scholarly journals Changes in perceptions of media bias

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 205316802098744
Author(s):  
Kirby Goidel ◽  
Nicholas T. Davis ◽  
Spencer Goidel

In this paper, we utilize a module from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study to explore how individual perceptions of media bias changed over the course of the 2016 presidential campaign. While previous literature has documented the role of partisan affiliation in perceptions of bias, we know considerably less about how these perceptions change during a presidential election. Consistent with existing theories of attitude change, perceptions of bias polarize with strong Democrats moving toward believing the media were biased against Hillary Clinton (and in favor of Donald Trump) and independent-leaning Republicans moving toward believing the media were biased against Donald Trump. At the end of the 2016 election, more individuals believed the media were biased against their side. These effects were moderated by how much attention individuals paid to the campaign.

2020 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 146-159
Author(s):  
Nicole Smith Dahmen

Applying person perception theory, this research uses quantitative content analysis to analyze 1,183 newspaper photographs of the two leading candidates from the 2016 presidential election. Study findings show that there were statistically significant differences in the photographic presentations of Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump in the 2016 election, with Clinton pictured more favorably than Trump.


2021 ◽  
pp. 001112872110647
Author(s):  
Michael A. Hansen ◽  
John C. Navarro

Divisive criminal justice issues are typically framed through gender and racial lenses, with little empirical work considering the increasing role of political partisanship. Using the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study ( N = 55,000), we estimate multivariate models of support for four policing and correctional reforms. The models initially point to gender gaps and racial gaps. However, as with many public policy issues, support for criminal justice reforms are largely a product of political partisanship—the gender and racial gaps are largely a consequence of gender and racial gaps in partisanship and appear to be driven by white Republican men. As legislative bodies continue to be overrepresented with individuals with the same demographic profile, criminal justice reform prospects are limited.


2018 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-242 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seth C. McKee ◽  
Daniel A. Smith ◽  
M. V. (Trey) Hood

ABSTRACTThe surprise outcome of the 2016 presidential election continues to raise more questions as experts grapple with the evidence for why most prognosticators considered a Hillary Clinton victory almost certain. This article uses the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study data to show that a primary explanation for why the election of Donald Trump was difficult to predict is that the bulk of his support did not materialize until Election Day, in the battleground states that he had to carry to win the Electoral College.


The Forum ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 271-294
Author(s):  
John Cluverius ◽  
Joshua J. Dyck

Abstract Americans born before 1980, called Millennials, are repeatedly treated as a singular voting bloc, but much like the Baby Boomers, have been socialized across a series of very different elections. We develop a theory of millennial political socialization that argues that older Millennials are more tied to the Democratic party and more liberal than their younger counterparts. We use the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study and an original survey of 1274 Americans conducted before the 2016 elections to test this theory. We find some support for our theory; in addition, we find that younger Millennials are socialized by issues of identity politics and culture – specifically on issues of immigration and the role of race in society. This implies a generation that largely favors Democrats, but whose Republicans are more culturally conservative than middle aged Republican voters.


1972 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-246 ◽  
Author(s):  
John P. Robinson

Data obtained from a Survey Research Center post-election study shows a newspaper's perceived support of a candidate was associated with about a 6% edge in the vote for that candidate.


Journalism ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 146488491988310
Author(s):  
Hallvard Moe ◽  
Brita Ytre-Arne ◽  
Torgeir Uberg Nærland

This article investigates sense-making processes of news audiences when faced with destabilizing global events. The destabilizing event is Trump’s 2016 election win, which we study from the perspective of audiences far removed: in the Nordic region. Asking how we can understand shifts in the balance between the informational and ritual aspects of news over time, we study how journalism matters when ordinary practices are suddenly uprooted, and in the gradual return to everyday life. Based on the analysis of extensive qualitative material, we formulate three successive phases of Norwegian news audiences’ reactions to the election: annoying circus far away, world-shattering shock and regained stability. We underline not only shared experiences but also nuances which we link to differences in media use routines, levels of interests in news as well as resources for the sense-making of politics. Our findings contribute to the scrutiny of news use in everyday life and at times of political upheaval, and add an audience perspective to research on Trump and the media.


2018 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Norman Smith ◽  
Eric Hanley

Recently released data from the 2016 American National Election Study allow us to offer a multifaceted profile of white voters who voted for Donald J. Trump in the 2016 presidential election. We find that Trump’s supporters voted for him mainly because they share his prejudices, not because they’re financially stressed. It’s true, as exit polls showed, that voters without four-year college degrees were likelier than average to support Trump. But millions of these voters—who are often stereotyped as “the white working class”—opposed Trump because they oppose his prejudices. These prejudices, meanwhile, have a definite structure, which we argue should be called authoritarian: negatively, they target minorities and women; and positively, they favor domineering and intolerant leaders who are uninhibited about their biases. Multivariate logistic regression shows that, once we take these biases into account, demographic factors (age, education, etc.) lose their explanatory power. The electorate, in short, is deeply divided. Nearly 75% of Trump supporters count themselves among his enthusiastic supporters, and even “mild” Trump voters are much closer in their attitudes to Trump’s enthusiasts than they are to non-Trump voters. Polarization is profound, and may be growing.


2017 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 82-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Barnidge ◽  
Albert C. Gunther ◽  
Jinha Kim ◽  
Yangsun Hong ◽  
Mallory Perryman ◽  
...  

If the individuals who are most likely to perceive media bias no longer encounter, via selective exposure, media content they might consider biased, why are perceptions of media bias so pervasive? We argue that many people who engage in politically motivated selective exposure also perceive “the media” in general to be biased. Relying on a survey of adults in the U.S. state of Wisconsin, which has witnessed particularly contentious and divisive political events since 2011, this study examines self-reported patterns of selective exposure to partisan media while accounting for the role of the local communication ecology in encouraging or discouraging partisan media selectivity. It also tests the idea that selective exposure is related to a generalized perception of media bias—the idea that “the media” in general are biased while self-selected media are not. Finally, the study tests a moderated mediation model showing the structure of relationships among political opinion extremity, selective exposure, and perceived media bias. Results suggest (a) a positive relationship between political opinion extremity and selective exposure, (b) opposite patterns of relationships between selective exposure and perceived media bias about self-selected and general media, respectively, and (c) evidence of moderated mediation among political opinion extremity, selective exposure, and perceived media bias.


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