scholarly journals Predatory Pricing: A Framework for Analysis

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 124-155
Author(s):  
Raimundas Moisejevas
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Predatory Pricing ◽  
Member States ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Extensive Analysis ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Abuse Of Dominant Position

Abstract One of the key principles of EU Competition law is a prohibition of the abuse of a dominant position established in the Article 102 of the TFEU. Predatory pricing is one of the forms of the abuse of dominant position. To decide whether the dominant undertaking has referred to predatory pricing it is necessary to check several elements: costs and prices of the dominant undertaking; the possibility to recoup losses; intent; and objective justifications. The Court of Justice, the European Commission and competition institutions in most member states perform extensive analysis of a relationship between costs and prices of a dominant undertaking while dealing with cases on predatory pricing. However, we believe that competition authorities should pay more attention to evaluation and to whether pricing will cause elimination of competitors and damage to consumers. This article critically reviews the framework of the analysis of predatory pricing in the practice of the Court of Justice and the European Commission.

7. The Direct Jurisdiction of the Court of Justice

2019 ◽  
pp. 208-248
Author(s):  
Nigel Foster
Keyword(s):  
Member State ◽  
European Commission ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Regulation ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
The Right ◽  
Interim Measures

This chapter considers the actions commenced before the Court of Justice. These include actions by the European Commission and other member states against a member state (Articles 258–60 TFEU); judicial review of acts of the institutions (Article 263 TFEU); the action against the institutions for a failure to act (Article 265 TFEU); actions for damages (Articles 268 and 340 TFEU); and the right to plead the illegality of an EU regulation (Article 277 TFEU). The chapter also considers interim measures under Articles 278 and 279 TFEU and enforcement actions arising from the Commission enforcement of EU competition law against individuals.

7. The Direct Jurisdiction of the Court of Justice

2021 ◽  
pp. 208-248
Author(s):  
Nigel Foster
Keyword(s):  
Member State ◽  
European Commission ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Regulation ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
The Right ◽  
Interim Measures

This chapter considers the actions commenced before the Court of Justice. These include actions by the European Commission and other member states against a member state (Arts 258–60 TFEU); judicial review of acts of the institutions (Art 263 TFEU); the action against the institutions for a failure to act (Art 265 TFEU); actions for damages (Arts 268 and 340 TFEU); and also the right to plead the illegality of an EU regulation (Art 277 TFEU). The chapter also considers interim measures under Arts 278 and 279 TFEU and enforcement actions arising from the Commission enforcement of EU competition law against individuals.

scholarly journals What Role for EU Competition Law in Regulated Industries? Reflections on the Judgment of the General Court of 17 December 2015 Orange Polska v European Commission (Case T-486/11)

2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (14) ◽  
pp. 265-277
Author(s):  
Sandra Marco Colino
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Commission ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Commission Decision ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Broadband Services ◽  
Regulated Industries ◽  
New Entrants

On 17th December 2015, the General Court of the European Union (GC) confirmed a fine of over EUR 127 million imposed by the European Commission (hereinafter the Commission) on the Polish telecommunications company Orange Polska (hereinafter OP), formerly known as Telekomunikacja Polska. According to the fining decision, issued in 2011 (hereinafter the Commission decision), OP abused its dominant position by refusing access to its wholesale broadband services to new entrants, acting in contravention of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

scholarly journals Commitment Decisions: Is the Sky the Limit? - Commentary to Judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) of 15 September 2016, Case T-76/14, Morningstar, Inc. v European Commission

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-212
Author(s):  
Rita Leandro Vasconcelos
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Commission ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Case Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Article 9 ◽  
Abuse Of Dominant Position ◽  
Limited Scope

In its judgment of 15 September 2016, the General Court ruled on whether the commitments offered by Thompson Reuters to the European Commission during an investigation of a possible abuse of dominant position were sufficient to address the competition concerns identified by the Commission. This is only the second time the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled on Commission decisions rendering binding the commitments offered by an undertaking Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003. With regard to standing, the General Court ruled the appeal lodged by a competitor admissible. As for substance, the General Court generally confirmed the previous case law. It ruled on the commitments meet the competition concerns identified by the institution, the different proportionality standard in Article 9 decisions as compared to Article 7 Regulation 1/2003 decisions (formal decision finding an infringement), and the limited scope of judicial review of the Court of Justice of the European Union in these appeals.

scholarly journals Piecemeal Harmonisation Through the Damages Directive? Remarks on What Received Too Little Attention in Relation to Private Enforcement of EU Competition Law

2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (12) ◽  
pp. 79-98
Author(s):  
Anna Piszcz
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
Member States ◽  
European Approach ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
The Eu

On 11 June 2013, the European Commission adopted a package of measures to tackle the lack of an efficient and coherent private enforcement system of EU competition law in its Member States. In particular, a draft Damages Directive was proposed in order to meet the need for a sound European approach to private enforcement of EU competition law in damages actions. The Damages Directive was ultimately adopted on 26 November 2014. This paper explores some aspects of private antitrust enforcement which have not received sufficient attention from the EU decision-makers during the long preparatory and legislative works preceding the Directive. The paper discusses also some of the remedies that have not been harmonised, and shows how these ‘gaps’ in harmonisation may limit the Directive’s expected influence on both the thinking and practice of private antitrust enforcement in Europe. It is argued in conclusion that further harmonisation may be needed in order to actually transform private enforcement of EU competition law before national courts

7. The Direct Jurisdiction of the Court of Justice

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nigel Foster
Keyword(s):  
Member State ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Interim Measures

This chapter considers the actions commenced before the Court of Justice. These include actions by the Commission and other member states against a member state (Arts 258–60 TFEU); judicial review of acts of the institutions (Art 263 TFEU); the action against the institutions for a failure to act (Art 265 TFEU); and actions for damages (Arts 268 and 340 TFEU). The chapter also considers interim measures under Arts 278 and 279 TFEU and actions arising from the Commission enforcement of EU competition law against individuals.

