scholarly journals Beware of Broken Windows! First Impressions in Public-Good Experiment

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Beckenkamp ◽  
Christoph Engel ◽  
Andreas Glöckner ◽  
Bernd Irlenbusch ◽  
Heike Hennig-Schmidt ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
First Impressions ◽  
Broken Windows ◽  
Public Good Experiment ◽  
Good Experiment

scholarly journals Public good experiment data of a water game framed to Rajasthan/India

Data in Brief ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 27 ◽  
pp. 104556
Author(s):  
Thomas Falk ◽  
Shalander Kumar ◽  
Srinivasa Srigiri
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Experiment Data ◽  
Public Good Experiment ◽  
Good Experiment

Verbal Feedback in a Public Good Experiment

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Pelloux ◽  
Jean-Louis Rulliere ◽  
Frans van Winden
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Verbal Feedback ◽  
Public Good Experiment ◽  
Good Experiment

scholarly journals The trade-off between welfare and equality in a public good experiment

2015 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 601-623 ◽  
Author(s):  
Agathe Rouaix ◽  
Charles Figuières ◽  
Marc Willinger
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Public Good Experiment ◽  
Good Experiment

A Hybrid Public Good Experiment Eliciting Multi-Dimensional Choice Data

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniela Di Cagno ◽  
Arianna Galliera ◽  
Werner GGth ◽  
Luca Panaccione
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Choice Data ◽  
Public Good Experiment ◽  
Good Experiment

scholarly journals Can exit prizes induce lame ducks to shirk less? Experimental evidence

2012 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 106
Author(s):  
Leif Helland ◽  
Jon Hovi ◽  
Lars Monkerud
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Overlapping Generations ◽  
Focal Point ◽  
Gift Exchange ◽  
Public Good Experiment ◽  
Olg Models ◽  
Trigger Strategies ◽  
Good Experiment ◽  
Elected Representatives

Elected representatives serving their final period face only weak incentives to provide costly effort. However, overlapping generations (OLG) models suggest that exit prizes sustained by trigger strategies can induce representatives in their final period to provide such effort. We evaluate this hypothesis using a simple OLG public good experiment, the central treatment being whether exit prizes are permitted. We find that a significantly higher number of subjects in their final period contribute when exit prizes are permitted. However, this result does not originate from use of trigger strategies. More likely explanations include gift-exchange and focal-point effects.

scholarly journals Decisions on Extending Group Membership—Evidence from a Public Good Experiment

Games ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 61
Author(s):  
Christian Grund ◽  
Christine Harbring ◽  
Kirsten Thommes ◽  
Katja Rebecca Tilkes
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Group Membership ◽  
Public Good Experiment ◽  
Group Cooperation ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Good Experiment ◽  
Random Draw ◽  
Decision Mechanisms ◽  
Group Member

We experimentally compare the consequences for group cooperation of two decision mechanisms involving the extension of group membership. We analyze an exogenous decision (random draw) and an endogenous decision (made by a particular group member) mechanism to extend a temporary agent’s group membership. Our results reveal that the prospect of group membership extension affects not only the temporary but also the permanent group members’ contributions with an endogenous mechanism.

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