Perception: Sensory, Conceptual, and Cognitive Dimensions

Author(s):  
Robert Audi

This chapter considers how perception is central in epistemology, and the concept of perception is among the most important in philosophy. If the psychological authority of perception—chiefly, its power to compel belief under varying conditions—is not in general contested, its epistemic authority—chiefly, its power to yield knowledge and justified belief—is often taken to be limited to certain realms and to hold for descriptive rather than normative propositions. Paradigms of the former are propositions ascribing observable properties, such as color and shape, to macroscopic objects. Whereas paradigms of normative propositions are those ascribing obligations to persons, wrongness to actions, or intrinsic goodness or badness to states of affairs.

2004 ◽  
Vol 02 (02) ◽  
pp. 201-219 ◽  
Author(s):  
ULRICH MOHRHOFF

Zurek's existential interpretation of quantum mechanics suffers from three classical prejudices, including the belief that space and time are intrinsically and infinitely differentiated. These compel him to relativize the concept of objective existence in two ways. The elimination of these prejudices makes it possible to recognize the quantum formalism's ontological implications — the relative and contingent reality of spatiotemporal distinctions and the extrinsic and finite spatiotemporal differentiation of the physical world — which in turn makes it possible to arrive at an unqualified objective existence. Contrary to a widespread misconception, viewing the quantum formalism as being fundamentally a probability algorithm does not imply that quantum mechanics is concerned with states of knowledge rather than states of Nature. On the contrary, it makes possible a complete and strongly objective description of the physical world that requires no reference to observers. What objectively exists, in a sense that requires no qualification, is (i) the trajectories of macroscopic objects, whose fuzziness is empirically irrelevant, (ii) the properties and values of whose possession these trajectories provide indelible records, and (iii) the fuzzy and temporally undifferentiated states of affairs that obtain between measurements and are described by counterfactual probability assignments.


Author(s):  
Alastair Norcross

Consequentialist theories of the right connect the rightness and wrongness (and related notions) of actions with the intrinsic goodness and badness of states of affairs consequential on those actions. The most popular such theory is maximization, which is said to demand of agents that they maximize the good, that they do the best they can, at all times. Thus it may seem that consequentialist theories are overly demanding, and, relatedly, that they cannot accommodate the phenomenon of going above and beyond the demands of duty (supererogation). However, a clear understanding of consequentialism leaves no room for a theory of the right, at least not at the fundamental level of the theory. A consequentialist theory, such as utilitarianism, is a theory of how to rank outcomes, and derivatively actions, which provides reasons for choosing some actions over others. It is thus a purely scalar theory, with no demands that certain actions be performed, and no fundamental classification of actions as right or wrong. However, such notions may have pragmatic benefits at the level of application, since many people find it easier to guide their conduct by simple commands, rather than to think in terms of reasons of varying strength to do one thing rather than another. A contextualist semantics for various terms, such as “right,” “permissible,” “harm,” when combined with the scalar approach to consequentialism, allows for the expression of truth-apt propositions with sentences containing such terms.


2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Conley ◽  
Padmanabhan Sudevan ◽  
Jonni-Rae Binder ◽  
Jeffrey P. Hayton ◽  
Rachel A. Dorshorst ◽  
...  

Nature ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 583 (7814) ◽  
pp. 31-32
Author(s):  
Valeria Sequino ◽  
Mateusz Bawaj

2020 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-152 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Armbrecht

