scholarly journals PROTECTING THE VULNERABLE IN SOUTH AFRICA: PROHIBITION OF CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE

Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Lizelle Ramaccio Calvino
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Corporal Punishment ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Physical Punishment ◽  
Regulatory Framework ◽  
Private Sphere ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Court Ruling ◽  
Legislative Framework ◽  
The Common

On 18 September 2019, the Constitutional Court confirmed that the common-law defence of “reasonable and moderate chastisement” is unconstitutional as it unjustifiably violates sections 10 and 12(1)(c) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. As a result, parents are no longer permitted to punish their child at home by way of inflicting physical punishment behind a facade of discipline. Despite the aforesaid, it should be noted that corporal punishment in the private sphere is not explicitly prohibited by South African legislation. In addition, South Africa’s legislative system lacks an appropriate regulatory framework to administer the anticipated proliferation of assault cases against parents. It is against this backdrop that this article first analyses the current legislative framework regulating the protection of children from physical punishment, and then follows with a succinct overview of the Constitutional Court ruling. The article assesses whether the mere repeal of the common-law defence of “reasonable and moderate” chastisement will be sufficient to eradicate corporal punishment in the private sphere, and if not, whether legislative prohibition and/or other interceding strategies will be required to give effect to the objective of the Constitutional Court ruling. In this regard, by way of comparative research, the legislative framework adopted by Sweden, being the first country in the world to prohibit all forms of corporate punishment of children is evaluated. Lastly, recommendations are made for the incorporation of practical steps, including possible legislative measures, to establish a regulatory framework from a children’s rights perspective to prohibit corporal punishment in the private sphere. Accordingly, for purposes of analysis and consideration, a qualitative approach is applied for purposes of the research. Primary sources such as the Constitution, case law, legislation, governmental documents, statistical data and research reports are consulted in conjunction with journal articles and textbooks.

scholarly journals PRESENCE AS A BASIS FOR THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT SOUNDING IN MONEY: THE “REAL AND SUBSTANTIAL CONNECTION” TEST CONSIDERED

Obiter ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
GMN Xaba
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Natural Justice ◽  
Recognition And Enforcement ◽  
Mere Presence ◽  
The Common ◽  
Foreign Judgment ◽  
Academic Debate

A somewhat contested basis of international competence in the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in South Africa is mere presence. Over the years, an academic debate has raged in South Africa over mere presence as a basis of jurisdiction for the enforcement of foreign judgments sounding in money. A recent decision by the Constitutional Court makes the topic worth revisiting.Practical circumstances, social and political considerations as well as natural justice inevitably call for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. As Forsyth aptly puts it “[a] plaintiff may sue in one country and hear with pleasure judgment given in his favour, then discover, to his dismay, that the defendant, with his assets, has absconded to another country”. In such a situation, the judgment has become brutum fulmen in the court which pronounced it and the plaintiff is placed in a grossly prejudicial position. However, because of widely accepted values and principles, legal systems of the world recognize and appreciate that a judgment rendered by the courts of one country may be enforced elsewhere, provided certain conditions are satisfied.Under South African common law one of the conditions for the enforcement of foreign judgments is that the court which pronounced the judgment must have had jurisdiction to entertain the case according to the principles of our law with reference to the jurisdiction of foreign courts. (In Reiss Engineering Co Ltd v Insamcor (Pty) Ltd 1983 (1) SA 1033 (W) 1037B the court stated that the mere fact that the foreign court may have had jurisdiction under its own laws, is not conclusive. Instead, the question of jurisdiction has to be determined in the light of the principles of our law on the jurisdiction of foreign courts. Other requirements for recognition and enforcement are that (i) the foreign judgment must be final and conclusive in its effect and not have become superannuated; (ii) the recognition and enforcement of the judgment by South African courts should not be contrary to public policy; (iii) the foreign judgment should not have been obtained by fraudulent means; (iv) the judgment must not involve the enforcement of a penal or revenue law of the foreign state; and (v) the enforcement of the foreign judgment must not be precluded by the provisions of the Protection of Business Act 99 of 1978, as amended. See Jones v Krok 1995 (1) SA 667 (AD) 685B−D.) This note is concerned only with the requirement that the foreign court that pronounced the judgment must have had jurisdiction to entertain the case according to the principles of our law with reference to the jurisdiction of foreign courts. The other four requirements are outside the scope of this paper and will not be discussed. It appears that the requirement that the foreign court must have had jurisdiction is a tenet central to the common law world. This requirement is a concept sui generis which is not affected by the internal jurisdiction rules of the foreign court, nor by the internal jurisdiction rules of the South African courts. Under South African common law there are, at least, two grounds which have been established with absolute clarity, that clothe a foreign court with international competence.

