scholarly journals Deprivation of Liberty and Human Dignity in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 150 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Spano

In its landmark 2013 judgment of Vinter and Others v. the United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights held that a life sentence which is not de jure and de facto reducible amounts to a breach of the prohibition of inhuman and degrading punishment, as enshrined in Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The author, a judge of the Strasbourg Court, analyses the Vinter judgment both as it stands alone as well as how it fits into and, now, influences the Court’s case-law on Article 3 and 5 of the Convention, before reviewing the procedural requirements laid down by the Court for a ‘Vinter review’ of life sentences. In doing so, the author examines the underlying tensions between the conception of penal policy as falling within the exclusive domain of domestic decision-making and the individualistic and dignitarian notion of human rights in which the Convention system is firmly grounded. The article is based on the 2016 Bergen Lecture on Criminal Law and Criminal Justice which the author gave on 26 October 2016 at the Faculty of Law, University of Bergen. 

2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 197
Author(s):  
Zeynab Kiani ◽  
Zeynab Purkhaghan

Deportation and extradition have been one of the long-standing issues in international law. After proposing new human rights' issues in the development of international law and human role in international relations, sometimes the question of deportation and extradition is in conflict with European human rights concept. It should distinguish between extradition with similar concepts such as delivery, transfer and dismissal. The extradition is the process that reflects the country's international collaboration and cooperation in the implementation of more stringent standards of criminal justice. Its successful implementation requires the cooperation of different countries in extradition with no political and security excuses. European Court of Human Rights as a judicial organ of the European Convention on Human Rights has issued sentences in its practice regarding some of these conflicts. Researcher with knowledge of neglecting the debate in the Iranian legal system, insists to evaluate the performance of the Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights in relation to deportation and extradition and procedure that the European Court has dealt using analytical methods to review the extradition from different angles and it is hoped that open a step for progress in Iran's penal policy and the legal in the international arena.


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 342-362
Author(s):  
Ergul Celiksoy

In November 2018, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights delivered its judgment in the case of Beuze v Belgium. Relying on Ibrahim and Others v the United Kingdom, the Grand Chamber held that the Salduz principles require a two-stage test of analysis, and hence, ruled out that systematic statutory restriction of a general and mandatory nature would in itself constitute an automatic violation of Article 6 § 3(c) of the European Convention on Human Rights. However, the Beuze judgment appears to be very controversial, since the Grand Chamber failed to put forward any convincing reason why it departed from previous case law, particularly Dayanan v Turkey and other judgments against Turkey. In their separate opinion, the concurring Judges in Beuze were concerned that the Beuze judgment overruled ‘ Salduz itself and all other cases that have applied the Salduz test’, and thus, ‘actually distorts and changes the Salduz principle and devalues the right that the Court established previously’. This article analyses the Beuze judgment in the light of the Court’s recent jurisprudence in order to examine whether it contradicts and dilutes the principles previously set out. Further, it discusses the implications of the new standards established in Ibrahim and Others and in subsequent cases, particularly Beuze. Particular attention is paid to the questions of how ‘fair’ is the application of overall fairness assessment in every case, how may the Court’s changing direction of approach concerning the right to access to a lawyer affect the increasing trend of recognition thereof, as a rule, by the contracting states, and finally, to what extent the new principles, especially those established in Beuze, comply with Directive 2013/48/EU on the right of access to a lawyer.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 70-79
Author(s):  
Lucia Smolková

This paper analyses the case law of the Slovak Constitutional Court and the Slovak Supreme Court dealing with inspections conducted by selected Slovak administrative bodies – especially by the administrative bodies in the area of foodstuffs administration – where inspected companies complain that their rights guaranteed by the Slovak Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights, namely the protection of their business premises, have been violated. The paper thus also deals with and analyses the related case law of the European Court of Human Rights and its (non)-application by the Slovak judicial bodies in their decision-making practice.


2013 ◽  
Vol 72 (2) ◽  
pp. 289-300 ◽  
Author(s):  
EIRIK BJORGE

AbstractThe way in which the courts in the United Kingdom have interpreted and applied the Ullah principle has created problems in the national application of the European Convention on Human Rights. As is evident particularly in Ambrose, this is partly because Lord Bingham's approach in Ullah has been misunderstood. The article analyses these issues in relation to the notion of binding precedent, finding that judicial authority belongs to principles. The national courts ought not, though that is what the Ullah–Ambrose approach enjoins, to expend their energies seeking to align the case before them with the least dissimilar of the reported cases. Rather they should stand back from the case law of the European Court, and apply the broad principles upon which the jurisprudence is founded.


