scholarly journals Regimes of Resonance: Cosmos, Empire, and Changing Technologies of CCP Rule

Modern China ◽  
2022 ◽  
pp. 009770042110680
Author(s):  
Vivienne Shue
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Historical Perspective ◽  
Xi Jinping ◽  
Marking Time ◽  
Symbolic Practices

This analysis aims to place certain key elements of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule observed under Xi Jinping today into longer and fuller historical perspective. It highlights trademark CCP practices of ordering space, marking time, potent political messaging, and vigorous propaganda diffusion as these have evolved over many years up to the present, reconsidering these in light of early Chinese cosmological thought and later symbolic practices of empire.

Writing about the Past, an Act of Resistance

2019 ◽  
pp. 21-42
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Official Publication ◽  
Xi Jinping ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Past ◽  
On Line ◽  
Historical Truth ◽  
Historical Accounts

Since taking power in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party has consistently tried to enforce a monopoly on the writing and interpretation of history. However, since 1998 individual initiatives have increased in the field of memory. Confronting official amnesia, victims of Maoist movements have decided to write their versions of history before it is too late. This chapter presents a typology of these endeavours. Annals of the Yellow Emperor (Yanhuang chunqiu), an official publication, enjoyed some freedom to publish dissenting historical accounts but was suppressed in 2016. With the rise of the internet, unofficial journals appeared that were often dedicated to a specific period: Tie Liu’s Small traces of the Past (Wangshi weihen) published accounts of victims of the Anti-Rightist movement for almost a decade before the editor was arrested; Wu Di’s Remembrance (Jiyi) founded by former Red Guards and rusticated youth circulates on line. The third type is the samizdat: targets of repression during Mao’s reign recount their experience in books that are published at their own expense and circulated privately. Most of these “entrepreneurs of memory” are convinced that restoring historical truth is a pre-requisite to China’s democratization. Since Xi Jinping came to power, they have suffered repression.

A Law Unto Itself: Chinese Communist Party Leadership and Yifa zhiguo in the Xi Era

Modern China ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 347-373 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan Trevaskes
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Power Relations ◽  
The Political ◽  
Xi Jinping ◽  
Party Leadership ◽  
The Law ◽  
Key Aspects

This article explores the political significance of “governing the nation in accordance with the law” 依法治国 ( yifa zhiguo) in the Xi Jinping era. It examines party statements and propaganda about the necessity of exercising party leadership over all key aspects of law-based governance, particularly the politico-legal system. The aim is to understand the strategic need for yifa zhiguo as part of the ideological repertoire of the Xi leadership. The argument is that yifa zhiguo is essentially an ideological and strategic message about power relations under Xi and the capacity of the party to withstand various threats to its credibility and thus ultimately to bring about the nation’s and party’s rejuvenation.

scholarly journals Deepening Not Departure: Xi Jinping's Governance of China's State-owned Economy

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Wendy Leutert ◽  
Sarah Eaton
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Management System ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
The Political ◽  
Centralized Control ◽  
Xi Jinping ◽  
Political Arena ◽  
Party Organizations ◽  
And Control ◽  
Radical Shift

Abstract To what extent has governance of China's state-owned economy changed under Xi Jinping? Against the background of momentous shifts in the political arena since 2012, some observe a decisive departure in Xi's approach to managing state-owned enterprises (SOEs): towards tight centralized control by the Chinese Communist Party and away from gradual marketization. Analysing the main aims and methods of SOE governance over the last two decades, we find that SOE policy under Xi exhibits a deepening of pre-existing trends rather than a departure. First, the essential vision of SOE functions articulated under Xi is strikingly consistent with that of his predecessors. Second, his administration's approach to governing SOEs is not novel; it relies on established mechanisms of bureaucratic design, the cadre management system, Party organizations and campaigns. While Xi has amplified Party-centred tools of command and control, this appears to be an incremental rather than a radical shift in approach.

Party Congress will set China's course to 2022

2017 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
100Th Anniversary ◽  
Chinese Politics ◽  
Xi Jinping ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Sixth Generation ◽  
The Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Party Congress

Subject China's 19th Communist Party Congress. Significance Preparations are underway for the 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, which is likely to be scheduled for October or November. Much political groundwork has been laid in support of President Xi Jinping and for progress on his vision for China. The Congress will set a direction towards the 100th anniversary in 2021 of the founding of the Party and the handover of power to a sixth generation of leaders shortly after. Impacts Beijing will probably be cautious in its foreign policy during the months running up to the Congress. Consolidating his position at the Congress should increase Xi's ability to press his economically reformist, politically illiberal agenda. Bar any serious reversal, Xi will be in a position to dominate Chinese politics after he retires from formal offices.

scholarly journals The Strength of a Weak Organization: The Communist Youth League as a Path to Power in Post-Mao China

2019 ◽  
Vol 243 ◽  
pp. 780-800
Author(s):  
Jérôme Doyon
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Xi Jinping ◽  
Communist Youth League ◽  
The Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Leading Cadres

AbstractHow can a weak organization be a path to power? The Chinese Communist Youth League (CYL) lacks autonomy and coherence yet it is seen as the cradle for one of the main factions within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). To understand this tension, I provide a novel account of the role played by the CYL in the recruitment of leading cadres since the 1980s. Against explanations based on factional struggles, I argue that the rise of CYL-affiliated cadres is a by-product of the organization's weakness. As the Party appoints CYL heads, CCP leaders, at various levels and at different points in time, have used the League to accelerate the promotion of their protégés. For years, there has been little incentive for Party bosses to dismantle this promotion path. However, in his bid to consolidate his power, Xi Jinping has weakened this channel so that it may not be used by potential rivals.

scholarly journals Chinese Football in the Era of Xi Jinping: What do Supporters Think?

