Psychopathy and Moral-Dilemma Judgment: An Analysis Using the Four-Factor Model of Psychopathy and the CNI Model of Moral Decision-Making

2021 ◽  
pp. 216770262110438
Author(s):  
Dillon M. Luke ◽  
Craig S. Neumann ◽  
Bertram Gawronski

A major question in clinical and moral psychology concerns the nature of the commonly presumed association between psychopathy and moral judgment. In the current preregistered study ( N = 443), we aimed to address this question by examining the relation between psychopathy and responses to moral dilemmas pitting consequences for the greater good against adherence to moral norms. To provide more nuanced insights, we measured four distinct facets of psychopathy and used the CNI model to quantify sensitivity to consequences ( C), sensitivity to moral norms ( N), and general preference for inaction over action ( I) in responses to moral dilemmas. Psychopathy was associated with a weaker sensitivity to moral norms, which showed unique links to the interpersonal and affective facets of psychopathy. Psychopathy did not show reliable associations with either sensitivity to consequences or general preference for inaction over action. Implications of these findings for clinical and moral psychology are discussed.

2021 ◽  
pp. 014616722098799
Author(s):  
Dillon M. Luke ◽  
Bertram Gawronski

Many real-world dilemmas involve disagreement about whether decisions should follow moral norms in an unconditional manner ( deontology) or be based on the consequences for the greater good ( utilitarianism). To examine how political ideology may account for some of these disagreements, the current research used a formal modeling approach to investigate the associations between political ideology and (a) sensitivity to consequences, (b) sensitivity to moral norms, and (c) general preference for inaction versus action in responses to moral dilemmas. Across three studies ( N = 996) with samples from the United States (Studies 1 and 3) and the United Kingdom (Study 2), conservatives were less influenced by overall consequences for the greater good in comparison with liberals. Political ideology was not significantly associated with sensitivity to moral norms and general action tendencies. The findings provide more nuanced insights into how political ideology may contribute to disagreements on real-world moral dilemmas.


2019 ◽  
Vol 46 (7) ◽  
pp. 1013-1026 ◽  
Author(s):  
Meike Kroneisen ◽  
Daniel W. Heck

Research on moral decision making usually focuses on two ethical principles: the principle of utilitarianism (= morality of an action is determined by its consequences) and the principle of deontology (= morality of an action is valued according to the adherence to moral norms regardless of the consequences). Criticism on traditional moral dilemma research includes the reproach that consequences and norms are confounded in standard paradigms. As a remedy, a multinomial model (the CNI model) was developed to disentangle and measure sensitivity to consequences ( C), sensitivity to moral norms ( N), and general preference for inaction versus action ( I). In two studies, we examined the link of basic personality traits to moral judgments by fitting a hierarchical Bayesian version of the CNI model. As predicted, high Honesty–Humility was selectively associated with sensitivity for norms, whereas high Emotionality was selectively associated with sensitivity for consequences. However, Conscientiousness was not associated with a preference for inaction.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arathy Puthillam ◽  
Hansika Kapoor

Conservatives are known to display smaller moral circles, have less empathy, and make utilitarian decisions. The present study aimed to understand the relationships between political ideology and empathetic concern (n = 513), and between ideology and moral decision-making (n = 210) in an inter-group setting, using an Indian sample. We measured trait empathetic concern and empathetic concern for the ingroup (i.e., their own religion) and outgroup (i.e., Muslims) using the Interpersonal Reactivity Index, and measured moral decision-making for a non-denominational group and in- and out-group using modified moral dilemmas. We found that right-leaning individuals, in terms of greater adherence to cultural norms, displayed higher levels of trait empathetic concern, as well as that for in- and outgroups; they were also more willing to sacrifice the outgroup to save multiple ingroup members in moral dilemma tasks, and thus made utilitarian moral decisions when sacrificing outgroup lives were concerned. Additionally, those leaning left, in terms of lower adherence to hierarchical structures, showed higher levels of empathetic concern for the outgroup. Implications and future avenues are discussed.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (5) ◽  
pp. 303
Author(s):  
Shawn E. Fagan ◽  
Liat Kofler ◽  
Sarah Riccio ◽  
Yu Gao

