Disunity of Virtue

Author(s):  
Gopal Sreenivasan

This chapter contains the argument against the unity of the virtues, which presupposes that the virtues are not unified and vindicates anti-imperialism about virtue. It describes the unity of the virtues that was more or less universally affirmed in ancient ethics and notes that the dominant tendency in contemporary moral philosophy is to reject it. It also sketches a position on the interrelation of the virtues that avoids the falsity of the unity thesis, while still salvaging some of its more attractive aspects. The chapter focuses on the thesis that one cannot have one virtue without having all of the others. It elaborates that if there is any one virtue that a person lacks, then it follows that this person does not have any of the other virtues.

2011 ◽  
Vol 2011 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-28
Author(s):  
Jens Bonnemann

In ethics, when discussing problems of justice and a just social existence one question arises obviously: What is the normal case of the relation between I and you we start from? In moral philosophy, each position includes basic socio-anthropological convictions in that we understand the other, for example, primarily as competitor in the fight for essential resources or as a partner in communication. Thus, it is not the human being as isolated individual, or as specimen of the human species or socialised member of a historical society what needs to be understood. Instead, the individual in its relation to the other or others has been studied in phenomenology and the philosophy of dialogue of the twentieth century. In the following essay I focus on Martin Buber’s and Jean-Paul Sartre’s theories of intersubjectivity which I use in order to explore the meaning of recognition and disrespect for an individual. They offer a valuable contribution to questions of practical philosophy and the socio-philosophical diagnosis of our time.


2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (6) ◽  
pp. 147-170

The article provides a comparison of the concept of homo œconomicus with the core theses of René Descartes’ moral philosophy. The first section draws on the work of the contemporary Western philosopher Anselm Jappe in which Descartes’ philosophy is held to be the cornerstone of the established view and current scientific definitions of homo œconomicus as the fundamental and indispensable agent of capitalistic relations. As opposed to this “common sense” position in the modern social sciences, the second section of the article builds upon Pierre Bourdieu’s Anthropologie économique (2017) to demystify the notion of homo œconomicus. The article then examines some aspects of modern philosophical anthropology that show odd traces of Descartes’ thinking and that are regularly applied in economic science as well as in the critique of economic thinking as such. These are the concepts of mutuality, giving, exchange and generosity, and they are regarded as central to the philosopher’s moral doctrine.The author concludes that the philosophical doctrine of generosity has very little in common with the bourgeois ideology of utility which implies an instrumental relationship between subjects: in Caretesian moral philosophy the Other is neither an object of influence nor a means to achieve someone’s personal goals nor a windowless monad. Generosity certainly has its economic aspects, but these do not include accumulating wealth in the bourgeois sense. It is more in the realm of the aristocratic practice of making dispensations. All throughout his life Decartes may be viewed as exhibiting a peculiar kind of nobility in which the desire to give, endow and sacrifice outweighs any selfish interest. The vigorous pursuit of well-being gives way to a quest for the leisure required to pursue intellectual activity, and care for oneself does not preclude attending to and loving the Other, whatever form it may take.


DoisPontos ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Valério Rohden

No presente trabalho será demonstrada a estreita, embora discreta, relação da filosofia moral de Kant com a ética antiga, especialmente com o estoicismo de Cícero. O tema será explicitado mediante uma aproximação entre as obras da Crítica da razão prática e Sobre os fins (De finibus), respectivamente de cada um desses autores. Será destacada a crítica de Kant à identificação entre virtude e felicidade e sua reformulação sintética no conceito de “sumo bem”. Na conclusão se torna claro que a realização moral da razão, reivindicada por Cícero, encontra na reformulação de Kant sua determinação mais precisa. The crises of practical reason and stoicism Abstract The present paper shows the close albeit subtle relation of Kant’s moral philosophy to ancient ethics, especially Cicero’s Stoicism. The subject is made explicit by means of a rapprochement between the Critique of practical reason and De finibus, so as to be highlight Kant’s criticism of the classical identifying of virtue and happiness and his synthetical recasting of the concept of the supreme good. The essay concludes by making clear that the moral actualization of reason, reclaimed by Cicero, finds in Kant’s reformulation its most precise determination.


Author(s):  
Motsamai Molefe

The article explores the place and status of the normative concept of personhood in Kwasi Wiredu’s moral philosophy. It begins by distinguishing an ethic from an ethics, where one involves cultural values and the other strict moral values. It proceeds to argue, by a careful exposition of Wiredu’s moral philosophy, that he locates personhood as an essential aspect of communalism [an ethic], and it specifies culture-specific standards of excellence among traditional African societies. I conclude the article by considering one implication of the conclusion, which is that personhood embodies cultural values of excellence concerning the place and status of partiality in Wiredu’s moral philosophy. Keywords: Afro-communitarianism, agent-centred personhood, Ethic, Ethics, Kwasi Wiredu, Partiality Personhood.


