Mathematical problems of decision-making in organizational systems
The theory of decision-making in organizational systems with complex structure in the conditions of conflict and uncertainty is stated. A review of the current state of the theory is given. Systems are studied: hierarchical, coalition and coalition-hierarchical (hybrid). The main attention in the process of designing mathematical models of systems is paid to the description of ways of information interaction of decision makers. This takes into account the options of their unfavorable (conflict) and benevolent “attitude” to each other. Two approaches to decision-making are proposed: 1) decision-making from the point of view of the selected participant of the system based on the method of penalty functions and obtaining the necessary conditions of optimality; 2) decision-making in the form of equilibria based on special principles of optimality, constructed using the principles of Nash, Pareto, Geoffrion, Stackelberg, Slater, threats-counter-threats, absolute active equilibrium and obtaining sufficient conditions of optimality. Theoretical results are illustrated by model examples. For researchers, graduate students and students involved in theoretical and practical issues of decision-making in complex systems.