scholarly journals Smooth coping: an embodied, Heideggerian approach to dual-process theory

2021 ◽  
pp. 105971232110173
Author(s):  
Zachariah A Neemeh
Keyword(s):  
Working Memory ◽  
Process Model ◽  
High Capacity ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Dual Process Theory ◽  
Process Theory ◽  
Reflective Thought ◽  
Dual Process Theories

Dual-process theories divide cognition into two kinds of processes: Type 1 processes that are autonomous and do not use working memory, and Type 2 processes that are decoupled from the immediate situation and use working memory. Often, Type 1 processes are also fast, high capacity, parallel, nonconscious, biased, contextualized, and associative, while Type 2 processes are typically slow, low capacity, serial, conscious, normative, abstract, and rule-based. This article argues for an embodied dual-process theory based on the phenomenology of Martin Heidegger. According to Heidegger, the basis of human agents’ encounters with the world is in a prereflective, pragmatically engaged disposition marked by readiness-to-hand ( Zuhandenheit), sometimes equated with “smooth coping.” Examples of smooth coping include walking, throwing a ball, and other embodied actions that do not require reflective thought. I argue that smooth coping primarily consists of Type 1 processes. The Heideggerian dual-process model yields distinctly different hypotheses from Hubert Dreyfus’ model of smooth coping, and I will critically engage with Dreyfus’ work.

scholarly journals Dual-Process Theory as a Theory of the Classification of Information Processing Acts

Diametros ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vitaliy Nadurak
Keyword(s):  
Information Processing ◽  
Qualitative Difference ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Dual Process Theory ◽  
Process Theory ◽  
Clear Cut ◽  
Conscious Control

The article proposes a consideration of the dual-process theory of higher cognition as a theory of the classification of acts of information processing. One of the reasons why the dual-process approach has been criticized is the fact that the information processing process can sometimes have characteristics that undermine a clear-cut attribution to one of the two traditionally defined opposite types. To avoid this criticism, it is proposed that the object of classification should not be the processes of information processing, but separate acts of combining two units of information. Unlike a process, a particular act of information processing at a particular moment in time cannot simultaneously have opposite characteristics, nor can it simultaneously have and not have some characteristic. In order to show the qualitative difference between various information processing acts as falling individually into either Type 1 or Type 2 processing, it is proposed to classify them by a feature that is present in one type and absent in another. It is suggested to take conscious control as such a feature. As a result, in the information processing acts corresponding to Type 2 category, units of information are combined in a consciously controlled way, whereas in the acts to be considered as Type 1, those units either already are combined or combine autonomously due to the existence of indirect associative connections.

scholarly journals Categorization, Fast and Slow

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 205-212
Author(s):  
Василь Старко
Keyword(s):  
Social Psychology ◽  
New York ◽  
Individual Differences ◽  
Cognitive Linguistics ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Psychological Review ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
Dual Process Theories

The title of this study is inspired by Daniel Kahneman’s best-selling book Thinking, Fast and Slow. In it, the Nobel Prize winner explains in great detail the working of two systems of human reasoning: System 1, which is fast, automatic, associative, subconscious, involuntary and (nearly) effortless, and System 2, which is slow, intentional, logical, conscious, effortful and requires executive control, attention, and concentration. This distinction applies to human categorization as well. Each of the two labels refers, in fact, to a set of systems, which is why the designations Type 1 and Type 2 processes are preferable. The default-interventionist architecture presupposes the constant automatic activation of categories by Type 1 processes and interventions of Type 2 processes if necessary. Type 1 categorization relies on the ‘shallow’ linguistic representation of the world, while Type 2 uses ‘deep’ extralinguistic knowledge. A series of linguistic examples are analyzed to illustrate the differences between Type 1 and Type 2 categorization. A conclusion is drawn about the need to take this distinction into account in psycholinguistic and linguistic research on categorization. References Barrett, F., Tugade, M. M., & Engle, R. (2004). Individual differences in working memorycapacity in dual-process theories of the mind. Psychological Bulletin, 130(4), 553–573. Chaiken, S., & Trope, Y. (Eds.). (1999). Dual-process theories in social psychology. NewYork, NY: Guilford Press. Devine, P. G. (1989). Stereotypes and prejudice: Their automatic and controlledcomponents. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56, 5–18. Evans, J. St. B. T., & Stanovich, K. (2013) Dual-process theories of higher cognition:Advancing the debate. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 8(3), 223–241. Geeraerts, D. (1993). Vagueness’s puzzles, polysemy’s vagaries. Cognitive Linguistics,4(3), 223–272. Heider, Eleanor Rosch (1973). On the internal structure of perceptual and semanticcategories. In: Cognitive Development and the Acquisition of Language, (pp. 111–144).T. E. Moore, (ed.). New York: Academic Press Kahneman, D. (2003). A perspective on judgement and choice. American Psychologist, 58,697–720. Kahneman, D. (2015). Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002). Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitutionin intuitive judgement. In: Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment,(pp. 49–81). T. Gilovich, D. Griffin, & D. Kahneman, (eds.). Cambridge, MA: CambridgeUniversity Press. Lakoff, G. (1973). Hedges: A study in meaning criteria and the logic of fuzzy concepts.Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2, 458–508. Lakoff, G. (1987). Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things. Chicago, London: University ofChicago Press. Reber, A. S. (1993). Implicit Learning and Tacit Knowledge. Oxford, England: OxfordUniversity Press. Stanovich, K. E. (1999). Who is Rational? Studies of Individual Differences in Reasoning.Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Stanovich, K. E., & West, R F. (2000). Individual difference in reasoning: implications forthe rationality debate? Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 23, 645–726. Старко В. Категоризаційні кваліфікатори// Проблеми зіставної семантики. 2013,№ 11. С. 132–138.Starko, V. (2013). Katehoryzatsiini kvalifikatory. Problemy Zistavnoyi Semantyky, 11,132–138. Sun, R., Slusarz, P., & Terry, C. (2005). The interaction of the explicit and the implicit inskill learning: A dual-process approach. Psychological Review, 112, 159–192. Teasdale, J. D. (1999). Multi-level theories of cognition–emotion relations. In: Handbookof Cognition and Emotion, (pp. 665–681). T. Dalgleish & M. J. Power, (eds.). Chichester,England: Wiley. Wason, P. C., & Evans, J. St. B. T. (1975). Dual processes in reasoning? Cognition, 3,141–154. Whorf, B. L. (1956). The relation of habitual thought and behavior to language. In:Language, Thought, and Reality. Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf, (pp. 134–159). Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press. (originally published in 1941) Wierzbicka, A. (1996). Semantic Primes and Universals. Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress.

