Nudging Charitable Giving: What (If Anything) Is Wrong With It?

Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly ◽

10.1177/0899764020954266 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 089976402095426

Author(s):

Rebecca C. Ruehle ◽

Bart Engelen ◽

Alfred Archer

Keyword(s):

Charitable Giving ◽

Imperfect Duties ◽

Systematic Overview ◽

Perfect Duties

Nudging techniques can help charities to increase donations. In this article, we first provide a systematic overview of prototypical nudges that promote charitable giving. Second, we argue that plenty of the ethical objections raised against nudges, such as the exploitation of power they involve and the arguably intrusive and deceptive nature, are not specific to nudging itself. Carefully designing nudges can help to avoid these worries. Third, given that most concerns boil down to the worry that nudges infringe on people’s autonomy, we analyze when this could nevertheless be justified. We differentiate between perfect duties, imperfect duties, and supererogatory acts and argue that nudges are (a) morally permissible (even when they violate autonomy) when it comes to perfect duties and can (b) provide the best available strategy when it comes to imperfect duties. That said, we also analyze the conditions under which nudging charitable giving is impermissible.

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Eine Kantische Begründung individueller Klimapflichten

Grazer Philosophische Studien ◽

10.1163/18756735-00000117 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 97 (4) ◽

pp. 679-692

Author(s):

Simon Hollnaicher

Keyword(s):

Climate Change ◽

Categorical Imperative ◽

Climate Impacts ◽

Imperfect Duties ◽

Perfect Duties ◽

Making A Difference ◽

The Face ◽

Individual Actions ◽

The Individual ◽

Climate Crisis

Abstract According to a well-known problem in climate ethics, individual actions cannot be wrong due to their impact on climate change since the individual act does not make a difference. By referring to the practical interpretation of the categorical imperative, the author argues that certain actions lead to a contradiction in conception in light of the climate crisis. Universalizing these actions would cause foreseeable climate impacts, making it impossible to pursue the original maxim effectively. According to the practical interpretation, such actions are morally wrong. The wrongness of these actions does not depend on making a difference, rather these actions are wrong because they make it impossible for others to act accordingly. Thus, apart from imperfect duties, for which has been argued convincingly elsewhere (Henning 2016; Alberzart 2019), we also have perfect duties to refrain from certain actions in the face of the climate crisis.

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The Imperfect Nature of Corporate Responsibilities to Stakeholders

Business Ethics Quarterly ◽

10.5840/beq200414212 ◽

2004 ◽

Vol 14 (2) ◽

pp. 201-217 ◽

Cited By ~ 20

Author(s):

David Lea

Keyword(s):

Corporate Governance ◽

Stakeholder Theory ◽

Practical Reasoning ◽

Imperfect Duties ◽

Stakeholder Groups ◽

Perfect Duties ◽

Do So

Abstract:In this paper, I specifically consider the issue of corporate governance and normative stakeholder theory. In doing so, I argue that stakeholder theory and responsibilities to non-shareholder constituencies can be made more intelligible by reference to Kant’s conception of perfect and imperfect duties. I draw upon Onora O’Neill’s (1996) work, Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructivist Account of Practical Reasoning. In her text O’Neill underlines a number of relevant issues including: the integration of particularist and universalist accounts of morality; the priority of obligations over rights; the importance of the distinction between imperfect and perfect duties; and the relation between the virtues and imperfect duties. On the basis of the foregoing analysis, the paper argues that business ethicists should avoid recommending the institutionalising of stakeholder responsibilities in terms of legally defined sets of stakeholder rights. Instead, we should regard stakeholder responsibilities as uniformalised imperfect duties. Conceiving responsibilities to all stakeholder groups in this manner, allows the firm the freedom to perfect these duties in ways appropriate to cultural and societal setting, and in accordance with the capacity to do so.