In moral dilemma tasks, high levels of psychopathic traits often predict increased utilitarian responding—specifically, endorsing sacrificing one person to save many. Research suggests that increased arousal (i.e., somatic marker production) underlies lower rates of utilitarian responding during moral dilemmas. Though deficient somatic marker production is characteristic of psychopathy, how this deficit affects the psychopathy–utilitarian connection remains unknown. We assessed psychopathic traits in undergraduates, as well as behavioral performance and skin conductance level reactivity (SCL-R; a measure of somatic marker production) during a moral dilemma task. High psychopathic traits and low SCL-R were associated with increased utilitarian decisions in dilemmas involving direct personal harm. Psychopathic traits were unrelated to SCL-R, nor did SCL-R mediate the relationship between psychopathy and utilitarianism. The present study did not find evidence that somatic marker production explains the connection between utilitarianism and psychopathy in a college population. Further research is necessary to identify the neural mechanisms relating psychopathy and moral decision-making in nonclinical samples.


2020 ◽  
Vol 46 (9) ◽  
pp. 1392-1407 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anita Körner ◽  
Roland Deutsch ◽  
Bertram Gawronski

Typical moral dilemmas pitting the consequences of a given action against the action’s consistency with moral norms confound several determinants of moral judgments. Dissociating these determinants, the CNI model allows researchers to quantify sensitivity to consequences, sensitivity to norms, and general preference for inaction over action regardless of consequences and norms. However, with the currently available set of dilemmas for research using the CNI model, the model is not suitable for studies with individual-difference designs. To overcome this limitation, the current research investigated the suitability of an extended dilemma battery to make the CNI model amenable for individual-difference research, examining relations of its parameters with psychopathy, empathic concern, need for cognition, self-reported utilitarianism, behavioral activation/inhibition, moral identity, and religiosity. The results support the suitability of the CNI model for individual-difference research with the extended dilemma battery, providing more nuanced insights into the underpinnings of individual differences in moral dilemma judgments.


2021 ◽  
pp. 014616722110350
Author(s):  
Dillon M. Luke ◽  
Bertram Gawronski

Although moral dilemma judgments are influenced by a variety of situational factors, there is evidence for considerable disagreement between individuals. Using the CNI model to disentangle (a) sensitivity to consequences, (b) sensitivity to moral norms, and (c) general preference for inaction versus action in responses to moral dilemmas, the current research examined the temporal stability of individual differences along the three dimensions. Across two time points 1 month apart, sensitivity to consequences ( r = .81) and sensitivity to norms ( r = .84) showed high levels of stability that were comparable to the Big Five personality traits; general preference for inaction versus action showed lower stability ( r = .41). Exploratory analyses revealed reliable associations between the three dimensions of moral dilemma judgments and three of the Big Five (extraversion, agreeableness, openness). Together, these findings provide evidence for stable individual differences in moral dilemma judgments that are related to basic personality traits.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Kappes ◽  
Jay Joseph Van Bavel

From moral philosophy to programming driverless cars, scholars have long been interested in how to shape moral decision-making. We examine how framing can impact moral judgments either by shaping which emotional reactions are evoked in a situation (antecedent-focused) or by changing how people respond to their emotional reactions (response-focused). In three experiments, we manipulated the framing of a moral decision-making task before participants judged a series of moral dilemmas. Participants encouraged to go “with their first” response beforehand favored emotion-driven judgments on high-conflict moral dilemmas. In contrast, participants who were instructed to give a “thoughtful” response beforehand or who did not receive instructions on how to approach the dilemmas favored reason-driven judgments. There was no difference in response-focused control during moral judgements. Process-dissociation confirmed that people instructed to go with their first response had stronger emotion-driven intuitions than other conditions. Our results suggest that task framing can alter moral intuitions.


