scholarly journals Religiosity differently influences moral attitude for robots in the US and Japan

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shogo Ikari ◽  
Kosuke Sato ◽  
Emily Burdett ◽  
Hiroshi Ishiguro ◽  
Jonathan Jong ◽  
...  

Researchers have speculated that religious traditions influence an individual's moral attitude and care toward robots. They propose that differences in moral care could be explained by values motivated by religion, anthropocentrism and animism. Here, we empirically examined how moral care for robots is influenced by religious belief and attendance with US and Japanese samples, cultures that are Abrahamic and Shinto-Buddhist traditions respectively (N = 3781). Moral care was higher in Japan and participants with higher religious beliefs had less moral care for robots only in the US. Further, participants who scored low on anthropocentrism and high on animism were more likely to attribute moral care for robots. Anthropocentrism in the US and Animism in Japan had a larger effect compared to the other country. The finding demonstrates how religion could influence moral attitudes for robots, and might suggest the realm of moral consideration could be shaped by cultural traditions.

2021 ◽  
pp. 191-216
Author(s):  
Christian Smith ◽  
Amy Adamczyk

Church leaders, youth ministers, and volunteers are likely curious about the extent to which parents find congregations useful in transmitting religious beliefs and behaviors. This chapter explores how parents use religious congregations to transmit religious belief. The chapter discusses why parents tend to feel that they, rather than their congregations, are primarily responsible for passing on religious faith. Many parents select their congregations for fairly practical reasons, they have a lot of confidence in their own understanding of religion, and they want to be involved in all aspects of their child’s life, including religious development. This chapter also unpacks what parents see as the most valuable contributions that congregations provide for their children. These include the congregation’s role in providing religious education, making religion fun for their children, and transmitting cultural traditions.


2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Kathinka Frøystad

This article throws the study of multireligious sociality in Western contexts into sharp relief by examining the case of India. Much of the current scholarship of cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism tends to assume that religious beliefs, practices and spaces make the respective religious communities close entirely in upon themselves. While this assumption may hold true for most of the Western settings we study, it does not necessarily give an accurate description of the conditions for multireligious sociality in other parts of the world. In India, for instance, religious boundaries still display signs of malleability despite the religious politicization and occasional interreligious violence of the past decades. Drawing on recent anthropological research, this article shows that people of different religious denominations still visit Sufi shrines, that Hindus still incorporate ritual elements and divine beings from the religious traditions of their Others and that they exercise a wide personal choice in terms of spiritual activities, thus enabling spiritual paths that cross in and out of Hinduism. In a Hindu context rituals do not necessarily have an insulating effect; they may also provide points of intersection that open up toward the Other, thus fostering familiarity and recognition. Similar arguments have been made for Buddhist settings. The question is thus whether the current scholarship of cosmopolitanism may entail a certain monotheistic bias that needs to accounted for, something that is of particular importance when theorizing in ways that make universal claims.


2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 319-340 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Letsas

Abstract Liberal debates on religious accommodation have so far focused on the nature of the interest upon which the right to freedom of religion is based. Liberals who oppose religious accommodation argue that there is nothing special about religious belief. Those who defend accommodation on the other hand seek to identify some property (such as conscience or deep commitments) that both religious and non-religious beliefs can share. The article seeks to develop an argument in favor of certain types of religious accommodation that is agnostic about the nature of religious belief and whether it is special in any sense. It argues that it is a mistake to think that the question of religious accommodation, as it arises in law, must necessarily turn on arguments about freedom of religion. The principle of fairness can justify legal duties to accommodate religious (and non-religious) practices, without the need to assess the character of the practice in question or the reasons for engaging in it. The article argues further that the principle of fairness can better explain why human rights courts uphold some claims for religious accommodation as reasonable, and not others.


Horizons ◽  
1992 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 84-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Terrence W. Tilley

AbstractThis essay argues that the reformed epistemologists (William Alston, Alvin Plantinga) have not (yet) sustained claims in religious epistemology significantly more extensive than William James did in the Varieties. It argues that even if reformed epistemologists show that religious belief can have a positive epistemic status, their approach may finally lead to relativism (given that religious traditions generate contradictory religious beliefs) because it offers no method for finding which, if any, concrete religious beliefs might be preferable to hold or in which religious practices one should engage, if any, and because it fails to distinguish between original and derived religious belief. I suggest that more attention must be paid to “social epistemology” if religious epistemology is to go significantly beyond James's accomplishments.


Author(s):  
KVVS Satyanarayana Satyanarayana

When two or more religious belief systems are combined into a new system, this is known as religious syncretism. It may also be defined as the incorporation of beliefs from unconnected traditions into a religious tradition. Polytheism and numerous religious affiliations, on the other hand, are seen as diametrically opposed to one another. These situations can arise for a variety of reasons, with the latter scenario occurring quite frequently in areas where multiple religious traditions coexist in close proximity to one another and are actively practised in the culture. It can also occur when a culture is conquered, with the conquerors bringing their religious beliefs with them but not succeeding in completely eradicating the old beliefs, and especially the old practises. Faiths' beliefs or histories may have syncretic components, however members of these so-labeled systems sometimes object to the label's use, particularly those who belong to "revealed" religious systems, such as Abrahamic religions, or any system that takes an exclusivist stance. Syncretism is viewed as a betrayal of the pure truth by some supporters of such beliefs. According to this logic, introducing a belief that is incompatible with the original religion corrupts it and renders it untrue altogether. Indeed, detractors of a certain syncretistic trend may occasionally use the term "syncretism" as a derogatory pejorative, meaning that individuals who attempt to adopt a new idea, belief, or practise into a religious system are really distorting the original faith by doing so. A fatal compromise of the integrity of the prevailing religion is, according to Keith Ferdinando, as a result of this development. Religions that are not exclusivist, on the other hand, are likely to feel free to absorb other traditions into their own systems of thought. Many traditional beliefs in East Asian civilizations have become entwined with Buddhism due to the assumption that Buddhism is compatible with local religions. The Three Teachings, or Triple Religion, which harmonizes Mahayana Buddhism with Confucian philosophy and elements of Taoism, and Shinbutsu-shg, which is a syncretism of Shinto and Buddhism, are two examples of notable concretizations of Buddhism with local beliefs. The Three Teachings, or Triple Religion, harmonizes Mahayana Buddhism with Confucian philosophy and elements of Taoism, and Shinbutsu-shg, which East Asian religious beliefs, practises, and identities (who, by any measure, constitute the majority of the world's Buddhists) frequently incorporate elements of other religious traditions, such as Confucianism, Chinese folk religion.