Notes: The unlamented demise of the common-law derivative action: A note remembering Michael Larkin

2021 ◽  
Vol 138 (3) ◽  
pp. 508-521
Author(s):  
Tshepo H Mongalo
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Corporate Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Statutory Interpretation ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Common ◽  
Court Of Appeal

This contribution presents an exposition of how the common-law rules relevant to the common-law derivative action would have clashed with the current statutory derivative action remedy had the common law not been repealed by s 165(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. The analysis of the possible impact of the common law is a relevant and timely one — irrespective of the fact that a statutory derivative action and remedy has been introduced in s 165(2) of the Companies Act — as it provides lessons to policy-makers on how to deal effectively with common-law rules whose time has passed and must be eradicated, particularly in corporate law. This is so since the Supreme Court of Appeal judgment in Hlumisa Investment Holdings (RF) Ltd & another v Kirkinis & others 2020 (5) SA 419 (SCA) has recently endorsed previous Constitutional Court judgments which confirmed the continued validity of the common-law principle of statutory interpretation that a statute should not be taken to alter the common law unless it is clear that that is what was intended. The contribution arrives at the conclusion that the limiting effect of English judgments, particularly Edwards v Halliwell [1950] 2 All ER 1064 and Prudential Assurance v Newman Industries (CA) [1982] Ch D 204 would have still been applicable in South Africa, even though they allow for a conservative exception to the rule in Foss v Harbottle in providing for derivative action claims at common law.

scholarly journals IS THERE STILL DEFAMATION BASED ON ADULTERY UNDER SOUTH AFRICAN LAW? A CRITICAL REVIEW J v J (4918 2012) [2016] ZAKZDHC 33 (unreported)

Obiter ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael C Buthelezi
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
Critical Analysis ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
High Court ◽  
Personality Rights ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Made In

On 22 July 2016, the Durban High Court ruled (per Masipa J) that there is no longer an action for defamation founded on the publication of allegations of adultery against another person. The court solely based its finding on the earlier judgment of the Constitutional Court (CC) in DE v RH (2015 (5) SA 83 (CC); 2015 (9) BCLR 1003 (CC), hereinafter “DE”). Earlier, in June 2015, in the DE judgment, the CC had unanimously struck down delictual action for contumelia and loss of consortium damages founded on adultery. In annulling this action, the CC held that the common-law action for contumelia and loss of consortium was no longer viable and that it was incompatible with the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Still, a question that was never considered by the courts prior the judgment of J is whether the DE judgment has automatically abolished other delictual actions aimed at protecting personality rights, specifically an action for defamation, and in general, actions for invasion of privacy and impairment of dignity, all founded on allegations of adultery. In this judgment, the court held that in view of the decision of DE, “public opinion no longer considers adultery as tabooed... a statement to the effect that a person committed adultery can no longer convey a meaning with the propensity to define a person …”. Nevertheless, when the opportunity to definitively answer this question ultimately presented itself, albeit in relation to defamation of character (or the protection of reputation), the court in J failed to satisfactorily address this vital question. As it will be demonstrated in this contribution, the judgment of Masipa J in the J judgment does not appear to be legally sound. Primarily, no authority, other than the CC judgment of DE, is used to support the judgment of J. As a result, the judgment has not even succeeded in dealing with the question of defamation, let alone other actions (namely, privacy and dignity) – all founded on adultery. Instead, the judgment creates confusion whether the judgment of DE extends to an action for defamation, and possibly to privacy and dignity. The objective of this note is to provide a critical analysis of the high court judgment in J. The critique is undertaken in light of the reasoning in DE and other like judgments. It begins by setting out the background to the ruling of the high court, followed by a commentary on the judgment. The commentary is undertaken in the form of a comparative analysis between the approaches adopted by the court in DE and in J, highlighting the striking differences in approaches by the two courts, when they develop the common-law. In addition, the critique of the high court judgment is made in light of the interests that the judgment of DE sought to protect when it abolished an action in adultery, and those that were at issue in the judgment of J. Thereafter, a conclusion is provided. The stance that the note adopts is that the CC in DE did not repeal defamation action founded on allegations of adultery; and that even if such action were to be annulled privacy and dignity ought to remain, as of necessity.