2018 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ilker Gündoğan ◽  
Albrecht Sonntag
Keyword(s):  
Development Strategy ◽  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Online Survey ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Stakeholder Group ◽  
Xi Jinping ◽  
Republic Of China ◽  
The Chinese Dream ◽  
General Secretary

Football has become a field of high priority for development by the central government of the People's Republic of China. After Xi Jinping took office as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012, a football development strategy was launched, including four “comprehensive” reforms. The purpose of this study is to examine the perceptions of these reforms by Chinese football supporters – a fundamental stakeholder group – through an online survey. Particular emphasis was laid on how nationalistic attitudes underpin supporters' expectations, especially with regard to the concept of the “Chinese Dream.” In addition, issues of football governance were also addressed.

Rebuilding the Leninist Party Rule: Chinese Communist Party under Xi Jinping's Stewardship

2016 ◽  
Vol 08 (01) ◽  
pp. 5-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lance L P GORE
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Xi Jinping ◽  
Non Profit ◽  
State Administration ◽  
Party Members ◽  
The Chinese Communist Party

In 2015, Xi Jinping tried to restore many Leninist features to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). He took measures to rebuild the ideological faith, entrench Party organisations with state administration and run the CCP as a meritocracy. “Party groups” (dangzu) are extended to non-governmental, non-profit and other societal organisations. He insisted that party members must observe both formal disciplines and informal norms of the Party, and show loyalty to the leadership.

China’s Favored Muslims? The Complex Relationship between the Chinese Communist Party and the Hui Ethnic Group

2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 429-448
Author(s):  
Erik Durneika
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Model Minority ◽  
Constitutional Rights ◽  
Xi Jinping ◽  
Republic Of China ◽  
Fair Treatment ◽  
Business Transactions ◽  
Muslim Countries ◽  
The Chinese Communist Party

The People’s Republic of China remains a multinational unitary state, where the prc Constitution expressly guarantees freedom of religion and fair treatment of ethnic minorities. The Chinese Communist Party (ccp) retains ultimate authority regarding internal and external affairs, including the selective enforcement of constitutional rights. Various ethnic groups, such as the Turkic Uighurs, have long been perceived as rebellious, while the Muslim Hui have often been treated favorably, with laxer enforcement of laws and more religious autonomy. Many attribute this “model minority” perception of the Hui to cultural similarities shared with the Han. Although the ccp continues to allow religious freedoms to the Hui, the trajectory of persecution has slightly increased due to threats of global Islamist insurgencies. Leadership under President Xi Jinping seeks to maintain its power by combating “foreign infiltration” of Islam. Party officials allow Hui to interact with Muslim countries internationally under one circumstance—beneficial business transactions.

Li Zhanshu: A Key Player in Xi Jinping’s Second Term

2017 ◽  
Vol 09 (03) ◽  
pp. 50-57
Author(s):  
Lance L P GORE
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Hebei Province ◽  
Xi Jinping ◽  
Standing Committee ◽  
Party Leadership ◽  
The Core ◽  
The Chinese Communist Party

Xi Jinping and Li Zhanshu share many similarities and formed a bond as rooky party secretaries in counties in Hebei province in the 1980s. Xi brought Li to Beijing in 2012 and Li played a key role in drumming up support for Xi to become the “core” of the Chinese Communist Party leadership. Li is expected to join the next Politburo Standing Committee and play a more prominent role in Xi’s second term.

Xi's legacy hinges on leadership reshuffle

2017 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
The Political ◽  
Corporate Debt ◽  
Xi Jinping ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Quiet Revolution ◽  
One Belt One Road ◽  
Foreign Policies ◽  
Party Congress

Subject The upcoming Chinese Communist Party Congress. Significance President Xi Jinping may be about to upend China’s post-Mao succession arrangements at the 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, scheduled to open on October 18. Xi has engineered a 'quiet revolution' that has introduced new risks into China's domestic and foreign policies. To continue his unfinished revolution and safeguard its legacy, Xi has the incentive and the political momentum to seek a third term as the head of the Party. Impacts Most of Xi's ambitious projects are works in progress, and success is far from certain. Xi’s leadership could be called into question should the economy run into serious problems, related to corporate debt, for instance. Failure of One Belt One Road or a serious breakdown in relations with Washington could cause problems for Xi domestically.

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