scholarly journals Euthanasia under French law

Author(s):  
A. Haddadi ◽  
F. Ravaz

Under criminal law, euthanasia can have two distinct qualifications: that of homicide in the event that the act of directly killing another person is characterized, or that of assisting a third party in the suicide. These two qualifications are applicable on the condition that the agent — the author of the act of causing death — is not the one who went through it. In fact, selfeuthanasia is nothing more than suicide.In addition to euthanasia imposed to a third party (such as in the case of Malevre, nurse from Mantes-la-Jolie, tried in 2003), the euthanasia requested and subscribed constitutes a complex legal question. Answering this question first involves specifying the position of contemporary criminal law in the face of suicide.In the event that suicide is only decriminalized, in fact, the author of the act — regardless of the outcome of his actions, who is himself the victim, cannot be prosecuted. Nor ultimately receive any condemnation.However, this lack of prosecution and conviction is by no means an endorsement of the act — suicide — by the law.Moreover, in the event that suicide is a right, it would then be necessary to agree that any candidate for this act can request assistance in the accomplishment of his death. Given these two opposing approaches, imposed on us the question of whether there is a right to die.Although the euthanasia imposed is unequivocally under ordinary criminal law, the euthanasia requested and granted is not based on any rights. To date, there is no right to approve a death request, but on the other hand, it does allow it to be respected and to some extent promotes its approach with dignity. This work will focus on two central points which are the possibility that euthanasia is a homicide under common law (I) and the attitude of French law concerning the right to death (II).

Author(s):  
Sharon Dolovich

In this chapter, Sharon Dolovich argues that the Supreme Court deploys three “canons of evasion” that undermine core constitutional principles: deference, presumption, and question substitution. The chapter shows how the Court on the one hand affirms basic constitutional principles—such as the right to counsel or the right against cruel and unusual punishment—that courts are to enforce against the state for the protection of individual penal subjects. Yet on the other hand, the doctrinal maneuvers of deference, presumption, and substitute question encourage judges in individual cases to affirm the constitutionality of state action even in the face of seemingly egregious facts. As a result, judicial review delivers almost automatic and uncritical validation of whatever state action produced the challenged conviction, sentence, or punishment. Dolovich identifies troubling questions raised by pervasive use of these canons for the legitimacy of the state’s penal power.


) Seller is bound to hand the goods over to the first carrier at a particular place, but hands them over prior to the place agreed. d) Goods are handed over to the first carrier but have not yet been identified. Q 67-9 In which of the above situations is the burden of the risk split during transport? Q 67-10 Under the CISG, when does the risk pass in the following situations: a) Seller hands goods over to freight forwarder who will undertake the transport itself. b) Same situation, but a third party will transport the goods. c) Same situation, but the freight forwarder has the right to transport in its own name. Q 67-11 Compare Art. 67 CISG with domestic sales laws. a) Compare Art. 67(1) CISG with § 2-509 UCC. Do you see any similarities? b) What is the corresponding rule in the BGB? c) Why is the BGB clearer than the CISG with regard to the passing of risk in the case of handing the goods over to a freight forwarder? Q 67-12 It has been stated that, under the CISG, although from a dogmatic view, the time of delivery and the time of passing of risk have been distinguished, in practice they will often coincide. Under French and Swiss law, the passing of risk has been settled differently. a) To what extent do Swiss and French law provide for a similar rule on the passing of risk? b) Which point in time is decisive as to whether the risk has passed to the buyer? c) Which rules are more suited for modern international trade, the French and Swiss ones or those found in Art. 67 CISG and the other sales laws? Discuss. d) Under Swiss law, title to the goods will not pass until handing over the goods to the buyer. How does the CC settle the passing of title to goods? Cf. Art. 1138(1) CC. e) In light of what has been said sub c), do you see a rationale in French law for how it handles the passing of risk? f) Which difficulty persists in Swiss law with regard to risk allocation between the buyer and the seller? Q 67-13 As a rule, the burden of proof as to where loss or damage to the goods occurred is borne by the party that wants to draw a benefit from that fact.

