The Effect of Leadership on Free-Riding: Results from a Public-Good Experiment

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-63
Author(s):  
Daniel M. Parsons ◽  
Nick Feltovich ◽  
Philip J. Grossman
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Public Good Experiment ◽  
Good Experiment

scholarly journals Public good experiment data of a water game framed to Rajasthan/India

Data in Brief ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 27 ◽  
pp. 104556
Author(s):  
Thomas Falk ◽  
Shalander Kumar ◽  
Srinivasa Srigiri
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Experiment Data ◽  
Public Good Experiment ◽  
Good Experiment

scholarly journals Beware of Broken Windows! First Impressions in Public-Good Experiment

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Beckenkamp ◽  
Christoph Engel ◽  
Andreas Glöckner ◽  
Bernd Irlenbusch ◽  
Heike Hennig-Schmidt ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
First Impressions ◽  
Broken Windows ◽  
Public Good Experiment ◽  
Good Experiment

Verbal Feedback in a Public Good Experiment

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Pelloux ◽  
Jean-Louis Rulliere ◽  
Frans van Winden
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Verbal Feedback ◽  
Public Good Experiment ◽  
Good Experiment

scholarly journals The trade-off between welfare and equality in a public good experiment

2015 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 601-623 ◽  
Author(s):  
Agathe Rouaix ◽  
Charles Figuières ◽  
Marc Willinger
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Public Good Experiment ◽  
Good Experiment

A Hybrid Public Good Experiment Eliciting Multi-Dimensional Choice Data

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniela Di Cagno ◽  
Arianna Galliera ◽  
Werner GGth ◽  
Luca Panaccione
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Choice Data ◽  
Public Good Experiment ◽  
Good Experiment

scholarly journals Can exit prizes induce lame ducks to shirk less? Experimental evidence

2012 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 106
Author(s):  
Leif Helland ◽  
Jon Hovi ◽  
Lars Monkerud
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Overlapping Generations ◽  
Focal Point ◽  
Gift Exchange ◽  
Public Good Experiment ◽  
Olg Models ◽  
Trigger Strategies ◽  
Good Experiment ◽  
Elected Representatives

Elected representatives serving their final period face only weak incentives to provide costly effort. However, overlapping generations (OLG) models suggest that exit prizes sustained by trigger strategies can induce representatives in their final period to provide such effort. We evaluate this hypothesis using a simple OLG public good experiment, the central treatment being whether exit prizes are permitted. We find that a significantly higher number of subjects in their final period contribute when exit prizes are permitted. However, this result does not originate from use of trigger strategies. More likely explanations include gift-exchange and focal-point effects.

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