2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (S1) ◽  
pp. S140-S140
Author(s):  
F. Keshvari ◽  
Z. Rezvani ◽  
F. Ghassemi ◽  
H. Pouretemad

In the stream of flurry of publications grappling different paradigms to tackle underlying mechanisms of moral decision-making, EVENT RELATED POTENtial (ERP) studies is beginning to explore psychophysiological components in the moral domain, focused on observing various moral behaviors in the experimental situations. This research was aimed at providing a new method of study investigating neural correlates of subjective moral decision-making in which we hypothesize that the social congruent or in-congruent context, could emerge a salience brain response in intuitive or cognitive control related responses toward moral dilemmas. Electrophysiological data were recorded from the scalp a 32-channel recording system complying with the international 10–20 system. The average N2 (175–300 ms) and LPP (300–600 ms) amplitude and latency were measured after the onset of putative counterpart response. Repeated measure ANOVA revealed that there was a difference between congruent versus in-congruent social response to high conflict scenarios in LPP amplitude in right lateral and frontal electrodes F(4, 174) = 5.812, P < 0.001 (Fig. 1). The findings also, suggest that N2 latency in less conflict moral scenarios may appear earlier compared with high conflict moral scenarios during in congruent social response in frontal electrodes especially left area F(3, 174) = 3.013, P < 0.05 (Fig. 2, figures are not available for this abstract). In conclusion, these results were either extend previous neurophysiological findings on classic moral scenarios and consistent with the notion that right hemisphere would be much more representative of cognitive control process during high conflict moral decision-making, while left frontal electrodes engaged in early intuitive process.Disclosure of interestThe authors have not supplied their declaration of competing interest.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Sophia Strojny

<p>Moral dilemmas require individuals to make a life-altering choice. Due to the severity of the choice, we argue that there is a degree of fear in moral decision-making. We aimed to see how prevailing fears in each individual predicts moral decision-making habits. We looked into the emotional and physical divisions of fear to deem which dimension of fear is more dominant in each participant. Then analysed these results against reported deontological or utilitarian moral inclinations to see if higher reports of fear impact moral decision-making. Additionally, we included two secondary variables that are most prevalent in fear research (gender and thinking styles) as well as the impact of burden on moral choice. We found that our research was supported; fear tendencies are linked to individual behaviours and burden of moral decisions was influenced by what we fear and affected moral choices.</p>


Curationis ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
E Arries

Nurses are increasingly confronted with situations of moral difficulty, such as not to feed terminally ill patients, whistle blowing, or participation in termination of pregnancy. Most of these moral dilemmas are often analyzed using the principle-based approach which applies the four moral principles of justice, autonomy, beneficence, and nonmalificence. In some instances, consequentialism is considered, but these frameworks have their limitations. Their limitations has to do with a consideration for the interpersonal nature of clinical nursing practice on the one hand, and is not always clear on how to judge which consequences are best on the other hand. When principles are in conflict it is not always easy to decide which principle should dominate. Furthermore, these frameworks do not take into account the importance of the interpersonal and emotional element of human experience. On the contrary, decision making about moral issues in healthcare demands that nurses exercise rational control over emotions. This clearly focuses the attention on the nurse as moral agent and in particular their character. In this article I argue that virtue ethics as an approach, which focus of the character of a person, might provide a more holistic analysis of moral dilemmas in nursing and might facilitate more flexible and creative solutions when combined with other theories of moral decision-making. Advancing this argument, firstly, I provide the central features of virtue ethics. Secondly I describe a story in which a moral dilemma is evident. Lastly I apply virtue ethics as an approach to this moral dilemma and in particular focusing on the virtues inherent in the nurse as moral agent in the story.


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