britain and the Soviet Union. Public interest in the three leaders – Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin – remains high, and their decisions continue to resonate in the post-Cold War era, as demonstrated by continued (and often ahistorical) references to the decisions made at the Yalta Conference. Consequently, while other aspects of Second World War historiography have pushed into new avenues of exploration, that which has looked at the Grand Alliance has followed fairly conventional lines – the new Soviet bloc materials have been trawled to answer old questions and using the frames of reference that developed during the Cold War. This has left much to be said about the nature of the relationship of the United States with its great allies and the dynamics and processes of that alliance, and overlooked full and rounded analysis of the role of that alliance as the instrument of Axis defeat.


2010 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 98-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan P. Dobson

The U.S. strategic embargo against the Soviet bloc, adopted in 1947–1948, had been designed to restrict the supply of weapons technology to the Soviet Union and to retard Soviet economic growth. When these objectives failed to materialize by 1957, a lengthy reevaluation of the purpose, benefits, and costs of the embargo ensued. The Kennedy administration eventually concluded that the strategic embargo was an integral part of U.S. Cold War strategy and, as such, could not be abandoned without suffering important diplomatic costs. The embargo became a means of bargaining with the Soviet Union and a medium through which to convey messages. Like any other tool of statecraft, the embargo proved to be as flexible as officials wanted to make it. Even if it failed in its original purpose, it could be used in other ways.


Author(s):  
Thomas C. Field Jr.

The Cold War in Latin America had marked consequences for the region’s political and economic evolution. From the origins of US fears of Latin American Communism in the early 20th century to the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, regional actors played central roles in the drama. Seeking to maximize economic benefit while maintaining independence with regard to foreign policy, Latin Americans employed an eclectic combination of liberal and anti-imperialist discourses, balancing frequent calls for anti-Communist hemispheric unity with periodic diplomatic entreaties to the Soviet bloc and the nonaligned Third World. Meanwhile, US Cold War policies toward the region ranged from progressive developmentalism to outright military invasions, and from psychological warfare to covert paramilitary action. Above all, the United States sought to shore up its allies and maintain the Western Hemisphere as a united front against extra-hemispheric ideologies and influence. The Cold War was a bloody, violent period for Latin America, but it was also one marked by heady idealism, courageous political action, and fresh narratives about Latin America’s role in the world, all of which continue to inform regional politics to this day.


2005 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 307-321
Author(s):  
Roland Marchal

From 1988, there has been a change in the pace of events in the Horn of Africa. The United States and the Soviet Union opted out of the logic of cold war which obtained up to then, leaving more room open to an intervention by neighbouring States (Israel, Irak, the Gulf States). The extension into the Horn of the Middle-Eastern rivalries is all the more real since the political powers are all in a precarious position, despite their use of an unmitigated coercion. Yet, the internal dynamics, which are complex, are still prevailing. It does not seem from their current evolution that there is any hope for real peace talks to end the conflicts.


1983 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 233-262
Author(s):  
Jyotirmoy Banerjee

In September 1982 the Social and Free Democratic coalition1 collapsed after thirteen years' rule; the conservative Union parties coalesced with the Free Democrats to return to power in Bonn. Two months later Brezhnev died in Moscow amidst an ongoing new Cold War with the Reagan Administration. His successor, as the Chief of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), turned out to be the former KGB chief, Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov. With time running out for NATO's deployment of new missiles in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and other West European states, and a significant conservative victory in the United Kingdom elections in June 1983, elements of uncertainty in the crucial relations between Bonn and Moscow may have increased. Between 1969 and 1982 the (SPD) had managed to reverse the (CDU's) twenty years of hardline approach to the Soviet bloc. Despite irritations, Bonn under SPD-led governments managed to keep its ostpolitik on an even keel. Central European detente seemed to have survived the collapse of the larger, superpower rapprochement. The critical question in mid-1983, following the conservative election victories in Bonn and London and against the background of significant US-USSR rivalry, is whether the latter rivalry would also suck into its vortex relative peace in Central Europe. Should that happen, the Cold War would return to Europe, reinforce the anomalies emanating from a divided Germany as well as the superpower adversary relationship in turn. In this context the present article will, first, take a retrospective look at ostpolitik, its causes and achievements, then explore Bonn's relations with Moscow as they evolved while the SPD was in power and, finally analyze the implications of the leadership changes in Bonn and Moscow for the future of ostpolitik.


1960 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 66-75 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. J. Honey

“This is an historic event of great significance in the political life of the Vietnam Workers' Party and people. With incomparable feelings of joy, we warmly congratulate the conference on its important achievements.” So ran the editorial in the Jen-min Jih-pao (People's Daily) on the morning of September 12, although—unless the Chinese are a nation of masochists, which I refuse to believe—it is hard to discover the reason for this jubilation, for China had just suffered her most humiliating defeat to date in the ideological war she is waging against the Soviet Union. The occasion was the Third Congress of the Vietnam Lao-Dong, or Workers', Party, which met in Hanoi from September 5 to 10. Since it was the first such congress for nine years, the Vietnamese Communists had spared neither trouble nor expense to make it a resounding success. Official delegations from the fraternal parties of eleven Communist states attended, together with representatives from Communist parties of seven non-Communist countries and fraternal diplomats stationed in Hanoi. The date of the congress had been carefully fixed so that proceedings would open three days after North Vietnam's National Day, and the foreign visitors had been invited to come a few days early to sample the delights of this celebration too.


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