Do Auditors Recognize the Potential Dark Side of Executives' Accounting Competence?

2018 ◽  
Vol 93 (6) ◽  
pp. 1-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne Albrecht ◽  
Elaine G. Mauldin ◽  
Nathan J. Newton
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Prior Experience ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Dark Side ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
Aggressive Attitude ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT Practice and research recognize the importance of extensive knowledge of accounting and financial reporting experience for generating reliable financial statements. However, we consider the possibility that such knowledge and experience increase the likelihood of material misstatement when executives have incentives to misreport. We use executives' prior experience as an audit manager or partner as a measure of extensive accounting and financial reporting competence. We find that the interaction of this measure and compensation-based incentives increases the likelihood of misstatements. Further, auditors discount the audit fee premium associated with compensation-based incentives when executives have accounting competence. Together, our results suggest that a dark side of accounting competence emerges in the presence of certain incentives, but auditors view accounting competence favorably despite the heightened risk. In further analyses, we demonstrate that executives' aggressive attitude toward reporting exacerbates the effect of accounting competence and compensation-based incentives on misstatements, but not on audit fees. JEL Classifications: M41; M42. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources identified in the text.

The Impact of Mandatory IFRS Adoption on Audit Fees: Theory and Evidence

2012 ◽  
Vol 87 (6) ◽  
pp. 2061-2094 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeong-Bon Kim ◽  
Xiaohong Liu ◽  
Liu Zheng
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Financial Reporting Standards ◽  
Ifrs Adoption ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
European Union Countries ◽  
The Impact

ABSTRACT: This study examines the impact of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption on audit fees. We first build an analytical audit fee model to analyze the impact on audit fees for the change in both audit complexity and financial reporting quality brought about by IFRS adoption. We then test the model's predictions using audit fee data from European Union countries that mandated IFRS adoption in 2005. We find that mandatory IFRS adoption has led to an increase in audit fees. We also find that the IFRS-related audit fee premium increases with the increase in audit complexity brought about by IFRS adoption, and decreases with the improvement in financial reporting quality arising from IFRS adoption. Finally, we find some evidence that the IFRS-related audit fee premium is lower in countries with stronger legal regimes. Our results are robust to a variety of sensitivity checks. Data availability: Data are available from public sources identified in the paper.

scholarly journals Keterbacaan Catatan Atas Laporan Keuangan dan Dampak Audit (Readability over Financial Reporting Footnotes and Audit Outcomes)

2021 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 53
Author(s):  
Nadiah Bella Sagitarisma ◽  
Riesanti E. Wijaya
Keyword(s):  
Regression Analysis ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Generalized Least Squares ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Analysis Method ◽  
Data Regression ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Relationship

This study aims to find out the relationship of readability over financial reporting footnotes and audit outcomes. Audit outcomes are projected by audit fees and audit report lag.  Researchers used data from the company's financial statements listed on IDX in 2015-2018. Researchers used purposive sampling. From the copying, researchers processed 184 company data. This study used the panel's data regression analysis method. Data processing uses Generalized - least - squares.  This research proves that the worse the readability, the lower the audit fee.  Meanwhile, the worse the readability, the more time it takes the auditor to carry out an examination of the financial statements. This phenomenon occurs because the condition of the readability of notes to financial statements in Indonesia is still at a low level.

scholarly journals Relevant but Delayed Information in Negotiated Audit Fees

2014 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 95-117 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karl E. Hackenbrack ◽  
Nicole Thorne Jenkins ◽  
Mikhail Pevzner
Keyword(s):  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Bad News ◽  
Specific Knowledge ◽  
Delayed Information ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
News Events ◽  
Jel Classifications

SUMMARY: Audit fee negotiations conclude with the signing of an engagement letter, typically the first quarter of the year under audit. Yet investors do not learn the audit fee paid until disclosed in the following year's definitive proxy statement. We conjecture that negotiated audit fees impound auditors' consequential private, client-specific knowledge about “bad news” events investors will learn eventually. We demonstrate that a proxy for the year-to-year change in the negotiated audit fee has an economically meaningful positive association with proxies for public realizations of “bad news” events that occur during the roughly 12-month period between the negotiation of the audit fee and the disclosure of the audit fee paid. Our results suggest that negotiated audit fees contain information meaningful to investors and that if disclosed proximate to the signing of the engagement letter instead of the following year, information asymmetry between managers and investors would be reduced. JEL Classifications: G19, D89, M40. Data Availability: Available from public sources identified in the text.

