Antigone Betrayed? The European Court of Human Rights’ Decisions on Conscientious Objection to Abortion in the Cases of Grimmark v. Sweden and Steen v. Sweden

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Irene Domenici
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
United Kingdom ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Conscientious Objection ◽  
European Convention ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
European Consensus ◽  
Article 9 ◽  
European Court

Abstract The article deals with the recent decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in the cases of two Swedish midwives who claimed a right to conscientious objection to abortion under Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). After giving an overview of the relevant previous case-law of the Court, I argue that the decisions of inadmissibility in the midwives’ cases are a step backwards in the promising evolution of the Court’s jurisprudence that began with the judgments in the cases of Eweida and others v. the United Kingdom and Bayatyan v. Armenia. In particular, the Court’s reasoning in Grimmark v. Sweden and Steen v. Sweden failed to take into consideration the existence of a European consensus and the fact that less restrictive alternatives could have reasonably accommodated the conscientious claims of the two applicants.

Overruling ‘the Salduz Doctrine’ in Beuze v Belgium: The ECtHR’s further retreat from the Salduz principles on the right to access to lawyer

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 342-362
Author(s):  
Ergul Celiksoy
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
United Kingdom ◽  
Case Law ◽  
European Convention ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
European Court ◽  
Increasing Trend ◽  
Grand Chamber ◽  
The Right ◽  
Right Of Access

In November 2018, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights delivered its judgment in the case of Beuze v Belgium. Relying on Ibrahim and Others v the United Kingdom, the Grand Chamber held that the Salduz principles require a two-stage test of analysis, and hence, ruled out that systematic statutory restriction of a general and mandatory nature would in itself constitute an automatic violation of Article 6 § 3(c) of the European Convention on Human Rights. However, the Beuze judgment appears to be very controversial, since the Grand Chamber failed to put forward any convincing reason why it departed from previous case law, particularly Dayanan v Turkey and other judgments against Turkey. In their separate opinion, the concurring Judges in Beuze were concerned that the Beuze judgment overruled ‘ Salduz itself and all other cases that have applied the Salduz test’, and thus, ‘actually distorts and changes the Salduz principle and devalues the right that the Court established previously’. This article analyses the Beuze judgment in the light of the Court’s recent jurisprudence in order to examine whether it contradicts and dilutes the principles previously set out. Further, it discusses the implications of the new standards established in Ibrahim and Others and in subsequent cases, particularly Beuze. Particular attention is paid to the questions of how ‘fair’ is the application of overall fairness assessment in every case, how may the Court’s changing direction of approach concerning the right to access to a lawyer affect the increasing trend of recognition thereof, as a rule, by the contracting states, and finally, to what extent the new principles, especially those established in Beuze, comply with Directive 2013/48/EU on the right of access to a lawyer.

THE COURTS AND THE ECHR: A PRINCIPLED APPROACH TO THE STRASBOURG JURISPRUDENCE

2013 ◽  
Vol 72 (2) ◽  
pp. 289-300 ◽  
Author(s):  
EIRIK BJORGE
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
United Kingdom ◽  
Case Law ◽  
European Convention ◽  
National Courts ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
European Court ◽  
Judicial Authority ◽  
The Way

AbstractThe way in which the courts in the United Kingdom have interpreted and applied the Ullah principle has created problems in the national application of the European Convention on Human Rights. As is evident particularly in Ambrose, this is partly because Lord Bingham's approach in Ullah has been misunderstood. The article analyses these issues in relation to the notion of binding precedent, finding that judicial authority belongs to principles. The national courts ought not, though that is what the Ullah–Ambrose approach enjoins, to expend their energies seeking to align the case before them with the least dissimilar of the reported cases. Rather they should stand back from the case law of the European Court, and apply the broad principles upon which the jurisprudence is founded.

scholarly journals CASE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN DECISIONS REGARDING NON-COMPLIANCE OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-46
Author(s):  
Dzhuzha О. M. ◽  
◽  
Melnychenko І. P. ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
United Kingdom ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Legal Analysis ◽  
Life Imprisonment ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Right

The article provides a legal analysis of the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in such cases like “Vinter and Others v. The United Kingdom”, “Hutchinson v. The United Kingdom”. The European Court of Human Rights has established key standards for those sentenced to life imprisonment, compliance with which will ensure that this type of punishment meets the requirements of the Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Such standards are: 1) sentencing of life imprisonment is not prohibited and does not conflict with the Article 3 or any other article of the Convention. The imposition of “non-reducible” life imprisonment may raise questions of compliance with the requirements of the Article 3 of the Convention; 2) in decision making whether life imprisonment can be considered as “non-reducible”, it is necessary to establish whether the person convicted to life imprisonment had any prospect of release. If national law provides for the possibility of reviewing life imprisonment regarding its mitigating, reducing, terminating or releasing, this is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of th Article 3 of the Convention; 3) for the purposes of the Article 3 of the Convention it is sufficient that life imprisonment is reducible de jure and de facto; 4) European penitentiary policy is currently focusing on the correctional purpose of imprisonment, in particular until the end of long prison sentences; 5) at the very beginning of the sentence a person convicted to life imprisonment has the right to know what he must do to consider the possibility of his release and under what conditions the sentence will be reviewed or also in what order a request to this may be made; 6) if domestic law does not provide for any mechanism or possibility to review life imprisonment, then the non-compliance with the requirements of the Article 3 of the Convention occurs at the time of imposition of life imprisonment and not at a later stage. The importance of such standards separating of the European Court of Human Rights for the national theory and practice of life imprisonment is that these provisions are effective guidelines for determining the prospects of releasing from sentencing in the form life imprisonment. Key words: European Court of Human Rights, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, case law, convict, life imprisonment.