This study focuses on the perceived quality of participatory event experiences by addressing the following question: What are the important aspects of the event experience? The aim of this research is to develop and refine a scale to measure the quality of the event experience for runners at a participatory event. The objective is to combine, apply, test, and refine the existing scales to increase our understanding of the perceived quality of events among amateur running athletes. Both affective and cognitive dimensions are included in the scale. Based on seven dimensions and 36 items, a formal scale development process is adopted. The data consist of 1,923 observations collected during a participatory event with approximately 60,000 registered participants. The seven-factor model, including immersion, surprise, participation, fun, social aspects, hedonic aspects, and service quality, was gradually revised in favor of a four-factor solution: service quality, hedonic aspects, fun, and immersion. As a result, 73.1% of the variance is extracted. This study contributes to a refined scale measuring the perceived event quality of participatory events. Service quality accounts for more than half of the variance extracted. Researchers should continue to develop research on the critical experiential dimensions in an event context. Furthermore, the links between the constructs need attention. The results suggest that event organizers should evaluate their events and event portfolios based on the scale and take actions to increase the perceived quality of these events.


2018 ◽  
Vol 34 ◽  
pp. 79-89
Author(s):  
Mónica Gómez Salazar

This paper argues the thesis that education should be understood as a guide that directs the young people towards reflexive and imaginative social practices that allow them to formulate new and varied hypotheses as well as alternative justifications. Based on Dewey, we will expose that a goal such as this is only applicable to members of a democratic society. Next, we present some features of onto-epistemological pluralism in relation to freedom and responsibility. It is concluded that there is no justification that is closer to truth or reality. The relevance of a justified belief with good reasons lies in its practical consequences for specific conditions of existence.


Author(s):  
John R. Searle

Intentionality is that feature of the mind by which it is directed at or about objects and states of affairs in the world. Intentionality is simply aboutness or directedness. “Proposition” is more difficult, but the essential idea is this: every intentional state has a content. Sometimes it seems that the content just enables a state to refer to an object. So if John loves Sally, then it appears that the content of his love is simply “Sally”. But if John believes that it is raining, then the specification of the content requires an entire “that” clause. “Are there non-propositional intentional states?” amounts to the question, “Are there intentional states whose content does not require specification with a ‘that’ clause?” This chapter explores whether there are any non-propositional states, and suggest that a very limited class, such as boredom, is in fact non-propositional.


Author(s):  
Clayton Littlejohn

On a standard way of thinking about the relationships between evidence, reasons, and epistemic justification, a subject’s evidence consists of her potential reasons for her beliefs, these reasons constitute the normative reasons that bear on whether to believe, and justification is taken to result from relations between a subject’s potential reasons for her beliefs and those beliefs. This chapter argues that this view makes a number of mistakes about the rational roles of reasons and evidence and explores some parallels between practical and theoretical reasons. Just as justified action is unobjectionable action, justified belief is unobjectionable belief. Just as you cannot object to someone deciding to do something simply on the grounds that their reasons for acting didn’t give them strong reason to act, you cannot object to someone believing something simply on the grounds that they didn’t believe for reasons that gave their beliefs strong evidential support.


Author(s):  
Samuel Scheffler

Many discussions of future generations attempt to identify a satisfactory population axiology: a principle that would enable us to assess the relative value of total states of affairs that differ in population-related respects. Such an axiology would in turn supply the basis for a principle of beneficence, which would spell out our responsibilities for promoting optimal population outcomes. By contrast, the approach defended in this book is predominantly attachment-based. The reasons for caring about the fate of future generations discussed in previous chapters all depend on our existing values and evaluative attachments and on our conservative disposition to preserve and sustain the things that we value. This chapter appeals to the nature of valuing to clarify these forms of dependence, and it explores the contrast between the axiological and attachment-based approaches.


Author(s):  
Mark Jago

What should we say about the ‘difficult’ cases of truthmaking, involving general and negative existential truths, modal truths, counterfactual truths, analytic truths, and temporal truths? The toughest cases are the general and negative existential truths. I’ll argue that we can’t account for them without introducing new bits of ontology (§5.2 and §5.3). Armstrong’s totality states of affairs are not the best option (§5.4). Negative states of affairs are a better bet (§5.5), although their metaphysical analysis is difficult (§5.6). I’ll discuss the remaining cases – modal truths, counterfactual truths, analytic truths, and temporal truths – in §5.7.


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