How Much Does IFRS Cost? IFRS Adoption and Audit Fees

2012 ◽  
Vol 88 (2) ◽  
pp. 429-462 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emmanuel T. De George ◽  
Colin B. Ferguson ◽  
Nasser A. Spear
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Small Firms ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Securities And Exchange Commission ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Publicly Traded ◽  
Financial Reporting Standards ◽  
Response Data ◽  
Ifrs Adoption

ABSTRACT This study provides evidence of a directly observable and significant cost of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption, by examining the fees incurred by firms for the statutory audit of their financial statements at the time of transition. Using a comprehensive dataset of all publicly traded Australian companies, we quantify an economy-wide increase in the mean level of audit costs of 23 percent in the year of IFRS transition. We estimate an abnormal IFRS-related increase in audit costs in excess of 8 percent, beyond the normal yearly fee increases in the pre-IFRS period. Further analysis provides evidence that small firms incur disproportionately higher IFRS-related audit fees. We then survey auditors to construct a firm-specific measure of IFRS audit complexity. Empirical findings suggest that firms with greater exposure to audit complexity exhibit greater increases in compliance costs for the transition to IFRS. Given the renewed debate about whether the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) should mandate IFRS for U.S. firms, our results are of timely importance. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from the sources identified in the paper. Survey response data are available from the authors upon request.

scholarly journals PENGARUH NARSISME KLIEN, AUDIT FEE, INDEPENDENSI, SKEPTISME PROFESIONAL, DAN INTERLOCK AUDITOR EKSTERNAL TERHADAP AUDIT JUDGEMENT DALAM PENDETEKSIAN KECURANGAN LAPORAN KEUANGAN (STUDI KASUS PADA KAP DI MANADO)

2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Claudia Wanda Melati Korompis ◽  
Lady Diana Latjandu
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Linear Regression Analysis ◽  
Personal Characteristic ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Multiple Linear Regression Analysis ◽  
Professional Skepticism ◽  
External Auditors ◽  
Audit Judgment ◽  
Audit Fee

A material misstatement is the beginning of a fraud that can not be detected by an auditor and may have negative effects on the financial reporting process. The Internal factors related to the audit work environment in this research are audit fees, Independence, professional skepticism and Auditor Interlock. Sometimes, the amount of audit fee makes an auditor in a dilemma position on giving the opinion about the fairness of financial statements relating to the interests of many parties. The other factor which making a dilemma problem is Independence. Independence should be maintained by an auditor to provide a neutral assessment of the financial statements. Researchers also choose professional skepticism as things that need to be developed in order to reduce the adverse effects of fraudulent financial statement. The last Internal factor in this research is Auditor Interlock that may help auditor to get all disclosure that they’re needed. The unique external factor is client narcissism. Narcissism is known as a distorted personal characteristic that may obstruct an auditor's opinion statement according to the scope of the examination.The samples are all external auditors in KAP which operating in Manado area. Multiple linear regression analysis is an analysis thecnique that used in this research. Instrument in this research is questionnaire and processed using SPSS program.The results of this study indicate that the Audit fee and Independence have a significant effect on audit judgment. While Client Narsism, Professional Skepticism, and Interlock external auditors have no significant effect on audit judgment. Key Words: Narcissism, Fee, Independence, Skepticism, Interlock, Judgment

CEO Behavioral Integrity, Auditor Responses, and Firm Outcomes

2019 ◽  
Vol 95 (2) ◽  
pp. 61-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shane S. Dikolli ◽  
Thomas Keusch ◽  
William J. Mayew ◽  
Thomas D. Steffen
Keyword(s):  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Behavioral Integrity ◽  
The Public ◽  
Future Performance ◽  
Confidentiality Agreement ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
Financial Misstatement ◽  
High Integrity ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT We investigate the audit fee response to CEO behavioral integrity (BI). BI refers to the perceived congruence between an individual's words and deeds (Simons 2002). Because low word-deed congruence should result in more explanations when communicating, we use variation in explanations beyond firm fundamentals and CEO-specific characteristics in more than 30,000 shareholder letters to serve as a linguistic-based proxy for CEO BI. We find that audit fees increase as BI decreases, but BI is not associated with financial misstatement or litigation. These findings are potentially consistent with auditors undertaking additional work in response to low BI, which, in turn, mitigates the risk of restatements and lawsuits. The likelihood of option backdating increases as BI decreases, consistent with the contention that auditors lacked incentives to prevent backdating. Finally, BI is increasing in future performance, which suggests that CEOs partially underpin the returns to high-integrity corporate cultures. JEL Classifications: J24; L25; M14; M41; M42. Data Availability: Proprietary data from KRW International cannot be shared because of the terms of a confidentiality agreement. All other data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

