Discourse ethics, epistemology, and educational justice: A reply to Harvey Siegel

2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 151-173
Author(s):  
Julian Culp

This article explores the contribution of Jürgen Habermas’ discourse theory of morality, politics, and law to theorizing educational justice. First, it analyzes Christopher Martin’s discourse-ethical argument that the development of citizens’ discursive agency is required on epistemic grounds. The article criticizes this argument and claims that the moral importance of developing discursive agency should be justified instead on the basis of moral grounds. Second, the article examines Harvey Siegel’s critique of Habermas’ moral epistemology and suggests that Siegel neglects that the epistemic justification of moral claims proceeds differently from the epistemic justification of assertoric claims. Finally, the article presents a discourse-theoretic conception of educational justice that defends the importance of discursively justifying norms of educational justice through properly arranged structures of justification.

2001 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 102-128 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Pettit

This essay emerges from consideration of a question in the epistemology of ethics or morality. This is not the common claim-centered question as to how moral claims are confirmed and whether their mode of confirmation gives us grounds to be confident about the prospects for ethical discourse. Instead, I am concerned with the less frequently posed concept-centered question of where in human experience moral terms or concepts are grounded — that is, where in experience the moral becomes salient to us. This question was central to moral epistemology in the form it took among thinkers such as Locke, Hume, and Kant, and it remains of the first importance today.


1990 ◽  
Vol 8 (1/2) ◽  
pp. 597
Author(s):  
John A. Coleman ◽  
Michael John Perry

2017 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 501-506 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sikina Jinnah ◽  
Douglas Bushey

AbstractIn order to advance a neatly deductive argument, Christopher J. Preston must make a number of assumptions and framing decisions that exclude important practical points from the scope of his analysis. We do not criticize him for doing so, as these simplifications allow him to advance a concise argument about an ethically complex subject. However, as scholars of politics and law, we are interested in what this ethical argument means—and does not mean—for the messy politics of climate engineering. Accordingly, in our response we unpack the political implications of some of Preston's assumptions and framing decisions in an effort to add a layer of practical richness to the abstraction of Preston's analysis.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (10) ◽  
pp. 850-856
Author(s):  
Gobinda Bhattacharjee ◽  

In this present work, I have made an attempt to discuss the concept of discourse ethics with its basic characteristics, and finally the main problems concerning Habermasian discourse theory of morality. Discourse ethics is an approach to ethics that is founded upon rules of dialogue, and which encourages participants to approach an ethical dilemma with both pure rational reason and experience firmly in hand. Habermasian discourse ethics is widely known as deliberative democratic theory often praised for its ideals. The concept of communicative action plays a central role in the development of Habermas discourse morality. It is a theory of morality, which claims that moral norms concerning justice can be tested rationally in an argumentative dialogue the ideal precondition is that dialogue should be free from domination. With its various characteristics, some main problems concerning Habermasian Discourse ethics is also discussed in this paper.


2005 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-154 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Linklater

Recent debates about Habermas's conception of dialogic politics have focused on whether its commitment to ethical universalism has an emancipatory potential or threatens the assimilation of non-liberal forms of life within exclusionary Western cultural frameworks. One way of contributing to this unfinished debate is to ask whether discourse ethics contributes to the modern ‘civilising process’, as Norbert Elias defined that term. All societies, according to Elias, have civilising processes or ways of trying to solve the problem of how persons can satisfy basic needs without ‘destroying, frustrating, demeaning or in other ways harming each other time and time again in their search for this satisfaction’. This formulation invites the question of whether or not the discourse theory of morality is the best available means of extending the civilising process in global politics.


2003 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Eveline T. Feteris

This paper argues that Habermas's conception of the rationality of moral and legal discussions has import for argumentation theorists interested in the rationality of public deliberations in politics and law. I begin with a survey of Haber mas's discourse theory and his criteria of rationality for moral and legal discourse. I then explain why, in his view, the forms of rational discourse in morality and law complement each other. My aim is to show how Habermas's account of this complementary relationship opens up fruitful perspectives for argumentation theory. Specifically, his thought can stimulate research regarding, on the one hand, the ways in which legal procedures provide for presumptively rational resolutions of moral disputes and, on the other hand, the applicability of ideal argumentation-theoretic models to the legal field. I conclude with a proposal for integrating Habermas's ideas in a research program for legal argumentation.


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