2020 ◽  
pp. 255-292
Author(s):  
Steve Wilson ◽  
Helen Rutherford ◽  
Tony Storey ◽  
Natalie Wortley ◽  
Birju Kotecha

This chapter considers the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and its relationship to the English legal system. The focus in the chapter is on key provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998—the Act that incorporated the Convention into UK law. In the earlier part of the chapter there is coverage of sections 2, 3, and 4 of the Act. These provisions concern the duties placed on the courts to take into account judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, to interpret domestic legislation so as to comply with rights under the Convention, and finally to issue a declaration of incompatibility when domestic legislation does not comply with rights under the Convention. Using examples from the case law, the chapter assesses how the courts balance their constitutional role to respect the supremacy of Parliament, with the duties provided in the Act to respect rights under the Convention. There is also an analysis of s.6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 which makes it unlawful for a public authority to act incompatibly with Convention rights. The analysis includes the contested question of what precisely constitutes a ‘public authority’, particularly when a private body is carrying out a public function.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Irene Domenici

Abstract The article deals with the recent decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in the cases of two Swedish midwives who claimed a right to conscientious objection to abortion under Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). After giving an overview of the relevant previous case-law of the Court, I argue that the decisions of inadmissibility in the midwives’ cases are a step backwards in the promising evolution of the Court’s jurisprudence that began with the judgments in the cases of Eweida and others v. the United Kingdom and Bayatyan v. Armenia. In particular, the Court’s reasoning in Grimmark v. Sweden and Steen v. Sweden failed to take into consideration the existence of a European consensus and the fact that less restrictive alternatives could have reasonably accommodated the conscientious claims of the two applicants.


Author(s):  
Dzhuzha О. M. ◽  
◽  
Melnychenko І. P. ◽  

The article provides a legal analysis of the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in such cases like “Vinter and Others v. The United Kingdom”, “Hutchinson v. The United Kingdom”. The European Court of Human Rights has established key standards for those sentenced to life imprisonment, compliance with which will ensure that this type of punishment meets the requirements of the Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Such standards are: 1) sentencing of life imprisonment is not prohibited and does not conflict with the Article 3 or any other article of the Convention. The imposition of “non-reducible” life imprisonment may raise questions of compliance with the requirements of the Article 3 of the Convention; 2) in decision making whether life imprisonment can be considered as “non-reducible”, it is necessary to establish whether the person convicted to life imprisonment had any prospect of release. If national law provides for the possibility of reviewing life imprisonment regarding its mitigating, reducing, terminating or releasing, this is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of th Article 3 of the Convention; 3) for the purposes of the Article 3 of the Convention it is sufficient that life imprisonment is reducible de jure and de facto; 4) European penitentiary policy is currently focusing on the correctional purpose of imprisonment, in particular until the end of long prison sentences; 5) at the very beginning of the sentence a person convicted to life imprisonment has the right to know what he must do to consider the possibility of his release and under what conditions the sentence will be reviewed or also in what order a request to this may be made; 6) if domestic law does not provide for any mechanism or possibility to review life imprisonment, then the non-compliance with the requirements of the Article 3 of the Convention occurs at the time of imposition of life imprisonment and not at a later stage. The importance of such standards separating of the European Court of Human Rights for the national theory and practice of life imprisonment is that these provisions are effective guidelines for determining the prospects of releasing from sentencing in the form life imprisonment. Key words: European Court of Human Rights, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, case law, convict, life imprisonment.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 90-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sam Thyroff-Kohl

This paper seeks to analyze the impact of terrorism on the enjoyment of civil liberties guaranteed under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The paper profoundly assesses case law from the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in order to assess how the Court manages to guarantee that rights are still respected and upheld, even when weighed against the most severe circumstances, namely terrorism. In doing so, the counter-terrorism legal system of one of the most controversial parties to the ECHR, the United Kingdom, is assessed to identify issues which arise when combating terrorism. Surveillance and stop-and-search are archetypical anti-terrorism measures that are limited through the ECtHR in order to not excessively infringe upon human rights, in accordance with Lloyd’s notion of imposing sufficient safeguards if new measures are enacted. Although the ECtHR can be considered an essential guarantor for human rights through its judicial dialogues and influences on domestic courts and governments, the issue of refoulment in torture cases must be readdressed in upcoming case-law. Moreover, grave privacy infringements are permitted to a terrifying extent, and the longer the ECtHR takes to take a solid stance against States abusing the aim of national security, the more severe it will naturally become, due to society’s incremental progression towards a digital life. Ultimately, terrorism tests democratic governments in a unique way, as imposing draconian measures would be an easy way to ensure safety. Nonetheless, fighting with one hand behind one’s back is necessary to uphold the status of a rights-respecting democracy. Only time will tell whether the ECtHR will evolve to give proactive verdicts to ensure human rights prior to their breach.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-100
Author(s):  
Krešimir Kamber

Abstract This article seeks to examine and explain the interaction between the substantive and procedural aspects of criminal law protection of human rights in the law of the European Convention of Human Rights. Noting certain theoretical and conceptual lacunae that arise in this context, the article suggests the most appropriate solution for the assessment of the substantive-procedural relationship from the perspective of legal theory and the European Court of Human Rights’ case-law. It submits, in particular, that it is always necessary to examine both aspects—substantive and procedural—of the same right and that the procedural aspect should be given primacy both in terms of the order of examination and inferences to be drawn on the question of observance of human rights by states.


2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 130-147
Author(s):  
Kevin Aquilina

This paper attempts to answer whether section 24(2) of the Maltese Official Secrets Act conforms, or is in conflict, with the right to a public hearing under section 39(3) of the Constitution of Malta and Article 10(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. It reviews case law of the European Court of Human Rights on the right to a public hearing and concludes that Strasbourg case law has developed to allow restrictions upon this right even if they are not written down in this Convention. On the other hand, from a comparative exercise carried out with seven similar laws to the Maltese Official Secrets Act, it transpires that the Maltese provision is unique, does not find any counterpart in these seven laws surveyed and, worse still, appears to conflict with Article 6, paragraph 1, of the European Convention.


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