scholarly journals HUMAN RIGHTS IN TIMES OF ARMED CONFLICTS

MEST Journal ◽  
2022 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 60-65
Author(s):  
Ewa Salkiewicz-Munnerlyn

The present contribution deals with the issue of human rights in armed conflicts versus the concept of war. This distinction was made in Article 2, and the same in all four Geneva Convention of 1949. In this article, the distinction is made between the universal system of human rights and the International Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflicts (IHLAC). The difference of application between these two sets of law relies on the fact, that the universal agreements of human rights always apply, both in armed conflict and peace when the IHLAC applies only in times of armed conflicts. There is a difference between them in the regulation. Human rights regulate the relationship between the state and persons under its jurisdiction, regardless of their nationality and the IHLAC applies to states and individuals or armed groups distinguishing between a civilian or a veteran. About the compliance control, it is a different system too, for the IHLAC, it is the ICRC and criminal tribunals, and for human rights, there are different committees of tribunals like the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The exam of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR shows, that it does not make a distinction between a state of war and peace, which is called the humanization of the law of armed conflicts. Also, the very important question of the fragmentation of international law is examined, based on the jurisprudence of the ICJ.

2015 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 691-700
Author(s):  
ROBERT KOLB

This doctoral thesis, now published as a monograph, provides a thorough analysis of one of the most crucial concepts of the modern law of armed conflicts (LOAC), namely military objectives. The concept is crucial because the targeting of such objectives is directly linked to the principle of distinction, which in turn is a cardinal tenet of LOAC. It requires that the belligerents must always make the distinction between civilian objects and persons on the one hand, and military objectives (persons and objects) on the other, and attack only the latter to the exclusion of the former (Article 48 of the Additional Protocol I of 1977 (AP I)). Thus, the concept of military objectives is cast amidst the protection of civilians during the conduct of hostilities (whereas Geneva Convention IV of 1949 concerns their protection outside the context of combat action). It stands to reason that this protection is an essential part of the modern law of armed conflicts. Moreover, it is only superficially surprising that AP I was the first treaty to generally define military objectives. In the nineteenth century, the civilian hardly appeared in the LOAC. It was at that time simply taken for granted that civilians were outside the reach of military action; they would not participate in it and concomitantly would be spared from attacks. The social environment of the past was such that military action and civilian presence were reasonably distinct: the battlefield was the pitch for military action, other areas were bluntly aloof from such action. The twentieth century completely changed these parameters. Air power allowed a belligerent to wreak heavy havoc into all the lands of the adverse party. Industrialization and modernization of the army made civilian objectives relevant from a military standpoint, in particular industrial plants. Finally, the difference between civilians and military personnel was blurred, since civilians participated in a variety of forms to military operations (guerilla warfare is but one of the most emblematic forms of such participation). All these factors, among others, explain that the majority of victims in modern armed conflicts are civilians, not rarely up to a proportion of 90 per cent.1 The question of military objectives remains also highly relevant when viewed from another perspective. It is a concept often applied in modern military campaigns, where air power is of the essence. However, it gives rise to uncertainties at least on two accounts. First, the definition is open-ended and contextual; it must be operationalized in single cases and this gives rise to legal uncertainty. Indeed, Article 52, § 2, AP I, the cardinal provision in this regard, provides only for criteria which have to be applied by the belligerent to single sets of facts in order to determine if an object is a military objective. Second, there are marked differences of interpretation between the US and the continental European conceptions of military objectives, especially in certain areas of targeting such as ‘economic targets’ (i.e. targets chosen for their economic value to the war-sustaining effort). Notwithstanding the relevance of the concept of military objectives, there is hardly a wealth of monographic treatment of the subject matter. Indeed, no monograph in the English language was directly and exclusively devoted to that notion before the present publication. This new monograph is thus more than welcome.


