A Girardian Interpretation of the Market Mechanism in Neo-Classical Economics

2021 ◽  
Vol 28 ◽  
pp. 129
Author(s):  
Shin
Keyword(s):  
Market Mechanism ◽  
Classical Economics

ECONOMICS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN THE THEORY OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS BY THOMAS KUHN

2021 ◽  
Vol XXIII (3) ◽  
pp. 103-113
Author(s):  
Arkadiusz Sadowski
Keyword(s):  
Sustainable Development ◽  
Theoretical Concept ◽  
Market Mechanism ◽  
Social Effects ◽  
Thomas Kuhn ◽  
New Paradigm ◽  
Economic Problems ◽  
Classical Economics ◽  
Scientific Revolutions ◽  
The Social

The aim of this article is to analyze selected aspects of the theory of sustainable development as a potentially new paradigm in economic theory. The paper presents the concept of the economics of sustainable development in the context of the theory of scientific revolutions developed by Thomas Khun. The study focuses on such issues as externalities and the functioning of the economy in the macrosystem, including society and the environment. Their inclusion in the economics of sustainable development has allowed the assessment of such fundamental aspects as the voluntary nature of transactions or the social effects of running a business from a different perspective. Based on conducted analyses and the review of the literature, it has been noted that the main assumptions of the economics of sustainable development constitute some sort of anomaly, and perhaps even a revolution in relation to classical economics (understood, in this study, as a general theoretical concept that proclaims the reliability of the market mechanism, as well as the convergence of individual interests of producers and consumers with collective interests). In the context of Khun’s concept, it has been pointed out that a possible future paradigm of economics will not constitute so much disapproval of the present one but will make it more comprehensive and will approach economic problems from a different perspective.

The Bases of Development Policy (Presidential Address)

1995 ◽  
Vol 34 (4I) ◽  
pp. 321-330
Author(s):  
Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi
Keyword(s):  
Development Economics ◽  
Development Policy ◽  
Economies Of Scale ◽  
Free Market ◽  
Presidential Address ◽  
Market Mechanism ◽  
Classical Economics ◽  
Economic Progress ◽  
Free Market Capitalism ◽  
The Government

Development economics seeks to isolate the elemental forces at work in developing countries that raise per capita income, initially and then continuously, by exploiting fully the inter-industry and inter-sectoral network of economies of scale, externalities, and complementarities; it also analyses the key factors that decide a fair distribution of the fruits of economic progress, and those which enhance human happiness more directly. The process of economic development is seen as complex, even mysterious; which must be tackled by conscious planning where coordination failures are threatening, and through the market mechanism if information problems are daunting. Yet a persistent theme in economic literature has been one of denial of the (marginal) utility of development economics. Essentially, most of these “arguments” against development economics are nothing more than a thinly disguised championing of the ideology of free-market capitalism and neo-classical economics as the ultimate truths about the economic universe [Heilbroner (1990)]. They are a frame of thought into which development economics would not fit “naturally”. As one would expect, these views about development economics have not gone unchallenged. But the main issue is far from settled. I, therefore, restate here the case for development economics to make sure that development policy is saved from the revages of an incompatible liberalist philosophy. I would concentrate on issues related to the acknowledged mainsprings of economic progress, and those related to the relationship between trade and growth and the interface of the government and the market. Finally, I would like to emphasise the need to acquire an overarching ethical vision in order to identify the ends of economic progress and to order the means to achieve them.

Beyond a subjective theory of value and towards a ‘fair price’: an organizational perspective on Fairtrade minimum price setting

Organization ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 17 (5) ◽  
pp. 563-581 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juliane Reinecke
Keyword(s):  
Conflicts Of Interest ◽  
Market Mechanism ◽  
Ethnographic Study ◽  
The Political ◽  
Price Setting ◽  
Fair Price ◽  
Classical Economics ◽  
Subjective Theory ◽  
Minimum Price ◽  
Theory Of Value

This article explores Fairtrade minimum price setting as an organizational formulation of a critical response to economic liberalism and its underlying notion of value—a subjective theory of value. The aim of the article is to show what happens if such meta-level philosophical debates on fairness and markets are lived out organizationally. This is achieved by using an ethnographic study of the price setting process of the Fairtrade Labelling Organizations. The case unpacks the complexities of defining a ‘fair’ price beyond the principle of marginal utility. I draw on French pragmatist sociology in order to decompose the political and moral constructions that underpin the organizational practices of minimum price setting. Challenging the assumption of free choice in neo-classical economics, Fairtrade redefines not only how value should be calculated, but also what it is it that should be valued and who values. This makes visible the political confrontation at the point of price determination, notably by providing a social arena for where conflicts of interest between opposing parties are played out. Once the producer enters price formation processes as a person and not only as the alienable owner of a commodity, the social, political and ecological and relations of production come to the fore that are otherwise concealed through the spontaneous market mechanism.

