scholarly journals Network Connectivity Game

2021 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 73-87
Keyword(s):  
Spanning Tree ◽  
Cost Allocation ◽  
Network Connectivity ◽  
Minimum Cost ◽  
Common Source ◽  
Network Nodes ◽  
Network Cost ◽  
Cost Efficient ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Tree Games

We investigate the cost allocation strategy associated with the problem of providing service /communication between all pairs of network nodes. There is a cost associated with each link and the communication between any pair of nodes can be delivered via paths connecting those nodes. The example of a cost efficient solution which could provide service for all node pairs is a (non-rooted) minimum cost spanning tree. The cost of such a solution should be distributed among users who might have conflicting interests. The objective of this paper is to formulate the above cost allocation problem as a cooperative game, to be referred to as a Network Connectivity (NC) game, and develop a stable and efficient cost allocation scheme. The NC game is related to the Minimum Cost Spanning Tree games and to the Shortest Path games. The profound difference is that in those games the service is delivered from some common source node to the rest of the network, while in the NC game there is no source and the service is established through the two-way interaction among all pairs of participating nodes. We formulate Network Connectivity (NC) game and construct an efficient cost allocation algorithm which finds some points in the core of the NC game. Finally, we discuss the Egalitarian Network Cost Allocation (ENCA) rule and demonstrate that it finds an additional core point.

A claims problem approach to the cost allocation of a minimum cost spanning tree

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez ◽  
Josep E. Peris ◽  
Begoña Subiza
Keyword(s):  
Spanning Tree ◽  
Cost Allocation ◽  
Minimum Cost ◽  
Claims Problem ◽  
The Cost

scholarly journals Algorithms for the power-p Steiner tree problem in the Euclidean plane

2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 28
Author(s):  
Christina Burt ◽  
Alysson Costa ◽  
Charl Ras
Keyword(s):  
Spanning Tree ◽  
Minimum Spanning Tree ◽  
Valid Inequalities ◽  
Minimum Cost ◽  
Performance Ratio ◽  
Mixed Integer ◽  
Steiner Tree Problem ◽  
Steiner Points ◽  
Tree Construction ◽  
The Cost

We study the problem of constructing minimum power-$p$ Euclidean $k$-Steiner trees in the plane. The problem is to find a tree of minimum cost spanning a set of given terminals where, as opposed to the minimum spanning tree problem, at most $k$ additional nodes (Steiner points) may be introduced anywhere in the plane. The cost of an edge is its length to the power of $p$ (where $p\geq 1$), and the cost of a network is the sum of all edge costs. We propose two heuristics: a ``beaded" minimum spanning tree heuristic; and a heuristic which alternates between minimum spanning tree construction and a local fixed topology minimisation procedure for locating the Steiner points. We show that the performance ratio $\kappa$ of the beaded-MST heuristic satisfies $\sqrt{3}^{p-1}(1+2^{1-p})\leq \kappa\leq 3(2^{p-1})$. We then provide two mixed-integer nonlinear programming formulations for the problem, and extend several important geometric properties into valid inequalities. Finally, we combine the valid inequalities with warm-starting and preprocessing to obtain computational improvements for the $p=2$ case.

scholarly journals On the core of cost-revenue games: Minimum cost spanning tree games with revenues

2014 ◽  
Vol 237 (2) ◽  
pp. 606-616 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arantza Estévez-Fernández ◽  
Hans Reijnierse
Keyword(s):  
Spanning Tree ◽  
Minimum Cost ◽  
The Core ◽  
Tree Games

THE PRICE OF NASH EQUILIBRIA IN MULTICAST TRANSMISSION GAMES

2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (03n04) ◽  
pp. 97-120 ◽  
Author(s):  
VITTORIO BILÒ
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Price Of Anarchy ◽  
Optimal Solution ◽  
Minimum Cost ◽  
Price Of Stability ◽  
Common Source ◽  
Cost Share ◽  
Worst Case ◽  
The Cost

We consider the problem of sharing the cost of multicast transmissions in non-cooperative undirected networks where a set of receivers R wants to be connected to a common source s. The set of choices available to each receiver r ∈ R is represented by the set of all (s, r)-paths in the network. Given the choices performed by all the receivers, a public known cost sharing method determines the cost share to be charged to each of them. Receivers are selfish agents aiming to obtain the transmission at the minimum cost share and their interactions create a non-cooperative game. Devising cost sharing methods yielding games whose price of anarchy (price of stability), defined as the worst-case (best-case) ratio between the cost of a Nash equilibrium and that of an optimal solution, is not too high is thus of fundamental importance in non-cooperative network design. Moreover, since cost sharing games naturally arise in socio-economical contests, it is convenient for a cost sharing method to meet some constraining properties. In this paper, we first define several such properties and analyze their impact on the prices of anarchy and stability. We also reconsider all the methods known so far by classifying them according to which properties they satisfy and giving the first non-trivial lower bounds on their price of stability. Finally, we propose a new method, namely the free-riders method, which admits a polynomial time algorithm for computing a pure Nash equilibrium whose cost is at most twice the optimal one. Some of the ideas characterizing our approach have been independently proposed in Ref. 10.

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