scholarly journals Research on Services Decision-Making in Closed-Loop Supply Chain Dominated by a Logistics Provider

Author(s):  
Wei Li ◽  
Fei Chen ◽  
Liurui Deng ◽  
Yiwen Zhao

Abstract In this paper, we assume that a closed-loop supply chain consists of an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) producing new products from raw materials, a remanufacturer producing re-manufactured products from used items directly collected from customers and a logistics provider which sells and distributes two products as a monopolist in the given market. By constructing game model in which logistics provider is a leader, OEM and remanufacturer are the equal status followers, we solve chain members’ optimal services decision-making. Finally, we analyze influence of service elasticities and intensities of service competition of two manufacturers on members’ equilibrium decision-making.

2011 ◽  
Vol 219-220 ◽  
pp. 722-726 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lu Shi ◽  
Xin Ma

The decision models of closed loop supply chain for scrapped medical equipment that is composed of one medical equipment manufacturer and one medical equipment retailer with product remanufacturing under hybrid recycle strategy was built. The whole-sale price and transfer recycling price were considered as the decision-making variables of the medical equipment manufacturer, and the recycling price as the decision-making variable of the party undertaking the recycling effort. The optimal pricing and the optimal profit were obtained and the optimal decisions of the manufacturer were analyzed on the further. And the profits of medical equipment manufacturer, retailer and the total supply chain are also discussed under different scenario.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junhai Ma ◽  
Yuehong Guo

This paper studied system dynamics characteristics of closed-loop supply chain using repeated game theory and complex system theory. It established decentralized decision-making game model and centralized decision-making game model and then established and analyzed the corresponding continuity system. Drew the region local stability of Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg equilibrium, and a series of chaotic system characteristics, have an detail analysis of the Lyapunov index which is under the condition of different parameter combination. According to the limited rational expectations theory, it established repeated game model based on collection price and marginal profits. Further, this paper analyzed the influence of the parameters by numerical simulations and concluded three conclusions. First, when the collection price is to a critical value, the system will be into chaos state. Second, when the sale price of remanufacturing products is more than a critical value, the system will be in chaos state. Last, the initial value of the collection price is sensitive, small changes may cause fluctuations of market price. These conclusions guide enterprises in making the best decisions in each phase to achieve maximize profits.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Doo Ho Lee

In this study, we consider a three-echelon closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, a collector, and two duopolistic recyclers. In the supply chain, the collector collects end-of-life products from consumers in the market. Then, both recyclers purchase the recyclable waste from the collector, and each recycler turns them into new materials. The manufacturer has no recycling facilities; therefore, the manufacturer only purchases the recycled and new materials for its production from the two recyclers. Under this scenario, price competition between recyclers is inevitable. With two pricing structures (Nash and Stackelberg) of the leaders group and three competition behaviors (Collusion, Cournot, and Stackelberg) of the followers group, we suggest six different pricing game models. In each of them, we establish a pricing game model among the members, prove the uniqueness of the equilibrium prices of the supply chain members, and discuss the effects of competition on the overall supply chain’s profitability. Our numerical experiment indicates that as the price competition between recyclers intensifies, the supply chain profitability decreases. Moreover, the greater the recyclability degree of the waste is, the higher the profits in the supply chain become.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (16) ◽  
pp. 4403 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haixiang Wu ◽  
Bing Xu ◽  
Ding Zhang

The green supply chain (GSC) can effectively reduce the waste of resources and avoid environmental pollution. For a closed-loop supply chain network consisting of multiple manufacturers, multiple retailers, and multiple consumer and recycling markets, we assume that retailers are responsible for the recycling of used products, manufacturers use raw materials to produce new products and recycled products for remanufacturing, and government departments subsidize all manufacturers and retailers for GSC technology investment. Then, the equilibrium conditions of manufacturers, retailers, demand markets, and recycling markets are obtained by using the variational inequality method, complementarity theorem, and Nash equilibrium theory, and the variational inequality model of the closed-loop supply chain network multiphase equilibrium is established. Based on numerical simulation, the optimal technology investment decision of green supply chain under different government subsidy rates, and the influence of market structure and enterprise cost asymmetry on the equilibrium solution of supply chain network are analyzed. The results show that government subsidies can effectively promote enterprises to upgrade their level of GSC technology investment. The intensification of enterprise competition and the asymmetry of enterprise costs will affect the composition of enterprise profits and the allocation of profits between enterprises, and the former will weaken the effect of government subsidies.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (15) ◽  
pp. 4237 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaodong Zhu ◽  
Lingfei Yu ◽  
Wei Li

The closed-loop supply chain management model is an effective way to promote sustainable economic development and environmental protection. Increasing the sales volume of remanufactured products to stimulate green growth is a key issue in the development of closed-loop supply chains. By designing an effective warranty strategy, customer’s perceived value can be enhanced and market demand can be stimulated. This study cuts through the warranty period of closed-loop supply chain products. Based on the perspective of consumer behavior, game theory is used to construct the optimal decision-making model for closed-loop supply chains. The optimal warranty decision making for new products and remanufactured products under centralized and decentralized decision-making models is discussed. Further, the impact of the closed-loop supply chain system with warranty services and the design of contract coordination is also shown. We show that consumer preference has a positive impact on the sales of remanufactured products and the profits of enterprises; with the extension of the new product and remanufacturing warranty period, the profit of the supply chain system first increases and then decreases, and the value is maximized at the extreme point in the manufacturer-led decision-making model. Furthermore, the leader gains higher profits with bargaining power, but the profit of the supply chain system under decentralized decision model is less than that of the centralized decision model, reflecting the double marginalization effect. The revenue sharing contract and the two-charge contract designed in this study coordinate the closed-loop supply chain system with warranty services, so that the member companies in the supply chain can achieve Pareto improvement.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (20) ◽  
pp. 8398
Author(s):  
Juan Pedro Sepúlveda-Rojas ◽  
Rodrigo Ternero

Purpose: This article analyzes the value of information and coordination in a closed loop supply chain (CLSC) and discusses the benefits of a global or local optimization approach and the impact of uncertainty. Methodology: A theoretical dyadic closed loop supply chain is analyzed where the manufacturer re-manufactures products returned by customers, producing “as good as new products” for the retailer. Twelve coordination scenarios were analyzed. For the definition of these scenarios, a framework based on two criteria was proposed: value of information and perimeter of decision making. Findings: Information on returns leads to lower costs than information on demand. In the presence of complete or partial coordination between the actors in the supply chain, it is preferable to have low product return rates. However, if we are in the complete absence of coordination, high rates of return are more convenient as they function as a buffer against uncertainties. The perimeter of decision making (global or local optimization) does not significantly improve the supply chain performance in relation to its costs. Only the exchange of information improves its performance. Therefore, companies should make efforts to exchange information, first, on their lot sizes, then on their returns and finally, on the customer demand. Originality: The novelty of our work relies on an analysis of the closed loop supply chain performance with the simultaneous presence of information, coordination, and uncertainty.


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