Passive Proselytism

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 244-269
Author(s):  
Christine Carpenter
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Case Law ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Freedom Of Religion ◽  
Article 9 ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Right

Abstract Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights protects the right to freedom of religion and conscience. The language of Article 9(1) has been interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights as including protections for acts of proselytism, when properly committed and respectful of the rights and freedoms of others. This was the view taken in the foundational Article 9 case of the Court, Kokkinakis v. Greece. In the decades since Kokkinakis, however, the view of the Court on proselytism appears to have shifted, in particular in Article 9 cases involving religious garments. This article seeks to determine whether the Court is consistent in its views on proselytism between these religious garment cases and earlier examples of Article 9 case law.

scholarly journals Deprivation of Liberty and Human Dignity in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 150 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Spano
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Criminal Justice ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Penal Policy ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
European Court ◽  
Life Sentence

In its landmark 2013 judgment of Vinter and Others v. the United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights held that a life sentence which is not de jure and de facto reducible amounts to a breach of the prohibition of inhuman and degrading punishment, as enshrined in Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The author, a judge of the Strasbourg Court, analyses the Vinter judgment both as it stands alone as well as how it fits into and, now, influences the Court’s case-law on Article 3 and 5 of the Convention, before reviewing the procedural requirements laid down by the Court for a ‘Vinter review’ of life sentences. In doing so, the author examines the underlying tensions between the conception of penal policy as falling within the exclusive domain of domestic decision-making and the individualistic and dignitarian notion of human rights in which the Convention system is firmly grounded. The article is based on the 2016 Bergen Lecture on Criminal Law and Criminal Justice which the author gave on 26 October 2016 at the Faculty of Law, University of Bergen. 

scholarly journals McGoliath v. David: The European Court of Human Rights Recent “Equality of Arms” Decision

2005 ◽  
Vol 6 (5) ◽  
pp. 895-907
Author(s):  
Monique C. Lillard
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
United Kingdom ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Legal Aid ◽  
Small Step ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
European Court ◽  
Private Citizens ◽  
Fair Hearing

The European Court of Human Rights has issued a judgment which adds to the developing law of Article 6, Section 1 (right to a fair hearing) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR or “the Convention”) and which sheds light on Article 10 (freedom of expression) and its interaction with the law of defamation. Practically, the decision in Steel and Morris v. the United Kingdom (hereinafter referred to as Steel) is likely to prompt a review of the availability of legal aid for defendants in civil cases in the United Kingdom (“UK”), and may be a small step towards balancing the arms in ad terrorem suits brought by large corporations against private citizens in order to silence public debate.

School Bans on the Wearing of Religious Symbols: Examining the Implications of Recent Case Law from the UK

2009 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erica Howard
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Case Law ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Religious Symbols ◽  
Article 9 ◽  
European Court ◽  
Religious Clothing ◽  
Religious Dress ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Right

AbstractThis article examines school bans on the wearing of religious symbols and starts with a discussion of the arguments for the imposition of a ban and the counter arguments against these. The question whether a ban on the wearing of religious clothing in schools is a violation of the right to manifest one's religion as guaranteed by Article 9 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) is analyzed using the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and of the English courts in relation to such bans in education. The cases appear to suggest that such bans can be considered an interference with the right to manifest one's religion under Article 9(1), but that these bans can be justified under Article 9(2) in certain circumstances. Two important considerations in the decision of the courts are the way decisions to ban certain forms of religious dress are made and whether alternative ways of manifesting the religion are available.

STRASBOURG'S U-TURN ON INDEPENDENCE AS PART OF AN EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATION UNDER ARTICLE 2

2015 ◽  
Vol 74 (3) ◽  
pp. 415-419 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaka Kukavica ◽  
Veronika Fikfak
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
United Kingdom ◽  
Case Law ◽  
The State ◽  
Recent History ◽  
Private Party ◽  
Turn On ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
European Court ◽  
Lower Standard

AFTER McCann and Others v the United Kingdom (Application no. 18984/91) (1995) ECHR 31, in which the European Court of Human Rights first read into Article 2 the procedural obligation of effective investigation, Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç (Application no. 24014/05), 14 April 2015, is perhaps one the most interesting decisions on the nature of the obligation to conduct an effective investigation in the Court's recent history. The Court, through its case law, has clarified that, when individuals have been killed by the state or a private party, the Contracting Parties have to undertake an investigation under Article 2, which has to be independent, adequate, prompt, and publicly scrutinised. It has been unclear, however, whether the element of independence had to meet criteria similar to those under Article 6, which guarantees a fair trial, or whether a lower standard was sufficient for an investigation to be considered effective in the context of Article 2. The Strasbourg court went back and forth on the issue (even adopting an absolutist approach in Al-Skeini and Others v the United Kingdom (Application no. 55721/07) (2011) ECHR 1093) and it was not until Mustafa Tunç that the issue of independence under Article 2 was addressed head-on.

scholarly journals True Believers? – Sincerity and Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-28
Author(s):  
Tim Wolff
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Burden Of Proof ◽  
Case Law ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Ulterior Motive ◽  
Article 9 ◽  
European Court ◽  
Freedom Of Belief

Sincerity of belief as a condition for the protection of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights – Three types of insincerity in the context of freedom of belief – Parody religions – Fraudulent religions – Conceptual linkage between insincerity and ulterior motive – Insincerity defined as demanding to practise one’s ‘belief’ while solely having an ulterior motive – Circumstances that should not be considered evidence of insincerity: implausible manifestations, inconsistency with co-believers – Circumstances that should be considered evidence of insincerity: obvious unseriousness, ignorance, personal inconsistency – Comparison to rejected and accepted forms of evidence of insincerity in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights – Burden of proof in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.

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