The Maturing of Soviet-Chinese Relations

1985 ◽  
Vol 481 (1) ◽  
pp. 70-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
YAN MEI
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Principal Axis ◽  
People’S Republic Of China ◽  
People's Republic Of China ◽  
Soviet Policy ◽  
Republic Of China ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Ideological Differences ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The U.S

It is argued that Soviet policy toward the People's Republic of China since 1960 has been reactive to Chinese initiatives. Both Chinese and Soviet policies are analyzed in the context of the maturation of the Sino-Soviet relationship. The U.S.-Soviet relationship is seen to be the principal axis of conflict within this triangle. China and the Soviet Union now exhibit an increasing realism and tolerance toward each other, with an attempt to minimize their ideological differences and former suspicions. Both countries are committed to normalizing the relationship.

Recruiting Agents in Industry and Trade—Lifting the Veil on Early People's Republic of China Operational Work

2011 ◽  
Vol 46 (5) ◽  
pp. 1345-1369 ◽  
Author(s):  
MICHAEL SCHOENHALS
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
People’S Republic Of China ◽  
Public Security ◽  
People's Republic Of China ◽  
Republic Of China ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Operational Activities ◽  
The Veil ◽  
Economic Espionage

AbstractThis paper is concerned with the operational activities of the public security organs of the People's Republic of China during the immediate post-1949 period of regime consolidation. The main part of the paper is a case-study of a 1950 pilot scheme to recruit agents in critical sectors of industry and trade in the city of Yingkou in Northeast China, a scheme in due course subsumed under a nationwide programme with a similar focus. In the years to follow, the operational recruitment of agents would become one of China's arguably most important operational responses to the twin Cold War threats of economic espionage and—above all—sabotage. This paper's findings suggest, with respect to operational activities, that in order to represent and explain more fully, in Leopold von Ranke's words, ‘how things really were’, social and political historians may well want to shift their focus away from successive highly public Maoist ‘mass movements’ and look instead to what transpired out of the public eye in the interregnum of ordinary times that such movements punctuated. If and when they do, they will discover significant yet hitherto largely unexplored similarities between the work of the early People's Republic of China public security organs and their counterparts in the Soviet Union and other (former) socialist states.

“Playing a Game,” Finding a “Lever”

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard A. Moss
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Nixon Administration ◽  
People’S Republic Of China ◽  
People's Republic Of China ◽  
Republic Of China ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Ping Pong

The Sino-Soviet conflict, which first surfaced in the late 1950s and degenerated into armed border clashes in 1969, proved to be the main catalyst for Sino-American rapprochement. The China question almost immediately entered into the dialogue of the Kissinger-Dobrynin channel. Publicly, the Nixon administration said it would pursue relationships with both the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. Privately, Nixon and Kissinger hoped to play the Soviets and the Chinese off each other—the concept of triangular diplomacy. Triangular diplomacy had less to do with the concrete and crude move of playing the powers off each other than it did with trying to influence the perceptions and emotions of Communist leaders. The documentary record suggests that it was only after Sino-American rapprochement had been set in motion in April-May 1971, with the Chinese Ping Pong diplomacy and the secret traffic through the Pakistani channel, that U.S. policymakers began to talk of playing the Communist powers off one another for American advantage.

scholarly journals From Crisis Management to Realignment of Forces

2022 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 116-154
Author(s):  
Alsu Tagirova
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Crisis Management ◽  
Relative Position ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
People’S Republic Of China ◽  
Political Environment ◽  
People's Republic Of China ◽  
Republic Of China ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Political Advantage

Abstract In 1969, after a series of large-scale border clashes, the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union finally decided to enter negotiations to prevent a wider military confrontation. The de-escalation process that ensued gave Soviet and Chinese leaders two options: either to compromise and reach a settlement or to go back to a strategy of delay. This article shows that the choice between the two options depended on whether either state believed it could improve its relative position in a better political environment or could gain certain political advantage by immediately settling the dispute. Ultimately, both sides chose to return to a strategy of delay. The Chinese decision was influenced by the strategic configuration of U.S. “triangular” diplomacy and the hope that it would enhance the PRC's relative position. For Soviet officials, the outcome stemmed from a lack of trust in their Chinese counterparts.

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