scholarly journals The Case of Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe v Louis Karel Fick: A First Step towards developing a Doctrine on the Status of International Judgments within the Domestic Legal Order

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 565
Author(s):  
Erika De Wet
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
International Law ◽  
South African ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Common ◽  
Foreign Judgment ◽  
Domestic Law

The Fick case which was decided by the Constitutional Court on 27 June 2013 was the first time since its inception that the Constitutional Court was confronted with the status of a binding international decision within the domestic legal order. It concerned a binding decision by the (now suspended) Southern African Development Community (SADC) Tribunal against Zimbabwe, which was also enforceable in South Africa. A key issue before the Court was whether or not the South African statutory rules of civil procedure for the enforcement of foreign judgments also covered judgments of international courts and tribunals (as anticipated by Article 32(1) of the Protocol on the SADC Tribunal). As none of the relevant statutory legislation was applicable in this instance, the common law remained the only possible avenue through which the SADC Tribunal’s decision could be enforced in South Africa. At the time of the decision, the common law on the enforcement of civil judgments had developed only to a point where it provided for the execution of judgments made by domestic courts of a foreign state (ie decisions of other national courts). The Court was therefore confronted with whether or not an international decision in the form of a cost order of the SADC Tribunal amounted to a “foreign judgment” as recognized by the South African common law. The Court answered this question in the affirmative by relying on those clauses in the Constitution that committed South Africa to the rule of law, as well as its obligations under international law, and to an international-law friendly interpretation of domestic law. Although the decision is to be welcomed and applied the law correctly to the facts of the case, it does raise the issue of the wisdom of equating international judgments with foreign judgments on a more general scale. This relates to the fact that it is generally accepted in most jurisdictions that the recognition and enforcement of a “foreign judgment” can be denied where it would result in a violation of domestic public policy. The public policy exception does not, however, fit well in a regime based on public international law, which does not permit States to use their domestic law as an excuse for not implementing their international obligations.

scholarly journals Transparency in corporate governance: Extent of directors duty to declare interest in company’s transactions

2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony O. Nwafor
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
United Kingdom ◽  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Men And Women ◽  
Legal Personality ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
Important Position

The realization that the directors occupy important position in corporate governance, and as business men and women, cannot be prevented from having dealings with the company, demand a close scrutiny of corporate transactions in which they are directly or indirectly involved or have an interest to ensure that such interest is not placed above their duty to the company. One of the ways in which the law strives to achieve this balance is by imposing a duty on the director to disclose to the board any interest he has in company’s transactions. This requirement which was previously governed by the common law and the company’s articles, is presently increasingly finding a place in companies statutes in different jurisdictions. The paper examines, through a comparative analysis, the provisions on the duty of the director to disclose interest in company’s transactions in South Africa and United Kingdom with the aim of discovering the extent to which the statute in both jurisdictions upholds the common law prescriptions. The paper argues that the need for transparency in corporate governance and the preservation of the distinct legal personality of the company demand that the duty to disclose interest should be upheld even in those cases of companies run by a sole director.

scholarly journals The protection of environmental interests through corporate governance: A South African company law perspective

2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 8-20
Author(s):  
Anthony O. Nwafor
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Sustainable Development ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
South African ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Company Law ◽  
The Common ◽  
Corporate Administrators ◽  
Environmental Interests

The quest to maximize profits by corporate administrators usually leaves behind an unhealthy environment. This trend impacts negatively on long term interests of the company and retards societal sustainable development. While there are in South Africa pieces of legislation which are geared at protecting the environment, the Companies Act which is the principal legislation that regulates the operations of the company is silent on this matter. The paper argues that the common law responsibility of the directors to protect the interests of the company as presently codified by the Companies Act should be developed by the courts in South Africa, in the exercise of their powers under the Constitution, to include the interests of the environment. This would guarantee the enforcement of the environmental interests within the confines of the Companies Act as an issue of corporate governance.

