scholarly journals Beyond IIT: (how) can we model the evolution of consciousness?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adrian Kent

Tononi et al.'s "integrated information theory" (IIT) postulates rules for assigning measures Phi and qualia types Q of consciousness to classical information networks. We consider whether IIT is compatible with Darwinian evolution. We argue that an IIT-like theory that assigns consciousness to physical systems by relatively simple mathematical rules poses extraordinary ?ne-tuning problems.For example, why, among all possible lawlike theories of consciousness, do we have one that makes us conscious of a high-level narrative of our environment and actions, so accurate that it appears to us to cause our behaviour?We introduce IIT+, a class of extensions of IIT in which Phi and/or Q influence the network dynamics. We argue that IIT+-like theories, unlike IIT-like theories, offer at least partial explanations of how some key features of consciousness evolved. We conclude that if one takes seriously Darwinian evolution and the case for an IIT-like theory, one has to take seriously the case for an IIT+-like theory.

Author(s):  
Susan Schneider

How can we determine if AI is conscious? The chapter begins by illustrating that there are potentially very serious real-world costs to getting facts about AI consciousness wrong. It then proposes a provisional framework for investigating artificial consciousness that involves several tests or markers. One test is the AI Consciousness Test, which challenges an AI with a series of increasingly demanding natural-language interactions. Another test is based on the Integrated Information Theory, developed by Giulio Tononi and others, and considers whether a machine has a high level of “integrated information.” A third test is a Chip Test, where speculatively an individual’s brain is gradually replaced with durable microchips. If this individual being tested continues to report having phenomenal consciousness, the chapter argues that this could be a reason to believe that some machines could have consciousness.


Entropy ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 405 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kyumin Moon

Integrated information theory (IIT) asserts that both the level and the quality of consciousness can be explained by the ability of physical systems to integrate information. Although the scientific content and empirical prospects of IIT have attracted interest, this paper focuses on another aspect of IIT, its unique theoretical structure, which relates the phenomenological axioms with the ontological postulates. In particular, the relationship between the exclusion axiom and the exclusion postulate is unclear. Moreover, the exclusion postulate leads to a serious problem in IIT: the quale underdetermination problem. Therefore, in this paper, I will explore answers to the following three questions: (1) how does the exclusion axiom lead to the exclusion postulate? (2) How does the exclusion postulate cause the qualia underdetermination problem? (3) Is there a solution to this problem? I will provide proposals and arguments for each question. If successful, IIT can be confirmed with respect to, not only its theoretical foundation, but also its practical application.


2021 ◽  
Vol 28 (11) ◽  
pp. 31-53
Author(s):  
James C. Blackmon

Integrated information theory (IIT) identifies consciousness with having a maximum amount of integrated information. But a thing's having the maximum amount of anything cannot be intrinsic to it, for that depends on how that thing compares to certain other things. IIT's consciousness, then, is not intrinsic. A mereological argument elaborates this consequence: IIT implies that one physical system can be conscious while a physical duplicate of it is not conscious. Thus, by a common and reasonable conception of intrinsicality, IIT's consciousness is not intrinsic. It is then argued that to avoid the implication that consciousness is not intrinsic, IIT must abandon its exclusion postulate, which prohibits overlapping conscious systems. Indeed, theories of consciousness that attribute consciousness to physical systems should embrace the view that some conscious systems overlap. A discussion of the admittedly counterintuitive nature of this solution, along with some medical and neuroscientific realities that would seem to support it, is included.


Author(s):  
Francis Fallon

This chapter aims to evaluate Integrated Information Theory's claims concerning Artificial Consciousness. Integrated Information Theory (IIT) works from premises that claim that certain properties, such as unity, are essential to consciousness, to conclusions regarding the constraints upon physical systems that could realize consciousness. Among these conclusions is the claim that feed-forward systems, and systems that are not largely reentrant, necessarily will fail to generate consciousness (but may simulate it). This chapter will discuss the premises of IIT, which themselves are highly controversial, and will also address IIT's related rejection of functionalism. This analysis will argue that IIT has failed to established good grounds for these positions, and that convincing alternatives remain available. This, in turn, implies that the constraints upon Artificial Consciousness are more generous than IIT would have them be.


2021 ◽  
Vol 28 (9) ◽  
pp. 65-75
Author(s):  
C. koch

Panpsychism shares many intuitions with integrated information theory (IIT), in particular that consciousness is an intrinsic fundamental property of reality, is graded, and can be found in small amounts in simple physical systems. Unlike panpsychism, however, IIT clearly articulates which systems are conscious and which ones are not (resolving panpsychism's combination problem) and why consciousness can be adaptive. The systemic weakness of panpsychism, or any other -ism, is that they fail to offer a protracted conceptual, let alone empirical, research programme that yields novel insights or proposes new experiments. Without those, progress on the mindâ–“body problem will not occur.


Entropy ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (8) ◽  
pp. 1032
Author(s):  
James E. Cooke

Any successful naturalistic account of consciousness must state what consciousness is, in terms that are compatible with the rest of our naturalistic descriptions of the world. Integrated Information Theory represents a pioneering attempt to do just this. This theory accounts for the core features of consciousness by holding that there is an equivalence between the phenomenal experience associated with a system and its intrinsic causal power. The proposal, however, fails to provide insight into the qualitative character of consciousness and, as a result of its proposed equivalence between consciousness and purely internal dynamics, into the intentional character of conscious perception. In recent years, an alternate group of theories has been proposed that claims consciousness to be equivalent to certain forms of inference. One such theory is the Living Mirror theory, which holds consciousness to be a form of inference performed by all living systems. The proposal of consciousness as inference overcomes the shortcomings of Integrated Information Theory, particularly in the case of conscious perception. A synthesis of these two perspectives can be reached by appreciating that conscious living systems are self-organising in nature. This mode of organization requires them to have a high level of integration. From this perspective, we can understand consciousness as being dependent on a system possessing non-trivial amounts of integrated information while holding that the process of inference performed by the system is the fact of consciousness itself.


PROTOPLASMA ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony Trewavas

AbstractLacking an anatomical brain/nervous system, it is assumed plants are not conscious. The biological function of consciousness is an input to behaviour; it is adaptive (subject to selection) and based on information. Complex language makes human consciousness unique. Consciousness is equated to awareness. All organisms are aware of their surroundings, modifying their behaviour to improve survival. Awareness requires assessment too. The mechanisms of animal assessment are neural while molecular and electrical in plants. Awareness of plants being also consciousness may resolve controversy. The integrated information theory (IIT), a leading theory of consciousness, is also blind to brains, nerves and synapses. The integrated information theory indicates plant awareness involves information of two kinds: (1) communicative, extrinsic information as a result of the perception of environmental changes and (2) integrated intrinsic information located in the shoot and root meristems and possibly cambium. The combination of information constructs an information nexus in the meristems leading to assessment and behaviour. The interpretation of integrated information in meristems probably involves the complex networks built around [Ca2+]i that also enable plant learning, memory and intelligent activities. A mature plant contains a large number of conjoined, conscious or aware, meristems possibly unique in the living kingdom.


2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 189-210 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nelson H. Carreras Guzman ◽  
Morten Wied ◽  
Igor Kozine ◽  
Mary Ann Lundteigen

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