scholarly journals A Central Bank Theory of Price Level Determination

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 258-283
Author(s):  
Pierpaolo Benigno

This paper develops a theory in which the central bank can control the price level without fiscal backing. It is shown that the remittances policy and the balance sheet of the central bank are important elements to specify. A central bank that is appropriately capitalized can succeed in controlling prices by setting the interest rate on reserves, holding short-term assets, and rebating its income to the treasury from which it has to maintain financial independence. (JEL E31, E52, E58)

2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (9) ◽  
pp. 1656-1673
Author(s):  
V.V. Smirnov

Subject. The article discusses financial and economic momenta. Objectives. I determine financial and economic momenta as the interest rate changes in Russia. Methods. The study is based on a systems approach and the method of statistical analysis. Results. The Russian economy was found to strongly depend on prices for crude oil and natural gas, thus throwing Russia to the outskirts of the global capitalism, though keeping the status of an energy superpower, which ensures a sustainable growth in the global economy by increasing the external consumption and decreasing the domestic one. The devaluation of the national currency, a drop in tax revenue, etc. result from the decreased interest rate. They all require to increase M2 and the devalued retail loan in RUB, thus rising the GDP deflator. As for positive effects, the Central Bank operates sustainably, replenishes gold reserves and keeps the trade balance (positive balance), thus strengthening its resilience during a global drop in crude oil prices and the COVID-19 pandemic. The positive effects were discovered to result from a decreased in the interest rate, rather than keeping it low all the time. Conclusions and Relevance. As the interest rate may be, the financial and economic momentum in Russia depends on the volatility of the price for crude oil and natural gas. Lowering the interest rate and devaluing the national currency, the Central Bank preserves the resource structure of the Russian economy, strengthens its positions within the global capitalism and keeps its status of an energy superpower, thus reinforcing its resilience against a global drop in oil prices.


2018 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 1587-1591
Author(s):  
Neil Wallace

In The Curse of Cash, Rogoff (2016) makes two arguments. (i) Large denominations of currency are primarily used for illegal activity. Therefore, eliminating them would have benefits that far outweigh the costs in terms of lost seigniorage. (ii) The zero lower bound (ZLB) on the interest rate implied by the possibility of holding large amounts of currency is a costly constraint on central-bank policy. The best way to eliminate the ZLB is to eliminate all but small denominations of currency, ten dollars and lower, and to have those be in the form of coins. The style of the book, no models and no symbols, works fairly well for (i), but not so well for (ii). For (ii), the author is unclear about a crucial matter: what fiscal policy accompanies alternative interest-rate settings chosen by the central bank? ( JEL E26, E42, E43, E52, E58, E62)


2012 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 283-315
Author(s):  
Ascarya Ascarya

This study aims to investigate transmission mechanism of dual monetary system from conventional and Islamic policy rates to inflation and output using Granger and VAR methods on monthly Indonesian banking data form January 2003 to December 2009. The result shows that conventional transmission mechanismsfrom conventional policy rate are all linked tooutput and inflation, while Islamic policy rate are not linked to output and inflation.In addition, the interest rate, credit and conventional interbank rate shocks give negative and permanent impacts to inflation and output, while PLS, financing and Islamic interbank PLS, as well as SBIS(Central Bank Shariah Certificate) as Islamic policy rate shocks give positive and permanent impacts to inflation and output. SBI (Central Bank Certificate) as conventional policy givespositive impact to inflation and negative impact to output.Keywords: Monetary transmission mechanism, Interest rate pass through, Conventional Banking, Islamic BankingJEL Classification: E43, E52, G21, G28


2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-34
Author(s):  
Bijan Bidabad ◽  
Abul Hassan

Dynamic structural behavior of depositor, bank and borrower and the role of banks in forming business cycle are investigated. We test the hypothesis that does banks behavior make oscillations in the economy through the interest rate. By dichotomizing banking activities into two markets of deposit and loan, we show that these two markets have non-synchronized structures, and this is why the money sector fluctuation starts. As a result, the fluctuation is transmitted to the real economy through saving and investment functions. Empirical results assert that in the USA, the banking system creates fluctuations in the money sector and real economy as well through short-term interest rates


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 182-227 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierpaolo Benigno ◽  
Salvatore Nisticò

This paper studies monetary policy in models where multiple assets have different liquidity properties: safe and “pseudo-safe” assets coexist. A shock worsening the liquidity properties of the pseudo-safe assets raises interest rate spreads and can cause a deep recession-cum-deflation. Expanding the central bank’s balance sheet fills the shortage of safe assets and counteracts the recession. Lowering the interest rate on reserves insulates market interest rates from the liquidity shock and improves risk sharing between borrowers and savers. (JEL E31, E32, E43, E44, E52)


Author(s):  
Leonardo Gambacorta ◽  
Paul Mizen

Central bank policy operates first through financial markets and then through banks as they adjust their interest rates. This chapter discusses the transmission of policy in this first step of the monetary transmission mechanism, known as interest-rate pass-through. Historically, the focus of attention has been the interest-rate channel. We show the origins of this channel via a microfounded model of interest-rate setting by deposit-taking institutions that are Cournot oligopolists facing adjustment costs. We then examine other channels such as the bank lending channel and the bank capital channel and the role of central bank communications, signaling, and forward guidance over future interest rates. Each is shown to influence the setting of current short-term interest rates. The chapter closes with some issues for the future of pass-through in the transmission process.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. G. Shelomentsev ◽  
D. B. Berg ◽  
A. A. Detkov ◽  
A. P. Rylova

2014 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 37-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valentina Ivanović

Abstract The main reason for central bank independence lies in the fact that it is necessary to clearly distinguish spending money from the ability of making money. Independence of central banks is now a characteristic of almost all developed and highly industrialized countries. In this respect, it represents an essential part of the overall economic reality of these countries. Over the past decade or somewhat earlier, the issue of importance of central bank independence has been raised in developing countries, making the institutional, functional, personal and financial independence of central banks current topics for consideration. The key reason for the growing attention to financial independence of central banks is due to the effects of the global financial crisis on their balance sheets and therefore the challenges related to achieving the basic goals of the functioning of central banks - financial stability and price stability. Financial strength and independence of central banks must be developed relative to the policy and tasks that are carried out and risks they face in carrying out of these tasks. Financial independence represents a key base for credibility of a central bank. On one hand, the degree of credibility is associated with the ability of central banks to carry out their tasks without external financial assistance. In order to enhance the credibility of central bank in this regard, it must have sufficient financial strength to absorb potential losses and that power must be continuously strengthened by increasing capital and rearranging profit allocation arrangements. This is particularly important in times of crisis.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document