Multiplicative Pacing Equilibria in Auction Markets
Budgets play a significant role in ad markets that implement sequential auctions such as those hosted by internet companies. In “Multiplicative Pacing Equilibria in Auction Markets,” the authors look at pacing in an ad marketplace using the lens of game theory. The goal is understanding how bids must be shaded to maximize advertiser welfare, at equilibrium. Motivated by the real-world auction mechanism, they construct a game where advertisers in the auctions choose a multiplicative factor not larger than 1 to possibly reduce their bids and best respond to the other advertisers. The article studies the theoretical properties of the game such as existence and uniqueness of equilibria, offers an exact algorithm to compute them, connects the game to well-known abstractions such as Fisher markets, and performs a computational study with real-world-inspired instances. The main insights are that the solutions to the studied game can be used to improve the outcomes achieved by a closer-to-reality dynamic pacing algorithm and that buyers do not have an incentive to misreport bids or budgets when there are enough participants in the auction.