Corporal Punishment: Law Reform Lessons for Australia from South Africa and New Zealand

2021 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Laetitia-Ann Greeff
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
New Zealand ◽  
Corporal Punishment ◽  
Cultural Change ◽  
National Level ◽  
Law Reform ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
In Loco Parentis ◽  
A Charge ◽  
The Impact

This article compares the law reform methods employed by South Africa and New Zealand to eliminate the defence of ‘moderate and reasonable chastisement’ to a charge of common assault, to determine the best possible law reform strategy for Australian jurisdictions, within the context of its federal system of governance. South Africa and New Zealand banned corporal punishment on a national level, with South Africa prohibiting the use of corporal punishment by way of the judicial condemnation of the Constitutional Court in 2019, and New Zealand’s legislation to ban corporal punishment through Parliamentary processes in 2007. Corporal punishment in the home is still legal in Australia if administered by parents or those in loco parentis. This article focuses on the three Australian States that have enacted human rights legislation—Victoria, the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) and Queensland—and the impact of this legislation on judicial law reform. In this regard, the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is discussed in terms of its ability to limit public interest litigation’s viability to strike down inconsistent legislation. The article suggests that all three countries can learn from one another concerning the successes and/or failures of law reform. Furthermore, the article concludes by acknowledging that even though formal abolition is the norm in South Africa and New Zealand, corporal punishment remains widespread. Parents and those in loco parentis must be supported by continual education initiatives to bring about requisite social and cultural change.

Child Protection through the Criminal Law

2020 ◽  
pp. 85-114
Author(s):  
Kenneth McK. Norrie
Keyword(s):  
Corporal Punishment ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Child Protection ◽  
Adult Population ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Legal Basis ◽  
Sexual Offences ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
A Charge

The earliest criminal law dealing with children differently from the adult population was that concerned with sexual offences. This chapter explores the changing policies of the law, from the late 19th century fear of girls being exposed to immorality and boys being exposed to homosexuality, through the more protective 20th century legislation which nevertheless hung on to old ideas of immorality and criminality, until the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009 focused almost (but not quite) exclusively on protection from harm and from exploitation. The chapter then turns to the crime of child cruelty or neglect from its earliest manifestation in the common law to its statutory formulation in Prevention of Cruelty to, and Protection of, Children Act 1889, which, re-enacted in 1937, took on a form that, for all intents and purposes, remains to this day. The last part of the chapter explores the legal basis for the power of corporal punishment – the defence previously available to parents, teachers and some others to a charge of assault of a child, known as “reasonable” chastisement. Its gradual abolition from the 1980s to 2019 is described.

The Diffuse and Second Look Models of Judicial Review

2021 ◽  
pp. 23-34
Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Latin America ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Common Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Second Look ◽  
The Common

This chapter examines the two models of judicial review that exist in the common law countries: the Diffuse Model and the Second Look Model. The Diffuse Model of judicial review originated in the United States and has spread to India, Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, most of the countries of Latin America, the Scandinavian countries (except for the Netherlands), and Japan. It is premised on the idea that a country’s written constitution is its supreme law and that courts, when deciding cases or controversies that are properly before them, are thus duty-bound to follow the constitution, which is supreme law, and not a contrary statute whenever those two items conflict. Meanwhile, the essence of the Second Look Model of judicial review is that a Supreme or Constitutional Court ought to have the power of judicial review, subject to some kind of legislative power of override. This, it is said, best harmonizes the advantages of a written constitution and a bill of rights enforced by courts with the imperatives of democratic self-government. The underlying goal is to obtain the advantages of both constitutional government and also of democratic government.

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