Unsuccessful Success? Failed No-Confidence Motions, Competence Signals, and Electoral Support

2011 ◽  
Vol 44 (11) ◽  
pp. 1474-1499 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laron K. Williams
Keyword(s):  
Formal Model ◽  
Original Data ◽  
Vote Share ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Electoral Support ◽  
The Government ◽  
Opposition Parties

If no-confidence motions are primarily motivated by bringing down governments, why do only approximately 5% of no-confidence motions in advanced parliamentary democracies from 1960 result in the termination of government? In this project the author addresses this puzzle by developing a formal model of the electoral benefits of no-confidence motions and tests these hypotheses with the use of an original data set. No-confidence motions represent highly visible opportunities for opposition parties to highlight their strength or ability compared to the government in the hopes of improving their vote shares. The author finds support for the signal-based theory on a sample of 20 advanced parliamentary democracies from 1960 to 2008. Although no-confidence motions result in decreases for the government parties, the opposition parties that propose the motion experience boosts in vote share. This relationship is even stronger when the proposing party is an alternative governing possibility—illustrated by the conditioning impacts of the number of parliamentary parties and the opposition party’s ideological extremism. This provides an explanation as to why opposition parties would continue to challenge the government even though the motions are likely to fail.

Divided We Fall: Opposition Fragmentation and the Electoral Fortunes of Governing Parties

2009 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 419-434 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ko Maeda
Keyword(s):  
Economic Performance ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Economic Voting ◽  
Vote Share ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Clarity Of Responsibility ◽  
Election Results ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Opposition Parties

This article introduces the concept of opposition fragmentation into the study of the determinants of election results. Empirical studies have demonstrated that anti-government economic voting is likely to take place where the clarity of responsibility (the degree to which voters can attribute policy responsibility to the government) is high. This argument is extended by focusing on the effects of the degree of opposition fragmentation in influencing the extent to which poor economic performance decreases the government’s vote share. With data from seventeen parliamentary democracies, it is shown that when there are fewer opposition parties, the relationship between economic performance and governing parties’ electoral fortune is stronger. Opposition fragmentation appears to be as strong a factor as the clarity of responsibility.

More spotlight, more problems? Westminster parliamentary systems and leadership replacement in large opposition parties

2016 ◽  
Vol 24 (5) ◽  
pp. 588-597 ◽  
Author(s):  
Florence So
Keyword(s):  
Original Data ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
Proportional Hazard ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Cox Proportional Hazard ◽  
Parliamentary Systems ◽  
Cox Proportional Hazard Models ◽  
Leadership Turnover ◽  
Opposition Parties

In this article, I argue that Westminster parliamentary systems encourage large opposition parties to replace their leaders between elections. Parliamentary system structures how parties compete over legislative outcomes. In Westminster systems, the government’s dominance in the legislative process promotes an adversarial government–opposition relationship. Subsequently, large opposition parties’ electoral prospects are tied to their ability to discredit the government’s policy agenda. Since this responsibility falls to party leaders, leaders of large opposition parties directly affect their parties’ electoral prospects, and parties are more motivated to replace those who are ineffective in damaging the government’s credibility. Therefore, leaders of large opposition parties in Westminster systems carry a higher risk of replacement than their counterparts in other parliamentary systems. I construct an original data set on party leadership turnover in 14 established parliamentary democracies. Results from Cox proportional hazard models support my claim and suggest that institution influences intraparty dynamics.

Opposition Parties and the Timing of Successful No-Confidence Motions

2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 533-553 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laron K. Williams
Keyword(s):  
Formal Model ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Democratic Accountability ◽  
Strategic Interactions ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Factors Influencing ◽  
The Government ◽  
Policy Direction ◽  
Parliamentary Politics ◽  
Opposition Parties

The power to remove the government via no-confidence motion is a powerful tool afforded to the opposition. By triggering the government’s downfall, opposition parties can substantially influence policy direction in parliamentary democracies. Yet, we know surprisingly little about how government and opposition parties interact to determine the occurrence of no-confidence motions and their chance of success. In this project, I develop a simple formal model that identifies the factors influencing when opposition parties propose no-confidence motions and their outcomes. I find support for these expectations by estimating an empirical model that is explicitly derived from the underlying theoretical model. Unlike previous empirical studies of government stability, this project honors the strategic interactions that occur between government and opposition parties. In addition to the possibility of the motion passing, opposition parties are motivated by electoral considerations, which induce different behaviors at various stages of the electoral cycle. This project offers a number of implications for the study of parliamentary politics, including theories of opposition behavior, democratic accountability, and government duration and termination.