The Association between Financial Reporting Risk and Audit Fees before and after the Historic Events Surrounding SOX

2010 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shannon L. Charles ◽  
Steven M. Glover ◽  
Nathan Y. Sharp
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Risk Measures ◽  
Risk Measure ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Time Period ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
Before And After

SUMMARY: This study investigates whether the association between financial reporting risk and audit fees changed during 2000–2003: a time period marked by momentous and historic events for auditors. We find a positive statistically and economically significant relationship between financial reporting risk and audit fees paid to Big 4 auditors. More importantly, we predict and find that the relation between financial reporting risk and audit fees strengthened significantly in 2002 and 2003, consistent with a shift in the way auditors priced risk, likely in response to the events surrounding the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Finally, we provide evidence that a commercially developed, comprehensive risk measure effectively proxies for an element of risk beyond what has traditionally been captured by various risk measures in audit fee models: namely, the risk that financial statements have been intentionally misstated. We believe this risk measure will be of interest to future researchers.

Interim Reporting Frequency and the Mispricing of Accruals

2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 29-47
Author(s):  
Shou-Min Tsao ◽  
Hsueh-Tien Lu ◽  
Edmund C. Keung
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Stock Prices ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Financial Reports ◽  
Regulatory Changes ◽  
Sample Composition ◽  
Reporting Frequency ◽  
Over Time ◽  
Jel Classifications ◽  
Accrual Mispricing

SYNOPSIS This study examines the association between mandatory financial reporting frequency and the accrual anomaly. Based on regulatory changes in reporting frequency requirements in Taiwan, we divide our sample period into three reporting regimes: a semiannual reporting regime from 1982 to 1985, a quarterly reporting regime from 1986 to 1987, and a monthly reporting regime (both quarterly financial reports and monthly revenue disclosure) from 1988 to 1993. We find that although both switches (from the semiannual reporting regime to the quarterly reporting regime and from the quarterly reporting regime to the monthly reporting regime) hasten the dissemination of the information contained in annual accruals into stock prices and reduce annual accrual mispricing, the switch to monthly reporting has a lesser effect. Our results are robust to controlling for risk factors, transaction costs, and potential changes in accrual, cash flow persistence, and sample composition over time. These results imply that more frequent reporting is one possible mechanism to reduce accrual mispricing. JEL Classifications: G14; L51; M41; M48. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the paper.

Does Incentive-Based Compensation for Chief Internal Auditors Impact Objectivity? An External Audit Risk Perspective

2016 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 21-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucy Huajing Chen ◽  
Hyeesoo H. (Sally) Chung ◽  
Gary F. Peters ◽  
Jinyoung P. (Jeannie) Wynn
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Audit ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Company Performance ◽  
Potential Threat ◽  
External Audit ◽  
Internal Auditors ◽  
Survey Responses

SUMMARY This paper considers the potential impact of internal audit incentive-based compensation (IBC) linked to company performance on the external auditor's assessment of internal audit objectivity. We posit that external auditors will view IBC as a potential threat to internal audit objectivity, thus reducing the extent of reliance on the work of internal auditors and increasing the assessment of control risk. The increase in risk and external auditor effort should result in higher audit fees. We hypothesize that the form of incentive-based compensation, namely stock-based versus cash bonuses, moderates the association between IBC and external audit fee. Finally, we consider whether underlying financial reporting risk mitigates the external auditor's potential sensitivity to IBC. We find a positive association between external audit fees and internal audit compensation based upon company performance. The association is acute to IBC paid in stock or stock options as opposed to cash bonuses. We also find evidence consistent with the IBC associations being mitigated by the company's financial reporting risks. Data Availability: Individual survey responses are confidential. All other data are derived from publicly available sources.

Auditors and the Principal-Principal Agency Conflict in Family Controlled Firms

2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 31-55
Author(s):  
Chiraz Ben Ali ◽  
Sabri Boubaker ◽  
Michel Magnan
Keyword(s):  
Risk Assessment ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Risk ◽  
Controlling Shareholder ◽  
Voting Power ◽  
The Public ◽  
Agency Conflict ◽  
Jel Classifications

SUMMARY This paper examines whether multiple large shareholders (MLS) affect audit fees in firms where the largest controlling shareholder (LCS) is a family. Results show that there is a negative relationship between audit fees and the presence, number, and voting power of MLS. This is consistent with the view that auditors consider MLS as playing a monitoring role over the LCS, mitigating the potential for expropriation by the LCS. Therefore, our evidence suggests that auditors reduce their audit risk assessment and audit effort and ultimately audit fees in family controlled firms with MLS. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G32; G34; M42; D86.

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