scholarly journals Time and causality in the social sciences

2021 ◽  
pp. 0961463X2110294
Author(s):  
Guillaume Wunsch ◽  
Federica Russo ◽  
Michel Mouchart ◽  
Renzo Orsi

This article deals with the role of time in causal models in the social sciences. The aim is to underline the importance of time-sensitive causal models, in contrast to time-free models. The relation between time and causality is important, though a complex one, as the debates in the philosophy of science show. In particular, an outstanding issue is whether one can derive causal ordering from time ordering. The article examines how time is taken into account in demography and in economics as examples of social sciences in which considerations about time may diverge. We then present structural causal modeling as a modeling strategy that, while not essentially based on temporal information, can incorporate it in a more or less explicit way. In particular, we argue that temporal information is useful to the extent that it is placed in a correct causal structure, thus further corroborating the causal mechanism or generative process explaining the phenomenon under consideration. Despite the fact that the causal ordering of variables is more relevant than the temporal order for explanatory purposes, in establishing causal ordering the researcher should nevertheless take into account the time-patterns of causes and effects, as these are often episodes rather than single events. For this reason in particular, it is time to put time at the core of our causal models.

1972 ◽  
Vol 67 (340) ◽  
pp. 951 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arthur S. Goldberger ◽  
H. M. Blalock

2010 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 539-562
Author(s):  
Hudson Meadwell

Action is a central category in the social sciences. It is also commonplace to assume that the social world has a causal structure. Yet standard ways of specifying causal relations in social science lack explanatory force when the subject matter is intentional action. The present article considers this problem. The metaphysics of action are distinguished from the metaphysics of intentional action, and it is argued that the former forces an implausible unity on the actions of inanimate nature and of rational agents. Agency in the metaphysics of action adds nothing to state-variable causation. Agency in the metaphysics of intentional action, in contrast, is argued to have a different structure, not reducible to state-variable causation. Work on endogenous choice in social science suggests that the concept of agency that is on view in literature on selection effects and social generation implies the metaphysics of intentional action. Recent research in the philosophy of action is considered in order to specify the structure of intentional action and the force of intentional explanations.


1972 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 367
Author(s):  
A. P. M. Coxon ◽  
H. M. Blalock ◽  
Peter Abell

2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 205979911876841 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guillaume Wunsch ◽  
Michel Mouchart ◽  
Federica Russo

One method for causal analysis in the social sciences is structural modeling. Structural models, as used in this article, model the (causal) mechanism for a social phenomenon by recursively decomposing the multivariate distribution of the variables of interest. Often, however, one does not achieve a complete decomposition in terms of single variables but in terms of “blocks” of variables only. Papers giving an overview of this issue are nevertheless rare. The purpose of this article is to categorize distinct types of block-recursivity and to examine, in a multidisciplinary perspective, the implications of block-recursivity for causal attribution. A probabilistic approach to causality is first developed in the framework of a structural model. The article then examines block-recursivity due to the presence of contingent conditions, of interaction, and of conjunctive causes. It also discusses causal attribution when information on the ordering of the variables is incomplete. The article concludes by emphasizing, in particular, the importance of properly specifying the population of reference.


1986 ◽  
Vol 81 (393) ◽  
pp. 256
Author(s):  
Richard Campbell ◽  
Hubert M. Blalock

1976 ◽  
Vol 5 (6) ◽  
pp. 777
Author(s):  
Neil W. Henry ◽  
H. M. Blalock

Social Forces ◽  
1974 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 129
Author(s):  
George Bohrnstedt ◽  
Hubert M. Blalock

Author(s):  
Érick Duchesne ◽  
Arthur Silve

This chapter focuses on formal modelling. A formal model is the mathematical exposition of reasoning. Its purpose is to formulate consistent and rigorously stated hypotheses, which often shed light on the causation of a particular social phenomenon. Often, in the social sciences, a formal model is valuable because it can accurately predict behaviour and describe an actual (although unobservable) causal mechanism. Thus, formal models also allow plenty of space for deductive reasoning. Whether they clarify hypotheses or describe a mechanism, the success of formal models remains a matter of debate. The chapter then presents a few examples of useful models and considers the most frequent criticisms of formal modelling in order to identify a series of good practices for its proper use.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document