Individual Differences in Implicit Learning

2015 ◽  
pp. 61-85
Author(s):  
Daisuke Nakamura
Keyword(s):  
Working Memory ◽  
Individual Differences ◽  
Implicit Learning ◽  
Evolutionary Theory ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Dual Process Theory ◽  
Process Theory ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Individual Difference Variables ◽  
Research Findings

This chapter reviews research on whether individual differences in psychometric intelligence, working memory, and other less investigated variables, such as emotion and personality, affect implicit learning, with particular focus on Reber's evolutionary theory and Kaufman's dual-process theory for implicit learning. The review shows that while the null effects of psychometric intelligence on implicit learning seems robust as both theories claim, those of working memory were unclear due to methodological insufficiency. For the effects of emotion and personality, further investigation is needed as studies in this direction have just begun to proliferate. The chapter concludes that the research findings on the effects of these individual difference variables on implicit learning are still inconclusive, except for psychometric intelligence, and provides suggestions for future research.

scholarly journals Dual Process Theories in Behavioral Economics and Neuroeconomics: a Critical Review

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
James D. Grayot
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Behavioral Economics ◽  
Critical Review ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Decision Models ◽  
Dual Process Theory ◽  
Process Theory ◽  
Standard View ◽  
Realistic Description ◽  
Dual Process Theories

Abstract Despite their popularity, dual process accounts of human reasoning and decision-making have come under intense scrutiny in recent years. Cognitive scientists and philosophers alike have come to question the theoretical foundations of the ‘standard view’ of dual process theory and have challenged the validity and relevance of evidence in support of it. Moreover, attempts to modify and refine dual process theory in light of these challenges have generated additional concerns about its applicability and refutability as a scientific theory. With these concerns in mind, this paper provides a critical review of dual process theory in economics, focusing on its role as a psychological framework for decision modeling in behavioral economics and neuroeconomics. I argue that the influx of criticisms against dual process theory challenge the descriptive accuracy of dualistic decision models in economics. In fact, the case can be made that the popularity of dual process theory in economics has less to do with the empirical success of dualistic decision models, and more to do with the convenience that the dual process narrative provides economists looking to explain-away decision anomalies. This leaves behavioral economists and neuroeconomists with something of a dilemma: either they stick to their purported ambitions to give a realistic description of human decision-making and give up the narrative, or they revise and restate their scientific ambitions.

Varieties of dual-process theory for probabilistic reasoning

2007 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 280-281 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Samuels
Keyword(s):  
Process Model ◽  
Probabilistic Reasoning ◽  
Base Rate ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Dual Process Theory ◽  
Process Theory ◽  
Dual Process Model

AbstractThough Barbey & Sloman (B&S) distinguish various frequentist hypotheses, they opt rapidly for one specific dual-process model of base-rate facilitation. In this commentary, I maintain that there are many distinct but related versions of the dual-process theory, and suggest that there is currently little reason to favor B&S's formulation over the alternatives.

Introspection, confabulation, and dual-process theory

2009 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 142-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan St. B. T. Evans
Keyword(s):  
Dual Process ◽  
Dual Process Theory ◽  
Process Theory ◽  
Target Article ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
Two Systems ◽  
Higher Cognition ◽  
Dual Process Theories

AbstractThis excellent target article helps to resolve a problem for dual-process theories of higher cognition. Theorists posit two systems, one of which appears to be conscious and volitional. It seems to control some behaviours but to confabulate explanations for others. I argue that this system is only conscious in an illusory sense and that all self-explanations are confabulatory, as Carruthers suggests.