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Duties of Charity, Duties of Justice

Political Studies ◽

10.1177/0032321716647402 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 65 (2) ◽

pp. 268-283 ◽

Cited By ~ 5

Author(s):

Robert E Goodin

Keyword(s):

Imperfect Duties ◽

Perfect Duties

Everyone agrees we have duties of charity, however restrictive a view they take of our duties of justice. But duties of charity can sometimes be stronger than duties of justice, and where they are, those owed duties of justice cannot complain when the duty-bearer discharges that duty of charity instead. Furthermore, duties of charity, being imperfect, require institutional specification to render them into perfect duties making clear who owes what to whom. Institutions do that by “consolidating” imperfect duties of charity. Such institutions would be very similar to those required by robust duties of justice. Anyone who takes appropriately seriously the duties of charity that everyone agrees we all have would thereby be led to prescribe broadly the same institutions as advocates of robust duties of justice.

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Stay!

Research in Phenomenology ◽

10.1163/15691640360699627 ◽

2003 ◽

Vol 33 (1) ◽

pp. 97-118 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

John Llewelyn

Keyword(s):

Asylum Seekers ◽

Imperfect Duties ◽

Perfect Duties ◽

The Absolute ◽

Natural Life

AbstractStay! That is to say, either stay with your decision or stay your hand. Demeure: either remain or delay. Morari or moriri: either life or death. The alternation is also a hyphenation, a connection-disconnection, as with that of Judaeo-Christianity and the ethicoreligious. How are these hyphenations construed in Kierkegaard's divergence from Kant and Hegel and in the responses of Derrida and Levinas to Johannes de silentio's story of what happened and did not happen on Mount Moriah? Perfect duties and imperfect duties fall under the responsibility of absolute duty. If the ethical is externally related to natural life, the life that is internal to the ethical is due to another externality, that of responsibility to the absolute other - or God, if you like. Another alternation. Another hyphenation? Or a dash? And would it be a dash that separates justice from love? And is love ever separate from self-love or from narcissisim? What sort of narcissism is exemplifed in Kierkegaard's search for salvation? Meanwhile Abraham waits, and with him or against him but without demur, so do Isaac (or is it Ishmael?), the ram, and a host of hostages, guests, and asylum-seekers, one by one.

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Chung-ying Cheng’s Dialogue with Confucianism and Kant: A Gadamerian Critique

Journal of Chinese Philosophy ◽

10.1163/15406253-12340038 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 48 (4) ◽

pp. 402-409

Author(s):

Stephen R. Palmquist

Keyword(s):

Imperfect Duties ◽

Perfect Duties ◽

Confucian Philosophy

Abstract Gadamer’s hermeneutics offers several strategies for critiquing Chung-ying Cheng’s synthesis of Confucianism and Kant. Interpreting Kant’s Groundwork, Cheng argues that the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties is too rigid: if the “life principle” is the ultimate root of Kant’s four types of duty, then human inclinations are good; Kant’s perfect duties turn out to be imperfect in some situations, while his imperfect duties such as benevolence (or ren, in Confucian philosophy) turn out sometimes to be perfect. Although Cheng’s synthesis does not satisfy the Groundwork’s universal aim, it does show how to apply Kant’s insights to empirical moral situations.

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Tracking Value and Extending Duties

10.1093/oso/9780192896353.003.0009 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 164-178

Author(s):

Barbara Herman

Keyword(s):

The State ◽

Imperfect Duty ◽

Moral Value ◽

Moral Change ◽

Imperfect Duties ◽

Perfect Duties ◽

Exercise Of Discretion

This chapter shows how both perfect and imperfect duties require both agents and institutions to take responsibility for tracking moral value across their respective contexts of right and duty. The casuistry that belongs to perfect duties is contrasted with the exercise of discretion essential to acting on an imperfect duty. A defense of juridical imperfect duties is offered. Citizens and officials of the state acting under the auspices of a juridical right or duty may need to exercise the kind of discretion that is the mark of an imperfect duty. Questions about moral change in the content and locus of duties are introduced.

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