Sondergerichte in den besetzten polnischen Gebieten im Jahr 1939. Eine rechtsgeschichtliche Analyse

Author(s):  
Konrad Graczyk

Abstract Special Courts in the Occupied Polish Territories in 1939. A Legal History Analysis. The study is devoted to the first period of activity of German special courts established in Poland in 1939. The basic scope presents the special courts of the Third Reich established on the basis of the regulation of 1933. They were a model for courts established in occupied Poland. Their creation is analyzed on the example of the Special Court in Katowitz (Sondergericht Kattowitz). Then, the activities of special courts in occupied Poland in 1939 are discussed with particular emphasis on case and penalty statistics. Attention is paid to some characteristic phenomena, such as problems with jurisdiction, differences resulting from the establishment of special courts as part of the military administration, and judgment of acts committed before the war and under Polish jurisdiction. The identified cases of violations of law in the activities of special courts in 1939 are also discussed.

2005 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 28-49
Author(s):  
Cora Sol Goldstein

In December 1945, less than six months after the unconditional defeat of the Third Reich and the military occupation of Germany, two anti-Nazi German intellectuals, Herbert Sandberg and Günther Weisenborn, launched the bimonthly journal, Ulenspiegel: Literatur, Kunst, und Satire (Ulenspiegel: Literature, Art and Satire), in the American sector of Berlin. Sandberg, the art editor, was a graphic artist. He was also a Communist who had spent ten years in Nazi concentration camps—the last seven in Buchenwald. Weisenborn, a Social Democrat and the literary editor, was a playwright, novelist, and literary critic. He had been a member of the rote Kapelle resistance group, was captured and imprisoned by the Gestapo in 1942, and was liberated by the Red Army in 1945.


1996 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen J. Whitfield

Among the most intensely absorbed viewers of John Ford's The Grapes of Wrath (1940) was Adolf Hitler, who knew almost nothing of the United States but who observed how degenerate the “Okies” had become. He believed that immigration had already mongrelized the general populace and, since even farmers of Anglo-Saxon stock had succumbed to racial disintegration, the Americans would be pushovers for the Wehrmacht. This particular movie-goer failed to notice the resilience and endurance also flickering on the screen; and it would be foolish to claim that his decision to declare war on the United States was based only upon a misinterpretation of The Grapes of Wrath (which he watched several times). But since no treaty obligation compelled the Third Reich to make war, after Pearl Harbor, upon an industrial power of which the Führer was so ignorant, any analysis of his motives must remain speculative. It may have been a mad urge for apocalyptic destructiveness (and self-destructiveness), springing from subterranean depths that the psychobiographer can fathom more readily than the military or diplomatic historian. Perhaps Hitler's miscalculation was not utterly irrational: with Holland's surrender in 1940, its place as the world's nineteenth largest army was ceded to the Americans.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tomasz Giaro

Two central questions about the idea of the shared legal heritage of Europe are examined. This idea determines the shape of legal history in most European countries after WW II, but its origins are still largely unknown. The two questions read: What was the impact of totalitarianism in Nazi Germany and of the exile of Jewish legal scholars upon this idea? What legal, political and cultural factors contributed to its dissemination? The questions are examined based on the biographies of Fritz Schulz, Fritz Pringsheim, Paul Koschaker, Franz Wieacker and Helmut Coing.


Author(s):  
S. Jazavita

he present article analyses the relationship between the Lithuanian Activist Front and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and their activity parallels in order to reach the Lithuanian and the Ukrainian independence in 1941. The research focuses on the attempts of the OUN and the LAF leaders to project the future Lithuanian and Ukrainian states in the 'New Europe' headed by Germany. Reaching for counterbalance against the USSR and the Communist ideology, the LAF and the OUN organizations aimed at taking into consideration the military and political power of Germany, while Škirpa, the leader of the LAF, coordinated his activities with the OUN leaders, Stetsko, Yaryi, and Bandera. Fanatical chiefs of the Third Reich manipulated with the Lithuanians and Ukrainians' feelings of revenge against the Bolsheviks and the will to feel Europeans; however, they involved a part of Lithuanians and Ukrainians to the massacre of Jews rather than allowed to contribute to Wehrmacht fight against the USSR. Important lesson here that Lithuania and Ukraine did not obtain any independence but just became a part of the Third Reich, which controlled the so called 'New Europe' at the time.


Author(s):  
Andrzej Wojtaszak

In the last decade preceding the outbreak of World War II, the war threat of Poland was perceived by the highest political and military authorities. During the reign of Józef Piłsudski the question was asked: who was the war with? This question asked to the military and political decision makers confirmed three possibilities of the outbreak of the conflict: with Russia, with Germany and with Russia and Germany. The analyzes carried out took into account the use of the natural environment as an important element in the preparation of variants of strategic plans for the future war. Each of the plans took into account the complexity of the defense situation of the state (special, long line of borders, natural obstacles and lack thereof). The Polish military alliances were counted on. The Polish defensive war of 1939 turned out to be a conflict with two aggressors (the Third Reich and the USSR), and with the passivity of our Allies, the chances of victory were only hypothetical. The natural environment may help in the implementation of military action plans, but it does not replace the lack of military capabilities of the army.


1999 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-51
Author(s):  
Kees Gispen

Inthis paper I would like to relate some of the results of my specialized research on Nazi inventor policy to themes and interpretations with which many students of the Third Reich already are familiar. One of those themes is the relationship between big business and the Nazi state. An influential hypothesis in this area centers on the notion of a “power cartel,” based on the insight that Nazi Germany was not a dictatorship in which all sectors of society were suppressed with equal force. According to the “power-cartel” interpretation, which incorporates elements of the Marxist perspective on the relationship between capitalism and National Socialism, the Third Reich was governed by an informal coalition of the Nazis, the military, and big business. This fundamental idea is then qualified by two additional observations. First, the Nazi movement is broken down into factions comprising the party, Labor Front, and SA on the one hand, and the Gestapo and SS on the other hand. The former are seen to lose power as time went by while that latter gained it, which helps explain the regime's increasing brutality and its accelerating descent into barbarism. Second, the idea of a changing balance of power is also applied to the power cartel as a whole. The point here is to account for the gradual loss of power by the military and big business. Their relatively advantageous positions in the regime’s early years steadily eroded, producing a very different weighting among the cartel’s members by the time World War II ended, without, however, ever completely destroying it.


2015 ◽  
pp. 157-180
Author(s):  
Uwe Schellinger ◽  
Andreas Anton ◽  
Michael T. Schetsche

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