scholarly journals Should Consumers Be Permitted to Waive Products Liability? Product Safety, Private Contracts, and Adverse Selection

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Albert H. Choi ◽  
Kathryn E. Spier
Keyword(s):  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Product Safety ◽  
Products Liability

scholarly journals Privacy as Product Safety

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Grimmelmann
Keyword(s):  
Social Media ◽  
Personal Information ◽  
Product Safety ◽  
Social Aspects ◽  
Social Software ◽  
Products Liability ◽  
Fair Information Practices ◽  
Privacy Law ◽  
Liability Law ◽  
Online Social Media

19 Widener Law Journal 793 (2010)Online social media confound many of our familiar expectations about privacy. Contrary to popular myth, users of social software like Facebook do care about privacy, deserve it, and have trouble securing it for themselves. Moreover, traditional database-focused privacy regulations on the Fair Information Practices model, while often worthwhile, fail to engage with the distinctively social aspects of these online services.Instead, online privacy law should take inspiration from a perhaps surprising quarter: product-safety law. A web site that directs users' personal information in ways they don't expect is a defectively designed product, and many concepts from products liability law could usefully be applied to the structurally similar problem of privacy in social software. After setting the scene with a discussion of how people use Facebook and why standard assumptions about privacy and privacy law fail, this essay examines the parallel between physically safe products and privacy-safe social software. It illustrates the value of the product-safety approach by considering another ripped-from-the-headlines example: Google Buzz.

scholarly journals Would a Warning Have Prevented the Accident?

1986 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sheree Gibson-Harris
Keyword(s):  
Case Law ◽  
Product Safety ◽  
Tort Reform ◽  
Property Damage ◽  
Accident Investigation ◽  
Products Liability ◽  
Liability Law ◽  
Design And Manufacturing ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Sound Management

After products liability tort reform has run its course, and the insurance crisis has been resolved, manufacturers will still be held responsible for defective products that fail prematurely causing injury, property damage and commercial loss. This products liability responsibility has two aspects which should be clearly distinguished by forensic engineers. The first, has little to do with recent developments in products liability law and simply involves a forensic engineers understanding of the more traditional factors that result in safe, quality products, through the establishment within the company of sound management, design and manufacturing practices. The second aspect of effective accident investigation, litigation or consulting with industry, demands an understanding of the concepts and trends in products liability case law as it relates to the product safety and liability responsibility of manufacturers. The following paper describes some of the concepts of products l

Producer Liability and Competition Policy When Firms Are Bound by a Common Industry Reputation

2014 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 1645-1676 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrzej Baniak ◽  
Peter Grajzl ◽  
A. Joseph Guse
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Market Structure ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Product Safety ◽  
Products Liability ◽  
Laissez Faire ◽  
The Relationship

Abstract We contrast the laissez-faire regime with the regime of strict producer liability and draw the implications for competition policy in a setting where oligopolistic firms cannot differentiate themselves from rivals but rather are bound by a common industry reputation for product safety. We show that, first, unlike in the traditional products liability model, firms’ incentives to invest in precaution depend on market structure. Second, depending on the magnitude of expected damages awarded by the courts, laissez-faire can welfare dominate strict producer liability. Third, the relationship between social welfare and industry size, and hence the role for competition policy, depends on the institutional regime governing the industry. Under some circumstances, restricting industry size is unambiguously welfare-enhancing.

AGENCY PROBLEM DALAM PENERAPAN PEMBIAYAAN AKAD MUDHARABAH PADA PERBANKAN SYARIAH

ALQALAM ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
Aswadi Lubis
Keyword(s):  
High Risk ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Human Resources ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Agency Problem ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Islamic Banking ◽  
The Public

The purpose of writing this article is to describe the agency problems that arise in the application of the financing with mudharabah on Islamic banking. In this article the author describes the use of the theory of financing, asymetri information, agency problems inside of financing. The conclusion of this article is that the financing is asymmetric information problems will arise, both adverse selection and moral hazard. The high risk of prospective managers (mudharib) for their moral hazard and lack of readiness of human resources in Islamic banking is among the factors that make the composition of the distribution of funds to the public more in the form of financing. The limitations that can be done to optimize this financing is among other things; owners of capital supervision (monitoring) and the customers themselves place restrictions on its actions (bonding).

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