2009 ◽  
Vol 42 (01) ◽  
pp. 8-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Kretzmer

The first step in application by treaty of IHL norms to non-international armed conflicts, adoption of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, 1949, was taken before the dramatic development of international human rights law (IHRL). The assumption was that unless international humanitarian law (IHL) norms were applied to such conflicts, the way States acted would be unrestrained by international law. With the development of IHRL this assumption is no longer valid. Application of IHL in such conflicts should therefore be re-examined. The Article argues that moving away from IHL in non-international armed conflicts should be based on the following principles: 1. In cases other than international armed conflicts, the presumption should be that the prevailing international legal regime is the human rights regime, based as it is on a law-enforcement model of law, rather than an armed conflict model. 2. The only justification for departure from that regime and for action under the armed conflict model, should be that the level and scope of organized armed violence are such that the State cannot reasonably be expected to act in accordance with the law-enforcement model. The rule of thumb in deciding whether this test has been met could be the definition of non-international armed conflicts adopted in APII. 3. There should be a return to the notion of minimum humanitarian standards or fundamental standards of humanity, which apply to all Parties in all situations, whether armed conflict, internal violence, disturbances, tensions and public emergencies. 4. A State should not be allowed to employ the armed conflict model, without at least some of the norms of protection that this model affords Parties in international armed conflicts. The ideal solution would be to demand that a State, which employs the armed conflict model has to draw the legal consequences and recognize as combatants those members of dissident forces who meet the substantive conditions of combatants under Article 4, paragraph 2 of Third Geneva Convention.


Refuge ◽  
1997 ◽  
pp. 6-8
Author(s):  
Karoline Kerber

The primary focus of attention in discussions on legal norms protecting refugees are usually the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and more recently international human rights instruments, such as the European Convention on Human Rights. In the context of armed conflicts, however, it seems natural to think of international humanitarian law as applicable in armed conflicts. This article examines the potential of international humanitarian law, i.e. the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their additional protocols of 1977, as sources of legal protection for refugees who seek shelter outside their home country.


Author(s):  
Rebecca Sutton

In international humanitarian law (IHL), the principle of distinction delineates the difference between the civilian and the combatant, and it safeguards the former from being intentionally targeted in armed conflicts. This monograph explores the way in which the idea of distinction circulates within, and beyond, IHL. Taking a bottom-up approach, the multi-sited study follows distinction across three realms: the Kinetic realm, where distinction is in motion in South Sudan; the Pedagogical realm, where distinction is taught in civil–military training spaces in Europe; and the Intellectual realm, where distinction is formulated and adjudicated in Geneva and the Hague. Directing attention to international humanitarian actors, the book shows that these actors seize upon signifiers of ‘civilianness’ in everyday practice. To safeguard their civilian status, and to deflect any qualities of ‘combatantness’ that might affix to them, humanitarian actors strive to distinguish themselves from other international actors in their midst. The latter include peacekeepers working for the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), and soldiers who deploy with NATO missions. Crucially, some of the distinctions enacted cut along civilian–civilian lines, suggesting that humanitarian actors are longing for something more than civilian status–the ‘civilian plus’. This special status presents a paradox: the appeal to the ‘civilian plus’ undermines general civilian protection, yet as the civilian ideal becomes increasingly beleaguered, a special civilian status appears ever more desirable. However disruptive these practices may be to the principle of distinction in IHL, it is emphasized that even at the most normative level there is no bright-line distinction to be found.


2012 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 391-414 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ben Clarke

In an attempt to impose limits on the level of acceptable incidental civilian suffering during armed conflict, international humanitarian law (IHL) articulates a proportionality formula as the test to determine whether or not an attack is lawful. Efforts to comply with that formula during the conduct of hostilities can involve a host of legal and operational challenges. These challenges have inspired a growing body of doctrinal and empirical research. A recent international conference in Jerusalem, co-sponsored by the Delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Israel and the Occupied Territories and the Minerva Center for Human Rights at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, brought together human rights lawyers, military experts and scholars from a variety of disciplines to assess recent developments relating to the proportionality principle in international humanitarian law. This report examines ten conference presentations which offer important insights into: the nature, scope of application and operational requirements of the proportionality principle under IHL; the modalities of investigation and review of proportionality decisions; and the challenges involved in proportionality decision-making.


