Executive Equity Compensation Plans and Board of Director Discretion over Equity Grants

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian D. Cadman ◽  
Richard Carrizosa
Keyword(s):  
Compensation Plans ◽  
Equity Compensation ◽  
Board Of Director

scholarly journals The Efficacy of Shareholder Voting: Evidence from Equity Compensation Plans

2013 ◽  
Vol 51 (5) ◽  
pp. 909-950 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTOPHER S. ARMSTRONG ◽  
IAN D. GOW ◽  
DAVID F. LARCKER
Keyword(s):  
Shareholder Voting ◽  
Compensation Plans ◽  
Equity Compensation

Director Compensation in the Banking Industry Around the Dodd-Frank Act

2021 ◽  
pp. 2150022
Author(s):  
Wikil Kwak ◽  
Xiaoyan Cheng ◽  
Burch Kealey
Keyword(s):  
Banking Industry ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Director Compensation ◽  
Compensation Plans ◽  
Equity Compensation ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Board Monitoring ◽  
Compensation Packages ◽  
Shed Light

Directors’ monitoring and advising activities as agents were supposed to increase after the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010. The Dodd-Frank Act significantly increases the pressure on the board of directors to be more effective agents of the stockholders even after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) became effective. Director compensation, especially incentive-based compensation, is intended to align with the interests of shareholders and motivate director behavior. This paper empirically tests how banks respond to the Dodd-Frank Act by redesigning their director compensation plans. Our findings suggest that banks recognize the need for improved board monitoring by highlighting the importance of director workload and qualifications through the design of director compensation packages in the post-Dodd-Frank Act period. We also find that the negative impact of excessive director equity compensation on firm performance was attenuated after the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act. The findings of this study shed light on the rationale of director compensation policies for banking firms.

Does Shareholder Approval Requirement of Equity Compensation Plans Matter?

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lilian K. Ng ◽  
Valeriy Sibilkov ◽  
Qinghai Wang ◽  
Nataliya S. Zaiats
Keyword(s):  
Compensation Plans ◽  
Equity Compensation

Does shareholder approval requirement of equity compensation plans matter?

2011 ◽  
Vol 17 (5) ◽  
pp. 1510-1530 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lilian Ng ◽  
Valeriy Sibilkov ◽  
Qinghai Wang ◽  
Nataliya Zaiats
Keyword(s):  
Compensation Plans ◽  
Equity Compensation

scholarly journals The Impact Of Outside Director Equity Holdings On The Mix Of Outside Director Compensation

2011 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Guy McClain
Keyword(s):  
Outside Directors ◽  
Return On Assets ◽  
Director Compensation ◽  
Compensation Plans ◽  
Negatively Associated ◽  
Equity Compensation ◽  
Outside Director ◽  
The Impact ◽  
First Time ◽  
Equity Holdings

<span>This study investigates the impact outside director equity holdings have on the determinants of the mix of equity in outside director compensation plans. The analysis, conducted over a 4 year period from 1997-2000, is based on a sample of 89 first time adopters of equity compensation. The use of first time adopters attempts to control for the fact that many of the variables in the study are endogenously determined over time. The results indicate that the mix of equity is negatively associated with outside director holding, positively associated with the market-to-book ratio (a measure of the firms investment opportunities) and negatively associated with return on assets (a measure of CEO bargaining power). These findings suggest that the negotiation that takes place between the CEO and outside directors regarding governance is not only affected by the firms wanting to match the marginal productivity of directors with the opportunities of the firm, but also with the equity holdings of the directors.</span>

The Relation Between Financial Incentives, Motivation, and Performance

2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 61-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anaïs Thibault Landry ◽  
Marylène Gagné ◽  
Jacques Forest ◽  
Sylvie Guerrero ◽  
Michel Séguin ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Financial Incentives ◽  
Work Performance ◽  
Autonomous Motivation ◽  
Compensation Plans ◽  
Work Settings ◽  
Path Analyses ◽  
Three Samples ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Performance Results

Abstract. To this day, researchers are debating the adequacy of using financial incentives to bolster performance in work settings. Our goal was to contribute to current understanding by considering the moderating role of distributive justice in the relation between financial incentives, motivation, and performance. Based on self-determination theory, we hypothesized that when bonuses are fairly distributed, using financial incentives makes employees feel more competent and autonomous, which in turn fosters greater autonomous motivation and lower controlled motivation, and better work performance. Results from path analyses in three samples supported our hypotheses, suggesting that the effect of financial incentives is contextual, and that compensation plans using financial incentives and bonuses can be effective when properly managed.

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