Dever de distinguishing como requisito da fundamentação da decisão judicial-penal à luz da Lei nº 13.964/2019

2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (130) ◽  
pp. 367-390
Author(s):  
Emetério Silva de Oliveira Neto
Keyword(s):  

O presente estudo tem por escopo analisar a adoção da sistemática do distinguishing nas decisões judiciais-penais, tendo por base a noção de precedente judicial e as implicações da influência do modelo de Common Law nas estruturas dogmáticas do direito processual brasileiro. Parte-se da premissa de que a fundamentação da decisão judicial constitui garantia do cidadão delineada na Constituição federal de 1988, melhor explicitada na ordem infraconstitucional pelo Código de Processo Civil de 2015 e pela Lei nº 13.964/2019, que modificou o Código de Processo Penal, trazendo os elementos que tornam a motivação adequada. O texto demonstra que um desses elementos é a técnica do distinguishing, de capital importância nos julgamentos criminais, ressaltando, por fim, que a necessidade de celeridade nos julgamentos dos processos judiciais não permite o uso indiscriminado da Inteligência Artificial, mormente quando em questão a liberdade ambulatória do cidadão, a ser definida com base na técnica do distinguishing. 

2016 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 326-337
Author(s):  
Steve Hedley

In this article, Professor Steve Hedley offers a Common Law response to he recently published arguments of Professor Nils Jansen on the German law of unjustified enrichment (as to which, see Jansen, “Farewell to Unjustified Enrichment” (2016) 20 EdinLR 123). The author takes the view that Jansen's paper provided a welcome opportunity to reconsider not merely what unjust enrichment can logically be, but what it is for. He argues that unjust enrichment talk contributes little of value, and that the supposedly logical process of stating it at a high level of abstraction, and then seeking to deduce the law from that abstraction, merely distracts lawyers from the equities of the cases they consider.


2000 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
WDH Sellar

This article is the revised text of the lecture delivered to the Stair Society at its Annual General Meeting in November 1997. It defends the proposition that Scots law, from the time of its emergence in the Middle Ages, has been a “mixed” system, open to the influence of both the English Common Law and the Civilian tradition. It also compares and contrasts the Reception of the Anglo-Norman law with that of Roman law. The former was quite specific as regards both time and substantive legal content. The Reception of Roman law, on the other hand, took place over a considerable period of time, and its effects were complex and diffuse. Above all, the Civilian tradition and the wider ius commune provided an intellectual framework against which to measure Scots law. Both Receptions exercised a profound influence on the continuing development of Scots law.


Moreana ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 40 (Number 153- (1-2) ◽  
pp. 193-217
Author(s):  
Jean-Pierre Moreau

Rien ne saurait mieux illustrer la modernité de Thomas More que la décision de Jean-Paul II, en novembre 2000, d’en faire le Patron des responsables de gouvernement et des hommes politiques. Pour évoquer cette modernité, quatre thèmes ont été retenus, sans souci d’exhaustivité: sa stature morale et l’écho particulier qu’éveille aujourd’hui son héroïsme, l’Utopie, non point comme programme politique mais comme champ d’expérimentation intellectuelle et littéraire, les droits de la conscience individuelle et leur transformation en défense des droits de l’homme, l’Europe en construction actuellement n’est pas totalement étrangère à l’édifice (chrétienté) que More voulait maintenir : principe de subsidiarité, rapports entre droit communautaire/droit canon et droit des Etats membres/Common law etc.


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