Philosophy ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 78 (3) ◽  
pp. 337-354 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. W. Moore

The author begins with an outline of Bernard William's moral philosophy, within which he locates William's notorious doctrine that reflection can destroy ethical knowledge. He then gives a partial defence of this doctrine, exploiting an analogy between ethical judgements and tensed judgements. The basic idea is that what the passage of time does for the latter, reflection can do for the former: namely, prevent the re-adoption of an abandoned point of view (an ethical point of view in the one case, a temporal point of view in the other). In the final section the author says a little about how reflection might do this.


Author(s):  
G. A. Cohen

This chapter examines Friedrich Nietzsche's moral philosophy, first by explaining what makes him different from most of the other moral philosophers such as David Hume, Thomas Hobbes, the Greeks, and Baruch Spinoza. It then considers Nietzsche's notion of good and evil by addressing three questions: How do we find out what sort of creatures men are? How do we decide what sort of creature man ought to be? Is it possible for man to transform himself into that sort of creature. It also discusses the problem faced by Nietzsche in his attempts to assess human nature, namely: what is to count as health in the spiritual dimension, when is a soul diseased, what is mens sana. Finally, it analyzes the main arguments put forward by Nietzsche in his two books Beyond Good and Evil and The Genealogy of Morals.


1989 ◽  
Vol 23 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 345-356 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sanford H. Kadish

The Report of the Landau Commission puts a painful question for public debate: can it ever be morally acceptable in a liberal democracy for the state to use cruel measures against a person to compel him to reveal information needed to prevent grave harms, such as the loss of lives? The question, of course, belongs to a class of questions that has baffled and divided people for generations. Are some actions inherently and intrinsically wrong, so that they may not be redeemed by the net good consequences they produce on balance? Even if this is the case in general, can it be true regardless of the enormity of the consequences? Battle lines in moral philosophy are drawn in terms of how these questions are answered. For consequentialists the morality of all actions is solely determined by their consequences, near and long term. For deontologists the morality of all actions is always determined, at least in part, by their intrinsic wrongness, so that if they are wrong they are not made right by their desirable consequences. Each side has, so it seems, an unanswerable objection to the position of the other. Deontologists ask: then you mean you are ready to declare, for example, that punishment of innocent persons may be morally justified if it is necessary to prevent crime? And consequentialists (without answering) ask in turn: then you mean that even if the life of thousands and the preservation of the basic freedoms of a democratic community depend on it, you would regard it as morally prohibited to use any force against a single innocent person?These questions are among the hardest of all hard questions. But they become even harder when they are asked in the context of a public debate over how a government should act in some immediate crisis.


1996 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 357-370 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. F. Stalley

It hardly needs to be said that the parallel between mental and physical health plays an important part in Plato's moral philosophy. One of the central claims of the Republicis that justice is to the soul what health is to the body (443b–444e).1 Similar points are made in other dialogues.2 This analogy between health and sickness on the one hand and virtue and vice on the other is closely connected to the so–called Socratic paradoxes. Throughout his life Plato seems to have clung in some sense to the ideas that justice is our greatest good, that the unjust man is correspondingly miserable and that no one is therefore willingly unjust. It follows from these ideas that the unjust man, like the sick man, is in a wretched state which is not of his own choosing.


2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (5) ◽  
pp. 223-232
Author(s):  
Ahmad Jafari Samimi

The purpose of this paper is to survey the relationship between economics and ethics in the history of economic thought. So the descriptive methodology of research is applied to find study and analyze the references which have been written about the matter. The conclusion shows that economics not only hasn’t been detached from ethics, but also has been the subdirectory of ethics in the beginning. In the other word economics grew out of moral philosophy and eventually became one of the moral sciences but these two sciences detached from each other as times go on, and this detachment is not part of the tradition of economics.


Author(s):  
T.M. Scanlon

Questions of justification arise in moral philosophy in at least three ways. The first concerns the way in which particular moral claims, such as claims about right and wrong, can be shown to be correct. Virtually every moral theory offers its own account of moral justification in this sense, and these accounts naturally differ from each other. A second question is about the justification of morality as a whole – about how to answer the question, ‘Why be moral?’ Philosophers have disagreed about this, and about whether an answer is even possible. Finally, some philosophers have claimed that justification of our actions to others is a central aim of moral thinking. They maintain that this aim provides answers to the other two questions of justification by explaining the reasons we have to be moral and the particular form that justification takes within moral argument.


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