Joint Intention and Accomplice Liability

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas Almendares ◽  
Dimitri Landa
Keyword(s):  
Erkenntnis ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. R. G. Williams

AbstractInformation can be public among a group. Whether or not information is public matters, for example, for accounts of interdependent rational choice, of communication, and of joint intention. A standard analysis of public information identifies it with (some variant of) common belief. The latter notion is stipulatively defined as an infinite conjunction: for p to be commonly believed is for it to believed by all members of a group, for all members to believe that all members believe it, and so forth. This analysis is often presupposed without much argument in philosophy. Theoretical entrenchment or intuitions about cases might give some traction on the question, but give little insight about why the identification holds, if it does. The strategy of this paper is to characterize a practical-normative role for information being public, and show that the only things that play that role are (variants of) common belief as stipulatively characterized. In more detail: a functional role for “taking a proposition for granted” in non-isolated decision making is characterized. I then present some minimal conditions under which such an attitude is correctly held. The key assumption links this attitude to beliefs about what is public. From minimal a priori principles, we can argue that a proposition being public among a group entails common commitment to believe among that group. Later sections explore partial converses to this result, the factivity of publicity and publicity from the perspective of outsiders to the group, and objections to the aprioricity of the result deriving from a posteriori existential presuppositions.


1993 ◽  
Vol 02 (03) ◽  
pp. 289-318 ◽  
Author(s):  
NICK R. JENNINGS

Systems composed of multiple interacting problem solvers are becoming increasingly pervasive and have been championed in some quarters as the basis of the next generation of intelligent information systems. If this technology is to fulfill its true potential then it is important that the systems which are developed have a sound theoretical grounding. One aspect of this foundation, namely the model of collaborative problem solving, is examined in this paper. A synergistic review of existing models of cooperation is presented, their weaknesses are highlighted and a new model (called joint responsibility) is introduced. Joint responsibility is then used to specify a novel high-level agent architecture for cooperative problem solving in which the mentalistic notions of belief, desire, intention and joint intention play a central role in guiding an individual’s and the group’s problem solving behaviour. An implementation of this high-level architecture is then discussed and its utility is illustrated for the real-world domain of electricity transportation management.


2004 ◽  
Vol 01 (02) ◽  
pp. 315-348 ◽  
Author(s):  
CYNTHIA BREAZEAL ◽  
ANDREW BROOKS ◽  
JESSE GRAY ◽  
GUY HOFFMAN ◽  
CORY KIDD ◽  
...  

This paper presents an overview of our work towards building socially intelligent, cooperative humanoid robots that can work and learn in partnership with people. People understand each other in social terms, allowing them to engage others in a variety of complex social interactions including communication, social learning, and cooperation. We present our theoretical framework that is a novel combination of Joint Intention Theory and Situated Learning Theory and demonstrate how this framework can be applied to develop our sociable humanoid robot, Leonardo. We demonstrate the robot's ability to learn quickly and effectively from natural human instruction using gesture and dialog, and then cooperate to perform a learned task jointly with a person. Such issues must be addressed to enable many new and exciting applications for robots that require them to play a long-term role in people's daily lives.


2000 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 39-69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raimo Tuomela
Keyword(s):  

1997 ◽  
Vol 06 (01) ◽  
pp. 3-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wolfgang Balzer ◽  
Raimo Tuomela

Tuomela's philosophical account of joint intentions is formalized in a special setting in which fully specified plans are available for the execution of the intended joint action. Using additional modal logical assumptions the definition is simplified and used to investigate how the presence of a joint intention can be efficiently checked.


2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 33
Author(s):  
Jianhua Zhang ◽  
Zhongzhi Shi ◽  
Jinpeng Yue ◽  
Baoyuan Qi
Keyword(s):  

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document