The Persistent Problem of Media Taxation: First Amendment Protection in the 1990S

1997 ◽  
Vol 74 (3) ◽  
pp. 579-590 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cathy Packer ◽  
Karla K. Gower

This article examines U.S. Supreme Court decisions regarding the constitutionality of taxation of the mass media. It concludes that the Court's 1991 decision in Leathers v. Medlock does not represent a substantial change in the law governing taxation of the media but is one step in the evolution of two distinct lines of media taxation cases. The article also examines how the lower courts have applied Leathers in the six years since it was decided. The lower court decisions uniformly - although not explicitly - recognize the two lines. What is needed now is explicit recognition by both the Supreme Court and the lower courts.

2006 ◽  
Vol 27 ◽  
pp. 209-230
Author(s):  
Mahalley D. Allen ◽  
Donald P. Haider-Markel

Many scholars have examined the relationship between public opinion and the U.S. Supreme Court, but most researchers have often failed to take into account the fact that the press mediates this relationship. Due to the public’s lack of independent knowledge about Supreme Court decisions, the media has the potential to play an influential role in the communication and interpretation of Supreme Court decisions. In this article, we examine the relationship between the Supreme Court, the media, and public opinion. First, we examine whether increased public tolerance on gay and lesbian issues has resulted in increased media coverage of gay-related cases before the Supreme Court. Second, we examine how media coverage of the Court’s 2003 decision to strike down state sodomy laws in Lawrence v. Texas may have been associated with decreased public support for gay and lesbian civil rights. Our analysis suggests that increased support for gay and lesbian civil rights may have lead to increased media attention to the Lawrence case and that the tone of this coverage may have subsequently resulted in an observed decrease in support for gay and lesbian civil rights following the Court’s decision. We also suggest that the release of a highly critical dissenting opinion by the Court in the case may have encouraged negative media coverage and the resulting shift in public opinion. Our research has broad implications for media coverage of Supreme Court decisions.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas Kahn-Fogel

For decades, scholars have routinely attacked the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as an incoherent mess, impossible for lower courts to follow. These scholars have based their claims almost entirely on qualitative analysis of the Court’s opinions. This Article presents the first systematic evaluation of the consensus view of Fourth Amendment law as incoherent. The primary method I use to evaluate the coherence of the body of law is an assessment of lower court performance on Fourth Amendment issues the Supreme Court would later resolve. Because the Supreme Court’s agreement with lower courts likely reflects, at least in part, the clarity of the Supreme Court’s previous pronouncements, a high rate of agreement between lower courts and the Supreme Court would tend to suggest the coherence of the field. On the other hand, if the Court concludes most lower courts got the wrong answer to a Fourth Amendment question, that conclusion suggests either a lack of clarity in the Court’s precedent or that the Court simply shifted course after having issued seemingly straightforward pronouncements in the past. Either of these possibilities would suggest a kind of incoherence or instability in Fourth Amendment law. I examine lower court decisions dealing with issues the Supreme Court subsequently addressed over the course of twenty Supreme Court terms. Because Supreme Court cases tend to deal with the most difficult, divisive issues, I also compare the frequency with which the Court has felt compelled to review Fourth Amendment questions to the rate at which the Court has dealt with other important constitutional issues.


2020 ◽  
pp. 239-262
Author(s):  
Chris Hanretty

This chapter looks at whether appellants succeed before the Supreme Court. Around half of appellants succeed, and these rates of success vary by area of law and by the type of appellant. The strongest predictors of success, however, have to do with the route the case took to the court. Appellants are more likely to succeed if the Supreme Court itself granted permission to appeal (rather than having leave granted by the lower court), and if appellants were able to convince at least some judges in lower courts. Success is not wholly determined by what happens in lower courts, however: litigants who employ one additional senior lawyer are more likely to succeed.