2007 ◽  
pp. 519-519

2011 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 247-259
Author(s):  
Émilie Pontanier

The author discusses the political and legal implications of French secularism in an Islamic context. To this purpose, she focuses on the French educational system in Tunisia, which allows the distinction between public and private spheres to be emphasized. By way of a discursive analysis of conversations with parents who school their children there, the author shows that the school system strengthens, on the one hand, the religious autonomy of families and, on the other hand, religious abstention. Secularism is therefore analyzed as a vector of religious resistance in the face of the transformation of Tunisian society in that it promotes a modern or “moderate” Islam and recognizes the right to be atheist.


2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (6) ◽  
pp. 137
Author(s):  
Ahmed Heidari ◽  
Seyed Hekmatollah Askari

Agency refers to a contract whereby a person selects another one to do his affairs. It is obvious that agency can be fulfilled in different ways, including explicit authorization and authorization by ratification. Authorization by ratification is ineffective for some contracts and it faces challenges in practice, because it follows the fulfillment of two rights, one the principal’s right for ratification, and the other the third-party’s right to be free from the obligations of an ineffective contract. This article has dealt with the positions of two important International Instrument of Human Rights as well as that of Iran’s domestic law regarding the scope of the use of ratification right by the principal and the owner of the authority right on the one hand and the rights of a third party on the other. It seeks to answer the question whether the principal has the right of ratification in any way, or has some legal restrictions? And if there are some limits to the principal’s right and access to such uncertainties can lead to further compatibility of Iranian law with International Instrument of Human Rights, based on which principles and rules can one establish a relative balance between the parties?


2017 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 113-118
Author(s):  
PAUL RAE

As anyone who has dealt with bureaucrats or authoritarian regimes knows, sometimes it pays to act a little dumb. Glazing over good-naturedly in the face of a petty or corrupt demand can occasionally bring to light the inanity or cruelty of the situation in such a way as to prompt a momentary softening, be it through pity, impatience or even embarrassment. The stakes in such situations can be high: in the domain of the international with which this this journal is preoccupied, it might concern free passage on the one hand, or the right to remain, unhindered, on the other. More often the circumstances are banal, though not, for all that, without complexity. They point not only to the importance of stupidity as an enabling feature of life in complex and diverse modern societies, but also to the myriad forms it can take, from strategic ignorance, through the stupefaction necessary to manage the teeming stimuli of urban environments, to willing, if circumspect, participation in whichever confederacy of dunces makes up our place of employment, the organizations with which we affiliate, or the communities in which we participate.


1986 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 142-164
Author(s):  
Stephen Goldstein

Compelling litigants to undergo medical examinations or tests raises a very clear problem of conflicting values. On the one hand, compelling any person to undergo a physical examination or test against his will is a clear impingement on his rights of liberty, privacy and bodily integrity. On the other hand, there are situations in which without such examinations or tests of a civil litigant the right of his adversary to fair and properly conducted litigation would be frustrated.In this article, we will discuss how four different legal systems have attempted to balance these conflicting rights in their development of rules concerning such medical examinations. We will discuss rather fully three systems that are viewed as following common law procedure – namely, those of England, the United States and Israel – and compare them with that of Italy, as an example of the Romanist civil law countries.


1956 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-247
Author(s):  
R. W. M. Dias

The literature on possessio has now assumed such proportions that it will require a volume at least to do anything like justice to it. The purpose of this article is only to outline an approach to the Roman law of possessio as suggested by Kocourek's analysis of possession in the common law. The present writer believes that a substantial similarity exists between these two great systems in their approach to possession and this has not been due to any borrowing by the one from the other: a fact which, if proved, should be of no little jurisprudential interest. It is, therefore, merely as a prologue to a fuller exposition elsewhere that the following contentions are advanced as to possessio in Roman law.Kocourek, writing of the common law, maintained that “possession” as a juridical concept distinct from physical control on the one hand and the right to have physical control on the other was unnecessary. If a person actually holds a thing, he either has a right to continue holding it or he has no right; if he is not holding a thing, he either has or has not a right to hold it. In all cases what matters is the right to have physical control. As long as the term “possession” is confined to physical control, no harm is done, but what Kocourek objects to is that mysterious tertium quid, called “possession,” from which are distinguished both physical control and the right to it, the former being known variously as “de facto possession,” “custody,” “detention,” and the latter as the “right to possess.”