Freud's dual process theory and the place of the a-rational

2003 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 527-528 ◽  
Author(s):  
Linda A. W. Brakel ◽  
Howard Shevrin
Keyword(s):  
Dual Process ◽  
Dual Process Theory ◽  
Process Theory ◽  
Rational System ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
System 2 ◽  
Dual Process Theories ◽  
System 1 ◽  
Evolutionary Fitness

In this commentary on Stanovich & West (S&W) we call attention to two points: (1) Freud's original dual process theory, which antedates others by some seventy-five years, deserves inclusion in any consideration of dual process theories. His concepts of primary and secondary processes (Systems 1 and 2, respectively) anticipate significant aspects of current dual process theories and provide an explanation for many of their characteristics. (2) System 1 is neither rational nor irrational, but instead a-rational. Nevertheless, both the a-rational System 1 and the rational System 2 can each have different roles in enhancing evolutionary fitness. Lastly, System 1 operations are incorrectly deemed “rational” whenever they increase evolutionary fitness.

scholarly journals Evaluating team decision-making as an emergent phenomenon

2018 ◽  
Vol 94 (1110) ◽  
pp. 216-219
Author(s):  
John Kinnear ◽  
Nick Wilson ◽  
Anthony O’Dwyer
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Dual Process Theory ◽  
Process Theory ◽  
Team Cognition ◽  
Random Pairing ◽  
Significant Difference ◽  
Team Decision ◽  
Improved Performance

BackgroundThe complexity of modern clinical practice has highlighted the fallibility of individual clinicians’ decision-making, with effective teamwork emerging as a key to patient safety. Dual process theory is widely accepted as a framework for individual decision-making, with type 1 processes responsible for fast, intuitive and automatic decisions and type 2 processes for slow, analytical decisions. However, dual process theory does not explain cognition at the group level, when individuals act in teams. Team cognition resulting from dynamic interaction of individuals is said to be more resilient to decision-making error and greater than simply aggregated cognition.MethodsClinicians were paired as teams and asked to solve a cognitive puzzle constructed as a drug calculation. The frequency at which the teams made incorrect decisions was compared with that of individual clinicians answering the same question.ResultsWhen clinicians acted in pairs, 63% answered the cognitive puzzle correctly, compared with 33% of clinicians as individuals, showing a statistically significant difference in performance (χ2(1, n=116)=24.329, P<0.001). Based on the predicted performance of teams made up of the random pairing of individuals who had the same propensity to answer as previously, there was no statistical difference in the actual and predicted teams’ performance.ConclusionsTeams are less prone to making errors of decision-making than individuals. However, the improved performance is likely to be owing to the effect of aggregated cognition rather than any improved decision-making as a result of the interaction. There is no evidence of team cognition as an emergent and distinct entity.

Inner Speech and Outer Thought

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith Frankish
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Function ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Inner Speech ◽  
Conscious Thought ◽  
Complex Problems ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
Dual Process Theories

It is plausible to regard inner speech as an activity, whose functions are continuous with those of outer speech. Yet there is also a case for thinking that inner speech has a cognitive role, as a vehicle for conscious thought. This chapter reconciles these apparently conflicting claims by showing how outer speech can itself play a cognitive role. Drawing on dual-process theories of reasoning, it develops a view of conscious (‘Type 2’) thinking as an activity, initially performed in outer speech. By engaging in self-directed speech, we can break down complex problems into subproblems that can be solved by nonconscious (‘Type 1’) processes, thereby vastly extending our reasoning powers. It is as the subsequent internalization of such ‘outer thinking’ that inner speech has a cognitive function. The chapter also extends this account to show how acts of inner speech can function as judgements and decisions.

scholarly journals A Theory-Driven Design Research Agenda: Exploring Dual-Process Theory

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 1373-1382
Author(s):  
Philip Cash ◽  
Jaap Daalhuizen ◽  
Dagny Valgeirsdottir ◽  
Robin Van Oorschot
Keyword(s):  
Design Research ◽  
Theory Development ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Dual Process Theory ◽  
Process Theory ◽  
Common Element ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
Dual Process Theories ◽  
Development Approach ◽  
Practical Impact

AbstractDesign research faces a critical 'impact gap' where the potential for scientific and practical impact is yet to be fully realised. A key means of bridging this gap is the adoption of fundamental theory from other fields to support clarification and synergy in design research. In this paper we examine one of the main candidates for adoption: dual-process theory of cognition. Cognition forms a common element across much of the design literature and leads to fundamental dual-process theories of reasoning. While dual- process theory has started to be recognised in design research, its widespread recognition and potential utility have not been widely explored. Following a conceptual theory development approach we identify and logically describe interactions between dual-process theory and design research. We conclude the paper with a proposition of a design research framework with a core rooted in dual-process theory, and based on this, an agenda for theory-driven design research. This contributes to the debate on how to improve impact, and theoretical and scientific rigour in design research, and provides a concrete agenda for discussion and development within the community.

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