scholarly journals Appointments: A More Effective Commitment Device for Health Behaviors

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Derksen ◽  
Jason Theodore Kerwin ◽  
Natalia Ordaz Reynoso ◽  
Olivier Sterck

Health behaviors are plagued by self-control problems, and commitment devices are frequently proposed as a solution. We show that a simple alternative works even better: appointments. We randomly offer HIV testing appointments and financial commitment devices to high-risk men in Malawi. Appointments are much more effective than financial commitment devices, more than doubling testing rates. In contrast, most men who take up financial commitment devices lose their investments. Appointments address procrastination without the potential drawback of commitment failure, and also address limited memory problems. Appointments have the potential to increase demand for healthcare in the developing world.

2014 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-35
Author(s):  
Michael Möcker

Commitment devices are regularly celebrated as an easy-to-use, budget way to dodge self-control problems. Analysis of a Bénabou and Tirole-style signaling game (2004) casts doubts on this view. Adding a commitment device to the standard model reveals difficulties: An agent relying on a commitment device to restrain his future self is less restrained in the present. Committing to do an unpleasant activity in the future leads to procrastination as the signaling effect of doing it now disappears. Therefore some agents may be better off without access to commitment devices. Policy implications are discussed.


2018 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 234-244 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tao Guo ◽  
Michael Finke

Many who want to save more for retirement are tripped up by short-run temptations. Yet, some can still achieve their goals by using commitment devices to limit suboptimal behavior. Defined contribution plans in the United States resemble a commitment device because they are framed as savings for the future and penalize early withdrawals. This study investigates whether defined contribution plans are particularly useful for households that value the future and exhibit self-control problems. We find that participation in defined contribution plans has a greater impact on wealth accumulation among households with hyperbolic preferences. Our results suggest that those who find it difficult to resist short-run temptation can achieve long-run goals through the use of less liquid accounts and automated savings.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-55
Author(s):  
Liang Bai ◽  
Benjamin Handel ◽  
Edward Miguel ◽  
Gautam Rao

Self-control problems constitute a potential explanation for the under-investment in preventive health in low-income countries. Behavioral economics offers a tool to solve such problems: commitment devices. We conduct a field experiment to evaluate the effectiveness of different types of theoretically-motivated commitment contracts in increasing preventive doctor visits by hypertensive patients in rural India. Despite achieving high take-up of such contracts in some treatment arms, we find no effects on actual doctor visits or individual health outcomes. A substantial number of individuals pay for commitment but fail to follow through on the doctor visit, losing money without experiencing health benefits. We develop and structurally estimate a pre-specified model of consumer behavior under present bias with varying levels of naivete. The results are consistent with a large share of individuals being partially naive about their own self-control problems: sophisticated enough to demand some commitment, but overly optimistic about whether a given level of commitment is sufficiently strong to be effective. The results suggest that commitment devices may in practice be welfare diminishing, at least in some contexts, and serve as a cautionary tale about their role in health care.


2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin M. King ◽  
Charles B. Fleming ◽  
Kathryn C. Monahan ◽  
Richard F. Catalano

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manu Manthri Savani

This article tests the effectiveness of commitment devices on weight loss. It can be applied as a health ‘nudge' that locks in future behaviours to achieve a desired health outcome, by staking money or reputation on achieving that goal. A field experiment randomly assigned 364 clients of an online weight loss service to either a reputational commitment device or an upfront refund on the monthly fee. The reputational commitment intervention was expected to combat time inconsistency and promote greater weight loss. Weight outcomes were measured at 12 weeks. The results showed that all experimental groups lost weight on average, but the group experiencing the reputational commitment reported end weight outcomes 1.5 kg higher than the comparison group, indicating slower weight loss (± 0.05, effect size -0.32). One possible explanation for the findings is ‘commitment overload'. The study nuances the understanding of commitment devices and how best to deploy them in health programmes including e-heath platforms.


1997 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
pp. 4-4
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Goodman ◽  
Michelle Burns ◽  
Cathryn L. Samples ◽  
Peter M. Keenan ◽  
Durrell J. Fox ◽  
...  

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document