Anticompetitive Effects in EU Competition Law

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pablo Ibáñez Colomo
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Time Variable ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Open Questions ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Competitive Disadvantage ◽  
Probability Threshold ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Freedom Of Action

Abstract This article examines the meaning and scope of the notion of anticompetitive effects in EU competition law. It does so by bringing together several strands of the case law (and this across all provisions, namely Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and merger control). The analysis is structured around a framework that considers the main variables that shape the notion in practice: the time variable (actual or potential effects); the dimensions of competition and the counterfactual; the meaning of effects and the probability threshold (plausibility, likelihood, certainty). The exercise shows that it is possible to discern a concrete meaning to the notion of anticompetitive effects. Some central questions, including the role and operation of the counterfactual and the threshold of effects, have already been answered by the Court of Justice. In particular, it has long been clear that anticompetitive effects amount to more than a mere competitive disadvantage and/or a limitation of a firm’s freedom of action. The impact on equally efficient firms’ ability and/or incentive to compete would need to be established. At the same time, some open questions and some potential areas of friction (relating, inter alia, to stakeholders’ tendency to conflate appreciability and effects) remain. These are also discussed.

scholarly journals Digital Economy, Big Data and Competition Law

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-89
Author(s):  
Roberto Augusto Castellanos Pfeiffer
Keyword(s):  
Big Data ◽  
Data Protection ◽  
Personal Data ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Digital Economy ◽  
Data Driven ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Privacy Concerns ◽  
Sense Data ◽  
Abuse Of Dominant Position

Big data has a very important role in the digital economy, because firms have accurate tools to collect, store, analyse, treat, monetise and disseminate voluminous amounts of data. Companies have been improving their revenues with information about the behaviour, preferences, needs, expectations, desires and evaluations of their consumers. In this sense, data could be considered as a productive input. The article focuses on the current discussion regarding the possible use of competition law and policy to address privacy concerns related to big data companies. The most traditional and powerful tool to deal with privacy concerns is personal data protection law. Notwithstanding, the article examines whether competition law should play an important role in data-driven markets where privacy is a key factor. The article suggests a new approach to the following antitrust concepts in cases related to big data platforms: assessment of market power, merger notification thresholds, measurement of merger effects on consumer privacy, and investigation of abuse of dominant position. In this context, the article analyses decisions of competition agencies which reviewed mergers in big data-driven markets, such as Google/DoubleClick, Facebook/ WhatsApp and Microsoft/LinkedIn. It also reviews investigations of alleged abuse of dominant position associated with big data, in particular the proceeding opened by the Bundeskartellamt against Facebook, in which the German antitrust authority prohibited the data processing policy imposed by Facebook on its users. The article concludes that it is important to harmonise the enforcement of competition, consumer and data protection polices in order to choose the proper way to protect the users of dominant platforms, maximising the benefits of the data-driven economy.

scholarly journals Insights from the Slovak Hybrid Mail Services Case. Case Comment to the Judgement of the General Court of 25 March 2015 and Order of Court of Justice of the EU of 30 June 2016 Slovenská pošta v Commission (Cases T-556/08, C-293/15P)

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (16) ◽  
pp. 191-203
Author(s):  
Karolis Kačerauskas
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Strange Situation ◽  
Member States ◽  
Commission Decision ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu ◽  
The Eu

The Slovak hybrid mail services case (or Slovenska posta case) is truly unique in EU jurisprudence. Within the last decade, the European Commission rarely applied Article 106(1) in conjunction with Article 102 TFEU to challenge competition distortions in individual cases. Thus Slovenska posta constitutes one of the rare examples of such enforcement. Slovenska posta also constitutes a very rare example of a judicial review of Commission decisions based on Article 106(1) and 102 TFEU. Slovenska posta is only the second case when European courts were called upon to review the application of Article 106(1) and 102 TFEU by the Commission and the first when the judicial review was conducted over a Commission decision regarding “failure to meet the demand”. Indeed, since 1989–1990 (when the Commission commenced to apply Article 106(1) and 102 TFEU to challenge competition distortions introduced by the Member States) and until 2014, when the Court of Justice adopted its decision in Greek lignite (DEI) case, none of the Commission decisions was reviewed by EU courts. Such lack of appeals resulted in a rather strange situation under which the Commission and CJEU developed their own jurisprudence on the application of Article 106(1) and 102 TFEU and occasionally interpreted the same legal criteria differently. In this regard, a court review in Slovenska posta was eagerly awaited in the hope it would reconcile these diverging positions and provide more clarity on the application of Article 106(1) and 102 TFEU.

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