2019 ◽  
pp. 444-468
Author(s):  
Alf Ross

This chapter discusses the legitimate role played by the sense of justice in scientific legal politics. It begins by introducing a distinction between ‘interests’ (attitudes based upon needs) and ‘moral attitudes’ as a contrasting pair. The standpoint based on interest is always conditioned by certain beliefs, and is thus the subject of justification in a rational argumentation. The moral attitude (the moral sense), on the other hand, is a direct and unconditioned attitude towards a norm of action or a social order. It is irrational in the sense that it is a direct expression of an emotion and inaccessible to justification and argumentation. These considerations concerning interest and moral attitude apply mutatis mutandis to policy considerations and the sense of justice as factors in scientific legal politics. Policy considerations express the evaluation of legal rules on the basis of rational arguments concerning the rules’ actual relevance in relation to presupposed interests. The sense of justice, on the other hand, is a disinterested and inculcated, immediate attitude of approval or disapproval towards a legal norm of action directed toward the social order.


Africa ◽  
1965 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 295-306 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. J. Ruel

Opening ParagraphThis paper attempts to answer two broad questions. Firstly, what is Kuria religion about? and secondly, what is the relationship between Kuria religious concepts and their social life and what is the place of ritual in this relationship? Neither of these are questions which Kuria would themselves ask—certainly in this form—but they are perhaps the two leading questions which an anthropologist must ask in examining the religious beliefs and ritual practice of another people. Much depends upon the answer to the first, for it is in terms of the answer that one is likely to establish the particular coherence of ‘integrity’ of a people's beliefs, held existentially in the context of their own social life. The answer is relevant too to an issue which has concerned those writing on related peoples of the same area as the Kuria—the problem of the relation between magic and religious beliefs. Thus Wagner, writing on the Bantu Kavirondo, uses the undifferentiated category of ‘magico-religious’ belief. But what exactly is meant by this umbrella term, and does it not itself obfuscate what it seeks to define? The second question considered—the relationship between Kuria religious concepts and their social life—is a continuation of the first in relation to their very elaborate and, in one sense, autonomous system of ritual based in particular on a complex sequence of rites of passage. These rites are a very striking feature of Kuria culture. It is, I think, by considering them in this double context—as expressing religious values on the one hand while controlling social behaviour on the other—that these rites are most fully understood.


Open Mind ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Neil Van Leeuwen ◽  
Kara Weisman ◽  
Tanya Marie Luhrmann

Abstract Are religious beliefs psychologically different from matter-of-fact beliefs? Many scholars say no: that religious people, in a matter-of-fact way, simply think their deities exist. Others say yes: that religious beliefs are more compartmentalized, less certain, and less responsive to evidence. Little research to date has explored whether lay people themselves recognize such a difference. We addressed this question in a series of sentence completion tasks, conducted in five settings that differed both in religious traditions and in language: the United States, Ghana, Thailand, China, and Vanuatu. Participants everywhere routinely used different verbs to describe religious versus matter-of-fact beliefs, and they did so even when the ascribed belief contents were held constant and only the surrounding context varied. These findings support the view that people from diverse cultures and language communities recognize a difference in attitude type between religious belief and everyday matter-of-fact belief.


2003 ◽  
Vol 18 ◽  
pp. 131-138
Author(s):  
Maria Leppäkari

The vast majority of sacred shrines and holy sites host pilgrims united by strong degrees of cultural homogeneity. But Jerusalem differs on this point- it draws pilgrims from a vast multitude of nations and cultural traditions since the city is considered holy by three major religious traditions: Judaism, Christianity and Islam. The representatives of these traditions go partly to different places at different times where they are engaged in different forms of worship. Often these visits are marked by clashes at the holy places. The notion of Jerusalem in religious belief is constructed by the transmission of various representations concerned with the image of the city. For Western Christianity today, Jerusalem is not only important because of the things which Jesus of Nazareth, according to the tradition, did there. For many Christians Jerusalem is vitally important because of the apocalyptic promise Jesus left his followers with: I'll be back! Therefore, the position of Jerusalem in the religious end-time play is crucial, since apocalyptic representations of the New Jerusalem motivate contemporary believers to make a pilgrimage to Jerusalem, and to partake actively in political disputes about the Israeli—Palestinian conflict.


Author(s):  
Kevin Vallier ◽  
Michael Weber

This chapter articulates and defends a “partially subjectivist” way of defining burdens on religious belief under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). On this view, courts should largely defer to plaintiffs as to what is a burden on their religious belief. There is only a minor requirement that the plaintiffs have to satisfy, which is to show that the government is doing something that pressures them to act in a way contrary to their beliefs—a relatively easy hurdle to clear. In general, courts are ill-equipped to determine what people’s religious beliefs really are, and this extends to determining when those beliefs are substantially burdened. More strongly, there is a tradition that says evaluating when people’s religious beliefs are burdened is really none of the court’s business. The partially subjectivist view honors these principles.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document