2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 265-291
Author(s):  
Manuel A. Vasquez ◽  
Anna L. Peterson

In this article, we explore the debates surrounding the proposed canonization of Archbishop Oscar Romero, an outspoken defender of human rights and the poor during the civil war in El Salvador, who was assassinated in March 1980 by paramilitary death squads while saying Mass. More specifically, we examine the tension between, on the one hand, local and popular understandings of Romero’s life and legacy and, on the other hand, transnational and institutional interpretations. We argue that the reluctance of the Vatican to advance Romero’s canonization process has to do with the need to domesticate and “privatize” his image. This depoliticization of Romero’s work and teachings is a part of a larger agenda of neo-Romanization, an attempt by the Holy See to redeploy a post-colonial and transnational Catholic regime in the face of the crisis of modernity and the advent of postmodern relativism. This redeployment is based on the control of local religious expressions, particularly those that advocate for a more participatory church, which have proliferated with contemporary globalization


Trictrac ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Petru Adrian Danciu

Starting from the cry of the seraphim in Isaiahʹ s prophecy, this article aims to follow the rhythm of the sacred harmony, transcending the symbols of the angelic world and of the divine names, to get to the face to face meeting between man and God, just as the seraphim, reflecting their existence, stand face to face. The finality of the sacred harmony is that, during the search for God inside the human being, He reveals Himself, which is the reason for the affirmation of “I Am that I Am.” Through its hypnotic cyclicality, the profane temporality has its own musicality. Its purpose is to incubate the unsuspected potencies of the beings “caught” in the material world. Due to the fact that it belongs to the aeonic time, the divine music will exceed in harmony the mechanical musicality of profane time, dilating and temporarily cancelling it. Isaiah is witness to such revelation offering access to the heavenly concert. He is witness to divine harmonies produced by two divine singers, whose musical history is presented in our article. The seraphim accompanied the chosen people after their exodus from Egypt. The cultic use of the trumpet is related to the characteristics and behaviour of the seraphim. The seraphic music does not belong to the Creator, but its lyrics speak about the presence of the Creator in two realities, a spiritual and a material one. Only the transcendence of the divine names that are sung/cried affirms a unique reality: God. The chant-cry is a divine invocation with a double aim. On the one hand, the angels and the people affirm God’s presence and call His name and, on the other, the Creator affirms His presence through the angels or in man, the one who is His image and His likeness. The divine music does not only create, it is also a means of communion, implementing the relation of man to God and, thus, God’s connection with man. It is a relation in which both filiation and paternity disappear inside the harmony of the mutual recognition produced by music, a reality much older than Adam’s language.


Imbizo ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Naomi Epongse Nkealah ◽  
Olutoba Gboyega Oluwasuji

Ideas of nationalisms as masculine projects dominate literary texts by African male writers. The texts mirror the ways in which gender differentiation sanctions nationalist discourses and in turn how nationalist discourses reinforce gender hierarchies. This article draws on theoretical insights from the work of Anne McClintock and Elleke Boehmer to analyse two plays: Zintgraff and the Battle of Mankon by Bole Butake and Gilbert Doho and Hard Choice by Sunnie Ododo. The article argues that women are represented in these two plays as having an ambiguous relationship to nationalism. On the one hand, women are seen actively changing the face of politics in their societies, but on the other hand, the means by which they do so reduces them to stereotypes of their gender.


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