How local personal vote-earning attributes affect the aggregate party vote share: Evidence from the Belgian flexible-list PR system (2003–2014)

Politics ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 464-479
Author(s):  
Gert-Jan Put ◽  
Jef Smulders ◽  
Bart Maddens
Keyword(s):  
Regression Models ◽  
Empirical Test ◽  
Original Data ◽  
Ordinary Least Squares ◽  
Vote Share ◽  
District Level ◽  
National Party ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Geographically Distributed ◽  
Party Vote Shares

This article investigates the effect of candidates exhibiting local personal vote-earning attributes (PVEA) on the aggregate party vote share at the district level. Previous research has often assumed that packing ballot lists with localized candidates increases the aggregate party vote and seat shares. We present a strict empirical test of this argument by analysing the relative electoral swing of ballot lists at the district level, a measure of change in party vote shares which controls for the national party trend and previous party results in the district. The analysis is based on data of 7527 candidacies during six Belgian regional and federal election cycles between 2003 and 2014, which is aggregated to an original data set of 223 ballot lists. The ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models do not show a significant effect of candidates exhibiting local PVEA on relative electoral swing of ballot lists. However, the results suggest that ballot lists do benefit electorally if candidates with local PVEA are geographically distributed over different municipalities in the district.

scholarly journals Why Do States Intervene in the Elections of Others? The Role of Incumbent–Opposition Divisions

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johannes Bubeck ◽  
Kai Jäger ◽  
Nikolay Marinov ◽  
Federico Nanni
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Original Data ◽  
The United States ◽  
Polarization Measurement ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Democratic Process ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Policy Positions ◽  
Us Government ◽  
The Government

Abstract Why do states intervene in elections abroad? This article argues that outsiders intervene when the main domestic contenders for office adopt policy positions that differ from the point of view of the outside power. It refers to the split between the government's and opposition's positions as policy polarization. Polarization between domestic political forces, rather than the degree of unfriendliness of the government in office, attracts two types of interventions: process (for or against democracy) and candidate (for or against the government) interventions. The study uses a novel, original data set to track local contenders’ policy positions. It shows that the new policy polarization measurement outperforms a number of available alternatives when it comes to explaining process and candidate interventions. The authors use this measurement to explain the behavior of the United States as an intervener in elections from 1945 to 2012. The United States is more likely to support the opposition, and the democratic process abroad, if a pro-US opposition is facing an anti-US government. It is more likely to support the government, and undermine the democratic process abroad, if a pro-US government is facing an anti-US opposition. The article also presents the results for all interveners, confirming the results from the US case.

Who Governs in the Council? Determinants of Ministerial Participation in Council Meetings

2020 ◽  
pp. 088832541990052
Author(s):  
Jan Kovář ◽  
Kamil Kovář
Keyword(s):  
Original Data ◽  
Legislative Elections ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Member States ◽  
Popular Support ◽  
Low Level ◽  
The Government ◽  
Visegrád Countries ◽  
Country Specific ◽  
The Eu

The Council of the EU is the primary institution through which ministers of member states can express their positions on Commission proposals and vote upon legislation. This article first examines the extent to which ministers actually attend Council meetings before moving toward investigating the determinants of ministerial participation in over a period covering almost thirteen years between May 2004 and December 2016. It aims to identify determinants of why ministers from the Visegrad countries participate at some meetings and are absent from others. Using an original data set containing information about 940 Council meetings as well as several country-specific characteristics, we show that, on average, at about four out of every six meetings, ministers are absent. The results of our regressions indicate a pattern in which holding the office of the EU’s rotating presidency, the number of b-points on the agenda, and the size of the government increase the likelihood of ministerial participation in meetings. In contrast, high levels of popular support for Eurosceptic parties and holding of national legislative elections decrease the probability of ministerial attendance. Moreover, meetings of Council formations related to policy areas with a low level of EU competence are significantly less likely to be attended by ministers.

scholarly journals Election proximity and representation focus in party-constrained environments