Author(s):  
Manfred Nowak

International humanitarian law (IHL) was developed to ensure respect for the dignity and integrity of the human being. It aims to reduce human suffering in times of armed conflict by requiring combatants to act in a humane manner and to avoid cruelty. In relation to non-international armed conflicts, both IHL and international human rights law (IHRL) have been challenged with arguments of state sovereignty and a supposed prohibition on interference with domestic affairs. This chapter examines the three types of ill-treatment under both IHRL and IHL in light of relevant literature and jurisprudence: torture, cruel and inhuman treatment or punishment, and degrading treatment or punishment. It discusses the United Nations Convention against Torture and the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the obligations of states under human rights law, and outrages upon personal dignity.


2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (5) ◽  
pp. 701-703 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alba Ripoll Gallardo ◽  
Frederick M. Burkle ◽  
Luca Ragazzoni ◽  
Francesco Della Corte

AbstractThe current humanitarian crisis in Yemen is unprecedented in many ways. The Yemeni War tragedy is symptomatic of gross failures to recognize, by combatants, existing humanitarian law and the Geneva Convention that have become the new norm in unconventional armed conflicts and are increasingly replicated in Africa, Afghanistan, and other areas of the Middle East with dire consequences on aid workers and the noncombatant population. The health and humanitarian professions must take collective responsibility in calling for all belligerent parties to cease the massacre and commit to guaranteed medical assistance, humanitarian aid, and the free flow of information and respect for the humanitarian principles that protect the neutrality and impartiality of the humanitarian workforce. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2016;page 1 of 3)


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 197-213
Author(s):  
Maryla Fałdowska

The article presents issues concerning juvenile prisoners of three special camps in Kozielsk, Starobielsk and Ostashkov. The author draws attention to the lack of definition of the legal status of minors after 1918, and thus — the lack of provisions on ensuring the safety of children in the international standards governing the treatment of prisoners of war in force during World War II and internal legal acts of the Soviet Union. The article emphasizes that the participation of children in armed conflicts was regulated as late as ten years after the outbreak of World War II in international humanitarian law, adopting on 12 August 1949 “The Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War” (Fourth Geneva Convention), under which children are entitled to special treatment or protection measures. The provisions of conventions protecting children during the war included, among others, regulations concerning the creation of special zones and sanitary facilities, evacuation from the besieged zone, provision of necessary food and clothing, provision of medical and hospital care, education or transfer to a neutral country. The author notes that the Fourth Geneva Convention does not contain a provision on special protection and care for juveniles, and that children during warfare are classified exclusively as civilian population. The circumstances of the Soviet captivity of minors after September 17, 1939, their stay in and leaving the camps, the reasons for selection, after which they were left alive and not included in the “death transports”, described in the article, make it possible to determine the number of rescued and murdered.


2007 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 310-355 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cordula Droege

International human rights law and international humanitarian law are traditionally two distinct branches of law, one dealing with the protection of persons from abusive power, the other with the conduct of parties to an armed conflict. Yet, developments in international and national jurisprudence and practice have led to the recognition that these two bodies of law not only share a common humanist ideal of dignity and integrity but overlap substantially in practice. The most frequent examples are situations of occupation or non-international armed conflicts where human rights law complements the protection provided by humanitarian law.This article provides an overview of the historical developments that led to the increasing overlap between human rights law and humanitarian law. It then seeks to analyse the ways in which the interplay between human rights law and humanitarian law can work in practice. It argues that two main concepts inform their interaction: The first is complementarity between their norms in the sense that in most cases, especially for the protection of persons in the power of a party to the conflict, they mutually reinforce each other. The second is the principle of lex specialis in the cases of conflict between the norms.


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