Perspectives and Regulation of the Russian Market for Project-based Transactions under the Kyoto Protocol

2008 ◽  
pp. 108-125
Author(s):  
K. Zavodov
Keyword(s):  
Energy Efficiency ◽  
Market Mechanism ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Market Regulation ◽  
Foreign Investments ◽  
Russian Market ◽  
Increase Energy Efficiency ◽  
New Form ◽  
Contract Structure ◽  
Carbon Fund

Project-based transactions (PBTs) are a market mechanism of attracting foreign investments in order to abate greenhouse gas emissions and increase energy efficiency of the country’s enterprises. The article provides a classification and analyzes advantages and drawbacks of PBTs from the point of view of a host country. The main trends and factors determining the dynamics of the PBT market are described. Given that Russia currently lags behind the leaders of the PBT market, an incorporation of a state carbon fund is put forward with an aim of channelling PBTs through it. This paper proposes a form of PBT market regulation by incorporating an option mechanism into the contract structure of a transaction. A comparison of the new form of regulation with the tools that are currently in use in Russia and other countries demonstrates its greater economic efficiency under uncertainty.

Two Intellectual Landmarks in the Year 1749

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 101-123
Author(s):  
Farhad Rassekh
Keyword(s):  
Paradigm Shift ◽  
David Hume ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Considerable Extent ◽  
Monetary Theory ◽  
Economic Theories ◽  
Classical Economics ◽  
Wealth Of Nations ◽  
Economic Thinking

In the year 1749 Adam Smith conceived his theory of commercial liberty and David Hume laid the foundation of his monetary theory. These two intellectual developments, despite their brevity, heralded a paradigm shift in economic thinking. Smith expanded and promulgated his theory over the course of his scholarly career, culminating in the publication of The Wealth of Nations in 1776. Hume elaborated on the constituents of his monetary framework in several essays that were published in 1752. Although Smith and Hume devised their economic theories in 1749 independently, these theories complemented each other and to a considerable extent created the structure of classical economics.

Probabilistic Supply and Demand Balance Control Method based on Electricity Market Mechanism Considering N-1 Criterion

2021 ◽  
Vol 141 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Akira Koide ◽  
Takao Tsuji ◽  
Kazuyuki Tanaka ◽  
Hitoshi Sugimoto
Keyword(s):  
Electricity Market ◽  
Control Method ◽  
Balance Control ◽  
Supply And Demand ◽  
Market Mechanism

Vertical Boilerplate

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Gibson
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Real World ◽  
Empirical Work ◽  
Full Scale ◽  
Market Mechanism ◽  
Law School ◽  
Information Cost ◽  
Information Costs ◽  
Policy Proposals ◽  
Radical Solution

Despite what we learn in law school about the “meeting of the minds,” most contracts are merely boilerplate—take-it-or-leave-it propositions. Negotiation is nonexistent; we rely on our collective market power as consumers to regulate contracts’ content. But boilerplate imposes certain information costs because it often arrives late in the transaction and is hard to understand. If those costs get too high, then the market mechanism fails. So how high are boilerplate’s information costs? A few studies have attempted to measure them, but they all use a “horizontal” approach—i.e., they sample a single stratum of boilerplate and assume that it represents the whole transaction. Yet real-world transactions often involve multiple layers of contracts, each with its own information costs. What is needed, then, is a “vertical” analysis, a study that examines fewer contracts of any one kind but tracks all the contracts the consumer encounters, soup to nuts. This Article presents the first vertical study of boilerplate. It casts serious doubt on the market mechanism and shows that existing scholarship fails to appreciate the full scale of the information cost problem. It then offers two regulatory solutions. The first works within contract law’s unconscionability doctrine, tweaking what the parties need to prove and who bears the burden of proving it. The second, more radical solution involves forcing both sellers and consumers to confront and minimize boilerplate’s information costs—an approach I call “forced salience.” In the end, the boilerplate experience is as deep as it is wide. Our empirical work should reflect that fact, and our policy proposals should too.

Market Mechanism Choice and Real Estate Disposition: Search Versus Auction

2002 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel C. Quan
Keyword(s):  
Real Estate ◽  
Market Mechanism

Marxian Economics as New-Classical Economics

1968 ◽  
Vol 10 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 496
Author(s):  
P. R. Brahmananda
Keyword(s):  
Marxian Economics ◽  
Classical Economics
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