2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Mancini

Section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 empowers courts to declare unconstitutional laws that are inconsistent with the Constitution “to the extent of their inconsistency.”1 Section 52 is a powerful tool in the hands of judges. For example, a claimant need not be directly affected by an unconstitutional law to raise a challenge to that same law,2 and once a court declares a law invalid under section 52, the law is effectively removed from the statute books.3 A key question is whether such a declaration, issued by one judge of a multi-member lower court, binds another judge of that same court. This phenomenon can be broadly described as “horizontal stare decisis.”4 But the Supreme Court has only explored horizontal stare decisis in the context of revisiting its own decisions.5 It has never opined on whether there is something special about horizontal stare decisis in lower courts, especially involving constitutional declarations under section 52; specifically, whether one judge is bound by another judge’s declaration of invalidity. This issue was directly confronted in the McCaw case at the Ontario Superior Court.6 Faced with a previous section 52 declaration of invalidity issued against section 33.1 of the Criminal Code, Spies J found that she was bound by that declaration. Accordingly, she found section 33.1 unconstitutional. In this short paper, after reviewing the salient facts of McCaw, I argue that Spies J’s ruling is broadly consistent with Supreme Court constitutional remedies doctrine, which is basically formalist in nature and permits no discretion on the part of judges to depart from the binding effect of a s.52 remedy. I then deal with two objections to this position. Ultimately, while one can question the coherence of the Supreme Court’s doctrine, McCaw represents a defensible application of it.


2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-29
Author(s):  
William V. Dorsaneo

The primary purpose of this Article is to evaluate the four most recent Supreme Court decisions on personal jurisdiction and situate those decisions within the history of Supreme Court personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. Starting with the seminal case of Pennoyer v. Neff, personal jurisdiction jurisprudence has been remarkably kaleidoscopic, with the Supreme Court intervening at various intervals to redefine the law in broad strokes, while zigzagging from one doctrinal position to another and thereby leaving lower courts to hash out the application of an evolving personal jurisdiction doctrine to varying fact patterns. I will divide this jurisprudential history into two main groups of cases after Pennoyer was superseded by the modern minimum contacts approach. The first group of decisions begins with International Shoe Co. v. Washington and continues through Hanson v. Denckla. The second group begins almost two decades later with Shaffer v. Heitner and continues through Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court and Burnham v. Superior Court.


2018 ◽  
Vol 112 (4) ◽  
pp. 741-745 ◽  

On June 26, 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld President Trump's most recent iteration of restrictions on entry to the United States by nationals from certain foreign countries. Following several rewrites of this travel ban, ensuing legal challenges, and lower court injunctions, the Court, in a five-to-four decision authored by Chief Justice Roberts, reversed the latest ruling of a lower court that had granted a partial preliminary injunction against the ban. Although acknowledging that there was considerable evidence tying the travel ban to bias against Muslims, the Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs were nonetheless unlikely to succeed either in their statutory claim that Trump lacked the authority to impose this ban or in their constitutional claim that the ban violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The Court accordingly reversed the lower court's injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings. The ruling, based on the Trump administration's asserted national security interest, leaves in place travel restrictions imposed on nationals of seven countries—Iran, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen—only two of which are not Muslim-majority countries.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Flávio Mirza Maduro

This mini-review aims to reflect upon the conditions of penitentiaries in Brazil during times of the pandemic; it also brings to discussion the recent decision by the Supreme Court of Brazil which allowed for certain detainees to carry out their sentences under house arrest; in addition, it aims to discuss how the judges on lower courts have decided in light of the aforementioned Supreme Court ruling. By outlining the conditions of imprisonment that can be observed in the jailing system, the authors seek to critically reflect upon the role of justice in the society during times of hardship. The authors begin by tracing a historical background in a concise way, in order to elucidate how situations of illnesses and bereavement have developed during the years. After that, the authors compare judicial rulings involving the current prison status quo. To conclude, the authors seek to add to the debate joining the voices who cry out for more assertive measures in the preservation of life and health of detainees and prison workers.


2016 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 227
Author(s):  
Matthew Barber

In the Supreme Court decision of Vector Gas Ltd v Bay of Plenty Energy Ltd, Tipping J put forward an approach to contact interpretation that, while indebted to that of Lord Hoffmann, was expressed differently and promoted the use of evidence of prior negotiations. Despite not gaining the support of any of the other sitting judges, this approach was swiftly taken up in the lower courts and, until recently at least, seems to have been accepted as representing New Zealand law. This article attempts a comprehensive examination of Tipping J’s approach. It concludes that, while coherent in principle, the detail of the approach is flawed in a number of ways, especially the way in which evidence of subsequent conduct is assumed to work. The future of Tipping J’s approach is considered.


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