2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (6) ◽  
pp. 674-685 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jorge M. Fernandes ◽  
Cristina Leston-Bandeira ◽  
Carsten Schwemmer
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Context ◽  
Original Data ◽  
Legislative Behavior ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Party Size ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Constrained Environments ◽  
Written Questions ◽  
Elected Representatives ◽  
Over Time

Do elected representatives have a time-constant representation focus or do they adapt their focus depending on election proximity? In this article, we examine these overlooked theoretical and empirical puzzles by looking at how reelection-seeking actors adapt their legislative behavior according to the electoral cycle. In parliamentary democracies, representatives need to serve two competing principals: their party and their district. Our analysis hinges on how representatives make a strategic use of parliamentary written questions in a highly party-constrained institutional context to heighten their reselection and reelection prospects. Using an original data set of over 32,000 parliamentary questions tabled by Portuguese representatives from 2005 to 2015, we examine how time interacts with two key explanatory elements: electoral vulnerability and party size. Results show that representation focus is not static over time and, in addition, that electoral vulnerability and party size shape strategic use of parliamentary questions.

scholarly journals Ministerial Autonomy, Parliamentary Scrutiny and Government Reform Output in Parliamentary Democracies

2021 ◽  
pp. 001041402110243
Author(s):  
Hanna Bäck ◽  
Wolfgang C. Müller ◽  
Mariyana Angelova ◽  
Daniel Strobl
Keyword(s):  
Agenda Setting ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Policy Reform ◽  
Original Data ◽  
Government Reform ◽  
Democratic Accountability ◽  
Limited Impact ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Institutional Settings ◽  
The Government

One of the most important decisions coalition partners make when forming a government is the division of ministries. Ministerial portfolios provide the party in charge with considerable informational and agenda-setting advantages, which parties can use to shape policies according to their preferences. Oversight mechanisms in parliaments play a central role in mitigating ministerial policy discretion, allowing coalition partners to control each other even though power has been delegated to individual ministers. However, we know relatively little about how such mechanisms influence the agenda-setting and gatekeeping powers of ministers and how much influence minister parties have on policy output relative to the government as a whole in different institutional settings. We fill this gap by analyzing original data on over 2000 important social and economic policy reform measures adopted in nine Western European countries over 20 years, based on a coding of more than 1200 country reports issued by the Economist Intelligence Unit and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). We find that parliaments with strong oversight powers constrain the agenda-setting capacity of minister parties but have limited impact on their gatekeeping capacity. Our findings have important implications for our understanding of policy-making and democratic accountability.

The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies

1996 ◽  
Vol 90 (2) ◽  
pp. 269-282 ◽  
Author(s):  
John D. Huber
Keyword(s):  
Formal Model ◽  
Institutional Arrangement ◽  
Vote Procedure ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Policy Conflict ◽  
Prime Ministers ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Significant Control ◽  
Members Of Parliament ◽  
The Government

I present a formal model of the confidence vote procedure, an institutional arrangement that permits a prime minister to attach the fate of a particular policy to a vote on government survival. The analysis indicates that confidence vote procedures make it possible for prime ministers to exercise significant control over the nature of policy outcomes, even when these procedures are not actually invoked. Neither cabinet ministers, through their authority over specific portfolios, nor members of parliament, through the use of no-confidence motions, can counteract the prime minister's policy control on the floor of parliament. The analysis also illuminates the circumstances under which prime ministers should invoke confidence vote procedures, focusing attention on the position-taking incentives of the parties that support the government, rather than on the level of policy conflict between the government and parliament.

Internal Opposition Dynamics and Restraints on Authoritarian Control

2017 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 883-900 ◽  
Author(s):  
Grant T. Buckles
Keyword(s):  
Formal Model ◽  
The Government ◽  
Opposition Parties

Autocrats rely on co-optation to limit opposition mobilization and remain in power. Yet not all opposition parties that pose a threat to their regime are successfully co-opted. This article provides a formal model to show that reliance on activists influences whether an opposition leader receives and accepts co-optation offers from an autocrat. Activists strengthen a party’s mobilization efforts, yet become disaffected when their leader acquiesces to the regime. This dynamic undermines the co-optation of parties with a strong activist base, particularly those with unitary leadership. Activists have less influence over elite negotiations in parties with divided leadership, which can promote collusion with the regime. The results ultimately suggest that party activism can erode authoritarian control, but may encourage wasteful conflicts with the government.

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